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I arrived at the University of Minnesota in 2012 as a graduate student in Ecology, 
Evolution and Behavior. Since that time, I have been fortunate to count a large number of 
people as mentors, confidants, constructive critics and commiserators. Emilie Snell-Rood 
deserves special mention here. Were it not for her constant encouragement and 
willingness to indulge a restless graduate student, I would not be where I am today. I am 
also immensely grateful to my friends from the EEB graduate program, including 
Katherine Liu, Jessie Tanner, James Tumulty, Jake Grossman, Daniel Drabeck, Maria 
Rebolleda-Gómes, Sarah Jaumann, Meredith Steck, Lisa O’Bryan and Gabi Huelgas-
Morales (MCB). I realize as I write this that I am the last of us to receive my degree. But 
if I have been reluctant to leave the University of Minnesota, it is partly owing to the 
many friendships that have made this such a special place. Thanks as well to Ruth Shaw, 
Mike Travisano, Mark Borrello and Daniel Stanton for your consistent encouragement 
and stimulus over the years. 
 
Two years into my graduate program I decided to change tracks and pursue a Ph.D. in 
philosophy. I did this, in large part, because I met Alan Love. Alan was like no 
philosopher I had ever encountered. I remember an early interaction in which he used the 
words “Ecdysozoa” and “Lophotrochozoa” to make a philosophical point. I didn’t know 
much about philosophy of science at the time, but I knew I wanted to spend more time 
around Alan. This, in hindsight, was one of the best ideas I ever had. Alan has been an 
incredible mentor during my time in the philosophy department, and has opened more 




I am also fortunate to have a wonderful dissertation committee. Bennett McNulty is a 
model of the philosopher I aspire to be: an excellent teacher, sharp thinker and, not least, 
genuinely good person. Jos Uffink is perhaps the most talented philosophical “sight-
reader” I have ever encountered. Scott Lidgard is a careful scholar and a deeply 
thoughtful scientist, and I have benefitted greatly from his feedback on this project. 
Finally, David Sepkoski is a fantastic historian (and a better philosopher than he realizes), 
whose knowledge and perspective have enriched many aspects of this work. Several non-
committee members rendered crucial feedback on particular chapters, including Douglas 
Erwin, Steven Holland, Adrian Currie and Marco Tamborini. I will not soon forget their 
prompt and insightful comments, to say nothing of their willingness to engage with a 
neophyte scholar at a different university. Thank you all. 
 
Successful dissertation projects require camaraderie. This I have enjoyed in bundles in 
my home department. I am particularly fortunate that Yoshinari Yoshida chose to do his 
Ph.D. in Minnesota during my second year. Without Yoshi’s bottomless curiosity and 
keen intellect, this dissertation would doubtless look very different. I have also benefitted 
from the friendship and support of Michael Calasso, Tucker Marks, Grace Cebrero, Chris 
Nagel, Codi Stevens, Nathan Lackey, Lauren Wilson, Aaron Vesey, Justin Ivory and Sara 
Parhizgari. I’ve learned things from each of them, and their presence in the department 
made it a pleasure to go to work each day (back when we did that sort of thing). Two 
amazing postdocs have enriched my time in the department, Janella Baxter and Amanda 
Corris. Likewise, I owe a debt of gratitude to former graduate students Will Bausman, 
Jack Powers and Melanie Bowman. Thanks for showing me the ropes, and for modeling 
what a successful graduate student looks like. Historians Felipe Eguiarte Souza and Kele 
Cable were always ready to indulge my historical interests. Kate Krieg, from the 
Department of English, has been a friend and kindred spirit for nearly ten years. To all of 
you: thanks for making this period of life such a rewarding one. I will always look back 
on it fondly. 
 
During my time in the Department of Philosophy I have had a number of wonderful 
professors, including Valerie Tiberius, Jessica Gordon-Roth, David Taylor, Samuel 
Fletcher, Peter Hanks, Roy Cook, Naomi Scheman and Bill Wimsatt. Thank you for the 
time and care you put into teaching, and for your consistent striving to make the 
department a better place. Thank you as well to the incredible Anita Wallace, Judy 
Grandbois, Janet McKernan and Pam Groscost. You’ve all done so much to help me 
navigate graduate school, and I can’t imagine my time at Minnesota without you. 
 
Looking back, this all began at Saint Olaf College. To Charles Taliaferro: thank you for 
introducing me to philosophy and for providing the most stimulating classroom 
experience of my life. You continue to inspire me to this day. To Kevin Crisp: thank you 
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for mentoring me during the final year of my undergraduate degree. You may not have 
known how much your guidance meant to me, but it meant a lot. And to Erik St. Louis: 
thank you for your support and your example. I still think of it often. 
 
A few final words of thanks. Thanks to my students for making my time in the classroom 
the most enjoyable part of my day. Thanks to the members of “BIG” (the Biological 
Interest Group) for getting me hooked on philosophy of science. Thanks to the “Love 
Lab” for reading nearly every chapter of this dissertation, and for rendering thoughtful 
feedback. Thanks to Douglas Lewis, whose publication fellowship provided generous 
financial support for my work over the years. Thanks to Michel Jansen for an enjoyable 
seminar and some welcome words of encouragement. Thanks to everyone involved in the 
Basel and Banff Summer Institutes (“From Biological Practice to Scientific 
Metaphysics”); I feel fortunate to have participated in such unique workshops. Thanks to 
my friends Devin Gouvéa and Kelle Dhein for providing friendship and community 
during our shared ABD period. And thanks to everyone involved in my all-time favorite 
conference/workshop, “Perspectives on Stephen Jay Gould,” held at Woods Hole in 
2015. Along with launching me on the project that would yield my first three 
publications, this really convinced me that history and philosophy of science is where I 
belong. 
 
My parents are the foundation of anything I may accomplish in life. Thanks mom and 
dad. There are few substitutes for the love, support and at-times unwarranted confidence 
of excellent and committed parents. You have my permission to stop reading this 
dissertation now. 
 
And lastly, thank you Emily for everything that you are. I love you immensely, and I’m 



































In his great work on fossil bones (1812), Georges Cuvier compared our ignorance of 
geohistory to our conceptual mastery of the heavens. Several centuries of research had 
“burst the limits of space” and drawn back the curtain on the hidden mechanism of the 
universe. Yet deep time remained obscure, shielded from inquiring eyes by the 
inconvenient fact that the past no longer exists. To “burst the limits of time,” scientists 
needed to overcome this barrier—needed, in other words, to extend their epistemic reach 
into the deepest stretches of geohistory. 
This dissertation is framed by this grand epistemological challenge. How do scientists 
“burst the limits of time” in order to unravel the complicated thread of time, life and 
environment? Cuvier was among the first people to show how the vanished contents of 
deep time might be reconstructed from surviving material evidence. Yet his achievement 
did not solve the epistemological problem once and for all. Over the past two hundred 
years, scientists have burst the limits of time again and again—new barriers, new 
ruptures. It is this process that interests me. I am particularly interested in how scientists 
from multiple disciplines pool their conceptual and material resources to reconstruct 
different aspects of complex historical events. In addition, I am interested in the strategies 
researchers have developed to probe the interactions between living things and their 
environments on a range of spatial and temporal scales. 
The dissertation is organized into five chapters of unequal length. After a brief Preface, 
Chapter 1 situates the project in three overlapping bodies of literature. These are: (1) 
philosophical studies of the “historical sciences,” (2) philosophical discussions of 
paleontology, and (3) philosophical discussions of scientific practice associated with the 
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“practice-turn.” This exercise enables me to articulate my aims for the project, and (no 
less important) to say what this dissertation is not about. 
The remainder of the chapters concern historical and philosophical topics in the sciences 
of geohistory. Chapter 2 examines a “start-up problem” in nineteenth century geology: 
how were fossils turned into a reliable yardstick for measuring geological time? I argue 
that in order to use fossils to measure time, geologists had to overcome a “problem of 
nomic measurement” (so named by Hasok Chang). Moreover, and contrary to 
philosophical expectations, they did not do this by formulating a theoretical explanation 
of the operative phenomena. Instead they pursued a more piecemeal strategy guided by 
practices of heuristic appraisal—something I suggest is typical of justification in start-up 
situations. 
In Chapter 3, I turn to the subject of explanation, and explore why explanations of 
complex historical events tend to grow more complicated over time. Using inquiry into 
earth’s largest mass extinction as an illustration, I argue that the main driver of 
explanation in geohistory is “non-explanatory work”: work that may be relevant to the 
evaluation of explanatory hypotheses, but that is not undertaken in the interest of testing 
an explanatory claim. This “drives” explanation by bringing new features of historical 
phenomena into focus—and this in turn creates new demands (adequacy conditions) on 
explanations, prompting investigators to develop more complex explanatory models. 
In Chapter 4, I explore the concept of “uniformitarianism”: perhaps the most contentious 
term in the geological literature. Since this is a polyvalent term, many commentators have 
assumed that its controversial status arises from a sort of semantic chaos, which sows 
confusion among otherwise competent language users. However, I argue that debates 
about uniformitarianism in geology do not arise from a mere babel of meanings. Instead, 
they arise from legitimate disagreements about substantive questions, for example, “Is 
uniformitarianism necessary?” and “When is it appropriate to offer non-uniformitarian 
explanations of past events?” This chapter examines these questions, and relates them to 
several “forms of understanding” pursued by researchers in geohistory. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I explore the emergence of a new approach to stratigraphic 
complexity, first in stratigraphy, and then, following its creative appropriation, in 
paleobiology. The approach is based on pioneering models of sedimentary basin filling, 
and has come to be associated with an approach known as “stratigraphic paleobiology.” 
This chapter traces the emergence of stratigraphic paleobiology and explores how it 
reconfigured the cultural landscape of paleobiology following the Paleobiological 
Revolution. It also considers how the new stratigraphy is shaping paleontological 
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1.  A Little History of Historical Reconstruction 
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, Georges Cuvier’s scientific star 
was on the rise. The reason was his flair for resurrection; for draping old bones in living 
fabric, and even divining the life habits of prehistoric beasts (Rudwick 2005). “Is not 
Cuvier the great poet of our era,” Balzac asked in his philosophical novel, La peau de 
chagrin: 
 
Byron has given admirable expression to certain moral conflicts, but our immortal 
naturalist has reconstructed past worlds from a few bleached bones; has rebuilt cities, 
like Cadmus, with monsters’ teeth; has animated forests with all the secrets of 
zoology gleaned from a piece of coal; has discovered a giant population from the 
footprints of a mammoth. These forms stand erect, grow tall, and fill regions 




Cuvier didn’t do half these things, of course. Yet his research on fossil bones was still a 
revelation (Dawson 2016). In a series of publications, Cuvier reconstructed complete 
skeletons for a range of extinct creatures, and proceeded to divine further things, like 
their external appearance and likely habits (Rudwick 1992). In all this, comparative 
anatomy held the key, and in particular, the notion of correlation. The idea was that only 
some combinations of characters are functionally viable—so animals with sharp teeth 
must also have stomachs capable of digesting meat, as well as other parts fitted to 
catching and subduing prey.1 Because of this, one can begin with a tooth or partial 
skeleton, and by tracing out a string of interdependencies, arrive at an understanding of 
the organism as a whole: 2 
 
He can call up nothingness before you without the phrases of a charlatan. He searches 
a lump of gypsum, finds an impression in it, says to you, “Behold!” All at once 
marble takes an animal shape, the dead come to life, the history of the world is laid 
open before you. (Balzac 1901, 21) 
 
Cuvier’s reconstructions were especially important for the nascent venture of 
geohistory: the project of reconstructing the history of the planet. The reason is that they 
showed the possibilities that lay dormant in the ruins of the past, should the naturalist 
approach them in the right frame of mind. Just as past scientists had “burst the limits of 
 
1 The alternative was non-viability; an animal whose parts were not so finely adjusted 
could not fulfil its conditions of existence, and hence could not exist. 
2 Cuvier never claimed to be able to reconstruct an entire animal from a fragment of bone 
(as later historical mythmaking has claimed). He simply claimed that the principles of 
comparative anatomy enable one to “determine the class, and sometimes even the genus 
of the animal to which it belonged, above all if the bone belonged to the head or the 
limbs” (Rudwick 1997, 36). 
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space,” so Cuvier would “burst the limits of time,” enabling an unprecedented look at the 
planet’s deep history (Rudwick 2005). His accomplishment was to penetrate the mists of 
time to reveal the succession of increasingly alien worlds that had preceded our own. 
Each bizarre creature he raised from the dust inspired more confidence in this program, 









Figure 1  Georges Cuvier’s reconstruction of the giant ground sloth Megatherium, from 




Although Cuvier’s popular acclaim rested on his seemingly miraculous 
resurrections, no less significant was his geological study of the Paris Basin, conducted in 
collaboration with the mineralogist Alexandre Brongniart. It had earlier been conjectured 
that Paris rested at the center of a shallow bowl formed by the distinctive Chalk 
formation, which could be observed in outcrops around Paris but not in the city itself 
(Rudwick 2014, 130).3 Utilizing surface exposures, as well as underground quarries and 
boreholes, Cuvier and Brongniart were able to confirm this hypothesis. In addition, they 
pieced together the order of formations overlying the Chalk—a succession of sandstones, 
clays, limestones and gypsum (the burial place of many of Cuvier’s resurrected 
creatures). Crowing their achievement was a colored map depicting the locations of the 
major formations surrounding Paris from a bird’s eye perspective. This was not the first 
map of its kind, but at least before the publication of William Smith’s great map in 1815, 
it was the most influential specimen of this increasingly important genre (Rudwick 2005). 
More innovative than the map, however, was the accompanying “general and 
ideal section,” which pictured the pile of formations in cross-section, as if the Parisian 
countryside had been excavated to reveal a cliff face (Figure 2). The section was 
“general” because it depicted the complete succession of formations at one location. It 
was “ideal” because the location was imaginary—no actual outcrop revealed the pile of 
formations in perfect order. For ease of interpretation, the section was pictured free of 
post-depositional disturbance, with all its layers restored to their original, more-or-less 
horizontal positions. Ultimately, it served two functions. First, it neatly summarized a  
 
3 The person responsible for this hypothesis was none other than Antoine Lavoisier, 
revolutionizer of chemistry and ill-fated “[Tax] Farmer General,” who was guillotined in 
1794 on trumped-up charges of defrauding the state (Gould 1989a). 
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Figure 2  Georges Cuvier and Alexandre Brongniart’s “general and ideal section” for the 
Paris Basin, first published in 1811. 
 
great deal of information; at a glance, researchers could gain an appreciation for the order 
and thickness of formations that may be poorly developed or even absent at particular 
locations. Second, it enabled geologists to see into the earth, and when used in 
conjunction with the bird’s eye map, to translate two dimensions into three across the 
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whole of the Paris basin (Rudwick 1976; Frodeman 2003). These were considerable 
accomplishments, and much of early nineteenth century geology was given over to their 
elaboration and extension (Laudan 1987; Rudwick 2008). 
Geological sections remain an important part of geology’s “visual language,” and 
Cuvier and Brongniart’s study would have been important if it had done no more than 
furnish a template for how similar diagrams could be constructed for other locations 
(Rudwick 1976; Rupke 1998). But in fact it did a good deal more than this. In Rudwick’s 
words, “[the] detailed analysis of the Paris Basin...became the most influential example 
of how the static three-dimensional structures described by [structural geologists] could 
be transformed into a dynamic history of a specific part of the Earth” (Rudwick 2014, 
132). The key, in this case, was fossils. In the course of their inquiry, Cuvier and 
Brongniart noticed that different parts of the pile contained different suites of distinctive 
fossils. This was important for two reasons. First, it helped with the task of stratigraphic 
correlation—with the identification of the same package of rock in different geographical 
locations.4 Second, and more important, it provided a means of inferring how 
environmental conditions had changed during the interval in which the rocks had been 
deposited. Cuvier and Brongniart observed, for example, that the distinctive Coarse 
Limestone contained fossils easily recognizable as members of well-known marine 
genera. This suggested that the area around Paris was once inundated with seawater, 
enabling its colonization by organisms adapted to saltwater conditions. Higher in the pile 
they found fossils resembling modern freshwater mollusks, suggesting that, at other 
 
4 Stratigraphic correlation is the way geologists establish relative age relations among 
rock formations (see Chapter 2). 
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times, the Paris Basin had been a lagoon or a large lake. And then, higher up, marine 
fossils again. Evidently, marine and freshwater conditions had passed the baton several 
times over the history of the basin, with drastic (and devastating) results for the resident 
fauna.5 
As noted, Cuvier and Brongniart’s study had a massive influence on their 
contemporaries, providing “a fruitful model for further research across Europe on what 
soon became known as Tertiary formations” (Rudwick 2005, 557). For the remainder of 
the century, stratigraphy was to be the staple scientific work of most geologists, and 
stratigraphic correlation their central problem (see Chapter 2). A typical publication from 
this period consisted in “a detailed description of the formations (and their fossils, if any) 
in some specific area. This was usually illustrated with a geological map and often also 
by sections showing the pile in profile”—just the technologies Cuvier and Brongniart had 
pioneered in their study of the Paris Basin (Rudwick 2014, 141). Once the succession of 
formations had been unraveled locally, the next task was to correlate successions in 
distant areas to form an integrated picture—and here fossils proved especially useful. 
Indeed, it was largely by the use of fossils that stratigraphy achieved its fabulous success 
during the nineteenth century, including the assembly of a broad outline of geohistory—
the geological time scale—which is still recognizable in its major features today. 
But fossils are not just valuable as instruments for correlation. In addition, they 
are sensitive indicators of environmental conditions—at least to the extent that you can 
infer the environmental preferences of long-dead organisms. This is most feasible when 
 
5 Later geologists challenged this interpretation, most influentially, the pioneering 
geologist Constant Prévost (see Rudwick 2008, Ch. 10). 
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fossil species have living relatives whose environmental preferences can be observed (as 
in Cuvier and Brongniart’s study). But even for more ancient species, it is often possible 
to make inferences about their life habits, and to use this information to constrain 
inferences about past states of the earth. Most reef-building corals, for example, prefer 
nearshore marine environments where light penetrates all the way to the seafloor (Ager 
1963). This generalization is not universal (coral gardens have recently been discovered 
in the deep sea, beyond the reach of sunlight). Still it is reasonable to assume that most 
fossil corals lived in shallow marine conditions—at least since the beginning of the 
Mesozoic Era, about 250 million years ago. In the earlier Paleozoic Era, different forms 
of coral flourished, meaning that inferences from contemporary observations are less 
applicable. Yet these inferences can still be made in a great many cases, as when ancient 
corals are found alongside other reef-builders in large limestone masses, and can even be 
rendered secure by calibrating actualistic expectations with non-biological proxies (see 
Chapter 4). 
In this way, biological and geological questions intertwine: questions about the 
habits of past organisms and the characteristics of physical environments; questions about 
the spatial and temporal distribution of fossil taxa and the succession of rock formations. 
Still, these are only the simplest questions that can be asked at the interface of biology 
and the earth sciences. In recent decades, the advent of more precise geochronology and 
stable isotope geochemistry have given scientists the ability to probe the relationship 
between life and its environment in increasingly rigorous ways (Bottjer 1995; Erwin 
2006a; Knoll 2011). Scales of resolution previously unthinkable have been achieved—it 
is now possible to resolve quarter-billion-year-old events to a period of a million years or 
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less, at least under special circumstances (see Chapter 3). And this, in turn, has facilitated 
precise comparisons between physical environmental changes and biological events like 
extinctions and adaptive radiations (Droser 1995; Harries 2003; Erwin and Valentine 
2013; Patzkowsky 2017). At the same time, a better understanding of the processes by 
which sedimentary basins are filled has given paleontologists new tools for understanding 
the stratigraphic distribution of fossils, and for dissecting the famed incompleteness of 
the fossil record (Chapter 5). The old project of “reading” the fossil record has in this 
way achieved a new level of sophistication, largely in virtue of conceptual and 
technological resources imported from outside of paleontology (see Brett 1995; Holland 
2000; Patzkowsky and Holland 2012). 
 
This dissertation is about the reconstruction of geohistory: about how scientists 
from a range of disciplines join together to unlock the potential of the rock record. It is 
also about scientific learning: about the processes involved in better reading the rocks of 
the earth as records of its history. Cuvier was one of the first naturalists to demonstrate 
how the vanished contents of deep time might be reconstructed from surviving material 
evidence. Yet his achievement did not solve the epistemological problem once and for 
all. In the past two hundred years, scientists have burst the limits of time again and 
again—new barriers, new ruptures. It is this project that interests me. I am particularly 
interested in how scientists from multiple disciplines pool their conceptual and material 
resources to reconstruct different aspects of complex historical phenomena. In addition, I 
am interested in the strategies researchers have devised to probe the interactions between 
living things and their environments on a range of spatial and temporal scales. 
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There is more to say about the broad motivation for this project, and I will say it 
in Chapter 1. The remainder of this Preface provides an outline of the dissertation, with 
brief descriptions of individual chapters. 
 
2.  Outline of Chapters 
This dissertation is organized into five chapters of unequal length. The first 
(“Situating the Project: Practices of Geohistory at the Intersection of the Earth and Life 
Sciences”) aims to situate the project within three overlapping bodies of literature. These 
are: (1) philosophical studies of the “historical sciences”; (2) philosophical studies of 
paleontology in particular; and (3) philosophical discussions of scientific practice 
associated with the “practice turn.” At each juncture, I identify key themes and concerns, 
and attempt to say what is distinctive about my topic and methodological approach. I also 
discuss the “time, life and environment” of my title, which I regard as the thematic 
“toothpick” holding together this “deli sandwich” of a dissertation. (Read on, and this 
metaphor will begin to make sense.) 
In Chapter 2 (“Measuring Time with Fossils: A Start-Up Problem in Scientific 
Practice”), I turn my attention to nineteenth century geology, and explore a key challenge 
that geologists faced in assembling a global geological time scale. This challenge was 
methodological, and concerned the practice of paleontological correlation: the 
“matching” of rocks in different geographical areas on the basis of the fossils they 
enclose. Paleontological correlation was the key to integrating information from scattered 
outcrops, and to ordering their constituent formations into a globally consistent series or 
“geological time scale.” However, contrary to philosophical expectations, this practice 
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lacked a sound theoretical justification during the period of its most conspicuous success. 
This chapter examines what this lack of justification amounted to, as well as how 
geologists validated the tool of paleontological correlation in ongoing inquiry. In short, I 
argue that geologists faced a version of what Hasok Chang (2004) calls the “problem of 
nomic measurement,” and that they solved it by adopting a thoroughly forward-looking 
approach oriented around considerations of heuristic merit. (A somewhat leaner version 
of this chapter will appear in the December 2021 volume of Philosophy of Science.) 
Chapter 3 (“Explaining the Apocalypse: The End-Permian Mass Extinction and 
the Dynamics of Explanation in Geohistory”) takes up the subject of scientific 
explanation. This is a perennially hot topic in philosophy of science, which has generated 
a large and complex literature focused on several interrelated topics. However, 
philosophers have exhibited a blind spot to the questions of how explanatory projects 
develop over time, as well as what processes are involved in generating their 
developmental trajectories. This chapter examines these topics using research into the 
end-Permian mass extinction as a case study. It takes as its jumping-off point an 
observation from Adrian Currie (2014, 2019a), that explanations of historical events tend 
to grow more complex over time. But it goes beyond this observation by scrutinizing the 
processes responsible for generating this pattern. Surveying several decades of research 
into the end-Permian extinction, I suggest that the principal “driver” of explanation in 
geohistory is non-explanatory work: work that is undertaken to increase our descriptive 
understanding of a phenomenon, not to test a particular explanatory claim. Non-
explanatory work drives explanation by imposing or eliminating demands on explanation, 
and by furnishing new resources for constructing explanatory models. Explanations grow 
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more complex because (1) the demands on explanation tend to increase with ongoing 
characterization of the target phenomenon, and (2) characterization tends to grow the 
roster of explanatory resources. However, the fact that non-explanatory work sometimes 
eliminates demands on explanation means that this trend is not irreversible. I suggest that 
to achieve a more rounded view of the dynamics of explanation, philosophers must ask 
how research into complex phenomena is organized, as well as how explanatory progress 
depends upon the coordination of different kinds of material and epistemic resources. 
(This chapter is forthcoming in Synthese.) 
 Chapter 4 is called “Uniformitarianism Re-examined, or The Present is the Key to 
the Past, Except When it Isn’t (and Even Then it Kind of Is).” It examines perhaps the 
more contentious term in the geological lexicon: uniformitarianism. Since this is a 
polyvalent term, many commentators have assumed that its controversial status arises 
from a sort of semantic chaos, which sows confusion among otherwise competent 
language users. However, I argue that debates about uniformitarianism in geology do not 
arise from a mere chaos of meanings. Instead, they arise from legitimate disagreements 
about a range of substantive questions. This chapter examines these questions, and relates 
them to several “forms of understanding” pursued by researchers in geohistory (Parker 
2014). These forms of understanding are: (1) understanding what happened; (2) 
understanding why something happened; (3) understanding complex earth systems; and 
(4) understanding the geological record itself. Each form of understanding, I claim, is 
associated with a different sense of “uniformitarian[ism]”: uniformitarian[ism] as (1) a 
method of reasoning; (2) a kind of explanation (or cause); (3) an assumption about earth 
system dynamics; and (4) a kind of study, respectively. And each of these is associated 
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with a different substantive question: (1) is uniformitarianism necessary; (2) when is it 
appropriate to give (non-) uniformitarian explanations of past events; (3) does the 
evolution of the earth system—including the changes associated with the 
Anthropocene—render uniformitarianism otiose; and (4) how useful are uniformitarian 
(or “actualistic”) studies of the geological record itself? This chapter examines these 
questions and suggests that it is because they are severally disputed that 
uniformitarianism continues to occupy a contentious place in geological discourse. In 
addition, it offers both a historical perspective and a forward-looking appraisal of the role 
of uniformitarianism in geological practice. 
Chapter 5 (“Biased, Spasmodic and Ridiculously Incomplete: How Sequence 
Stratigraphy Helped to Unlock the Potential of the Fossil Record”) is a historical study. It 
concerns the advent of a new approach to stratigraphic complexity, first in geology, and 
then, following its creative appropriation, in paleobiology. The approach is associated 
with a set of models that together revolutionized stratigraphic geology during the 1970s 
and 1980s. These included the celebrated sequence stratigraphic models of Peter Vail and 
others, which show how the processes of sedimentary accumulation impart a complex 
structure to the stratigraphic record. Transposed into paleobiology, they gave researchers 
a powerful way of studying the incompleteness of the fossil record, and of removing 
biases imposed by the structure of the rock record itself. In addition, they helped to 
reconfigure the cultural landscape of paleobiology, giving a new impetus to fieldwork 
and eroding the barrier that Gould and others had erected between the “old” and the 
“new” paleontology. This chapter traces these developments, and explores how 
“stratigraphic paleobiology” has begun to transform paleontological discussions of 
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incompleteness and bias in the fossil record. An Appendix to Chapter 5 (beginning on 
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1.    Wrapped in History 
The earth is wrapped in its history—in layer upon layer of sandstone, shale, 
granite and garnet schist—like a newborn baby in a swaddle. Thin by comparison with 
the radius of the planet, this wrapper is nonetheless vast in extent, with stacks of rock 
measuring tens of kilometers in total thickness. Sedimentary rocks are the main 
repository of historical information about events and conditions at the earth’s surface. 
These form when granular substances sink to the bottom of a body of water, or are 
washed or blown to places where they can be buried and consolidated. Igneous rocks also 
contain useful information, in particular about the chemical evolution of the planet. These 
form when molten materials cool to the point where they harden or crystalize, much like 
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water turning into ice. A third kind of rock forms when other rocks are subjected to high 
temperatures and pressures, altering them without turning them into liquids. These 
metamorphic rocks are not so useful as historical documents; yet like igneous rocks they 
contain valuable information about a variety of subsurface processes. Altogether, the 
geological record is a vast repository of information: information about the history of life 
and the evolution of earth’s surface environments; information about the dynamics of 
earth systems and the composition and behavior of the planetary interior (Miall 2015; 
Knoll 2021). The challenge for scientists is to extract this information, and ultimately, to 
mobilize it in support of claims about unobservable events and conditions, including 
those in the deep past (Knoll 2003; Fortey 2004; Bjornerud 2012). 
This dissertation is about how this is done, in a particular and somewhat unusual 
sense. Specifically, it is about how scientists engaged in reconstructing geohistory 
organize and equip themselves to exploit the pools of information contained in the 
geological record. The dissertation fits within the “turn to practice” in philosophy of 
science, which is to say, it treats knowledge-making practices as its primary focus 
(Ankeny et al. 2011; Soler et al. 2014). However, in contrast to much philosophical 
work—even work framed by the practice-turn—its emphasis is on the “down to earth” 
aspects of scientific practice; on the routine and material, as opposed to the rarefied and 
abstract. What activities are involved in using the rocks of the Earth as evidence for 
claims about its past? How do researchers assign evidential value to material evidence, 
and manage the risks associated with incompleteness and bias? And what is involved in 
better “reading the rocks” of the earth as records of its physical and biological history? A 
down to earth approach is suitable for these questions because they concern matters that 
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are literally down to earth: rocks and the fossils they contain. More to the point, it is 
appropriate because historical reconstruction is a bottom-up activity, whose approach to 
the earth stands in contrast to the more idealized approaches of fields like astronomy and 
geophysics (Greene 2009; Rudwick 2008).1   
 My treatment of these questions is far from systematic. As the geologist Raymond 
Moore writes, the domain of geohistory “comprises all chemical, physical, and biological 
conditions which have existed on and in the earth, all processes which have operated to 
make and modify these conditions, and all events which have affected any part of the 
earth, including its inhabitants, during [any] time from the beginning of the planet 
onward to the present” (Moore 1949, 3). Frankly, this is a lot of stuff, and it seems to 
follow that any unitary analysis of “historical reconstruction” or “historical inference” is 
bound to fail. This has not always stopped philosophers from trying to give such 
analyses. So, for example, Patrick Forber and Eric Griffith write that “[the] task of 
historical reconstruction involves crafting a causal etiology for a specific event or set of 
 
1 As Mott Greene (2009) observes, approaches to the study of the earth have long been 
split along a fault line, with historical geologists on one side, and physicists, astronomers 
and geophysicists on the other. Writes Greene: “The earth of nineteenth-century 
astronomy and scientific cosmology was a gravitationally governed and rotating 
spheroid. It had no history of note other than a steady thermodynamic course from a 
frozen (or fiery) origin in a distant but calculable past to a fiery (or frozen) endpoint in a 
distant but calculable future...Viewed from this standpoint, the earth of geology was little 
more than the study of transient epiphenomena, well below the threshold of scientific 
interest” (Greene 2009, 167–168) A major accomplishment of early geology was 
therefore “to give importance, coherence, and meaning to a variety of materials, 
structures, and processes [particulars] that held virtually no interest for astronomers and 
physicists” (168). They did this, as Martin Rudwick emphasizes, by constructing “a new 
kind of natural science, in which the historical dimension was central and constitutive” 
(Rudwick 2008, 6). 
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events” (Forber and Griffith 2011, 2, emphasis added).2 In a similar vein, the geologist–
philosopher Robert Frodeman writes that “historical science is defined by the role that 
historical [i.e., narrative] explanation plays in its work” (Frodeman 2003, 964, emphasis 
added; see also Gould 1989b). Finally, Aviezer Tucker states that “inferences of 
[common] origins form the epistemic basis of the historical sciences” (Tucker 2020, 105, 
emphasis added). Examples like this could be multiplied indefinitely. They testify to the 
“professional bias toward generality” that Thomas Nickles diagnoses as characteristic of 
academic philosophy (Nickles 1987, 52). 
 Now, generality is all well and good where interesting generalizations can be had. 
But as Nickles observes, the bias towards generality is arguably responsible for many of 
philosophy’s woes when it comes to analyzing scientific methodology. In particular, the 
need to say something general has often prevented philosophers from saying much that is 
very interesting about scientific methods: “By imposing virtually [impossible] demands 
on the subject [namely, that any analysis of scientific methodology be completely 
general]...philosophers leave themselves with almost nothing to say…!” (Nickles 1987, 
52). Nickles is here talking about the analysis of scientific methods in general, but his 
point also applies to discussions of method in the historical sciences. Faced with a highly 
heterogeneous subject matter, philosophers can either say that the historical sciences lack 
a singular methodology (which is true, but boring), or claim that such a methodology 
exists at a high level of abstraction (which is likely to be unilluminating even if it is true). 
 
2 This involves, first, identifying a temporal sequence of events or “chronology,” and 




In any event, by adhering to the idea that a philosophical account must be as general as 
possible, they end up on the horns of a dilemma of their own making. 
 The way out of this dilemma is to pay more attention to the goals and interests of 
historical scientists, as well as to the diversity of practices grouped somewhat 
uncomfortably under the rubric of “historical reconstruction.” As Adrian Currie (2017, 
2018) says, we cannot assume that all historical scientists are up to the same thing, or, to 
use the language of a later chapter, that they are all pursuing the same “form of 
understanding.” Indeed, I will suggest in Chapter 4 that historical scientists are interested 
in no less than four distinct forms of understanding, only one of which is adequately 
characterized by an emphasis on narrative explanation (cf. Forber and Griffith 2011; 
Frodeman 2003). In addition to understanding why something happened (the appropriate 
subject of narrative explanation), geohistorical scientists are interested in what the past 
was like, in how information is stored in the geological record, and in how complex earth 
systems operate over a range of spatial and temporal scales. Recognizing this diversity 
makes it unlikely that we will arrive at any one-size-fits-all analysis of historical 
reconstruction, even at a fairly high level of abstraction. Or as Currie puts the point: 
general treatments of the historical sciences are “a mug’s game” (Currie 2021). 
This dissertation heeds Currie’s warning—I have no general account of historical 
reconstruction to offer. Instead, my goal is to address philosophical questions in contexts 
sufficiently constrained to permit definite answers. I have already listed some of these 
questions. For example, in Chapter 2, I address the question, “What activities are 
involved in using the rocks of the Earth as evidence for claims about its past?” by 
focusing on stratigraphic practice, and in particular, on the justification of paleontological 
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correlation in nineteenth century geology. In Chapter 4, I address the question, “What is 
involved in better ‘reading the rocks’ of the earth as records of its physical and biological 
history?” by examining situations in which uniformitarian assumptions are relaxed in 
response to open-ended learning. And in Chapter 5, I examine the question, “How do 
researchers manage the risks associated with incomplete and biased data?” by tracing the 
emergence of a new approach to stratigraphic complexity, first in geology and then in 
paleobiology. Chapter 3 is not oriented around one of these big questions; rather, it is an 
attempt to elaborate a “dynamics of explanation” for the sciences of geohistory. Still, it 
asks a question that has not received as much attention as it should have: “Why do 
explanations of historical events tend to grow more complicated over time?” 
 
 It will be apparent from these remarks that this dissertation is not a tightly 
integrated whole, as Cuvier believed the animal body to be (see the Preface). Instead, I 
think of it as a deli sandwich, with assorted-yet-complementary layers held together by a 
thematic toothpick. This “toothpick” is the time, life and environment of my title. 
Throughout the dissertation, I am interested in how scientists study the interweaving of 
time, life and environment on various time scales, and sometimes, exploit this 
interweaving for investigative purposes. Paleontology is focal for this project, since it is 
paleontology that deals most directly with the interaction of living things and their 
environments over large spatial and temporal scales. Yet no less important is stratigraphic 
geology, the study of layered rocks and different kinds of information they contain. 
Absent stratigraphy, the fossil record would be a mere cabinet of curiosities: interesting 
enough, but without great interest for understanding life’s history. It follows that to 
 21 
 
understand the evolution of the earth and its inhabitants, close interdisciplinary 
coordination is essential. Time, life and environment will be understood together, or not 
at all. 
 Recent developments have accented the importance of interdisciplinarity for the 
sciences of geohistory. Most notably for my purposes, paleontologists have increasingly 
sought “to interpret the fossil record within the context of Earth’s dynamic planetary 
history,” using geochemical analyses to reveal histories of environmental change and 
perturbation, and linking these to the fossil record through stratigraphic correlation (Knoll 
2011, 3). The result has been mounting evidence that life has been shaped by—and in 
turn has shaped—the physical environment; or to put this somewhat whimsically, that life 
and environment are interwoven on the loom of time. As a recent textbook states: 
 
We cannot understand either the physical or biological history of the Earth in 
isolation...because the two have been tightly intertwined: the physical environment 
has influenced life, and life in turn has influenced the physical environment. (Stanley 
and Luczaj 2015, 2) 
 
Peter Ward and Joe Kirschvink have a similar perspective: 
 
One [conclusion of recent studies of Earth history] is that evolutionary history has 
been importantly affected not only by the interplay of life (competition and predation) 
but also by the course of the physical evolution of the Earth, its atmosphere and its 
oceans [which are in turn shaped by organismic activities]. (Ward and Kirschvink 
2016, 345) 
 
Finally, this, from leading pre-Cambrian paleontologist Andrew Knoll: 
Both organisms and environments have changed dramatically through time, and more 
often than not they have changed in concert. Shifts in climate, in geography, and even 
 22 
 
in the composition of the atmosphere and oceans have influenced the course of 
evolution, and biological innovations have, in turn, affected environmental history. 
(Knoll 2003, 5) 
 
Linguistic trends mark this increasingly “systematic” approach to earth’s history. A Web 
of Science search for the term “earth system” retrieves two papers from 1988, neither of 
which conformed to the current usage of the term (Knoll 2011).3 By 2011, however, the 
number of citations had grown to 237 (and a comparable search of the CSA Illumina 
(Georef) database yields 746 hits). In 2020, the number of citations exceeded 7,500. The 
relevance of this trend for paleontology was nicely captured by the popular textbook, 
Principles of Paleontology, published near the beginning of the upswing: “Paleontology 
has become an increasingly dynamic science, with a growing interdisciplinary focus on 
broadly-based research questions, propelled by discoveries reported nearly every week in 
leading scientific journals” (Foote and Miller 2006, 287). 
This dissertation aims to approach paleontology in this light—not as a well-
defined discipline with clear borders and a central mission, but as a sprawling and 
dynamic science, increasingly entangled with other departments of the sciences 
(including stratigraphy). It is not a dissertation about “earth system science,” the branch 
of science that treats feedbacks and other interactions between the biosphere, atmosphere 
and other earth systems (Steffen et al. 2020). Still, in its emphasis on the entangled nature 
of time, life and the physical earth, it addresses themes that earth systems science also 
addresses (see especially Chapters 3, 4 and 5). Even Chapter 2, which concerns the 
methodology of measuring time with fossils, engages the theme of time, life and 
 
3 To speak of “the earth system” is to refer to the interacting processes of the atmosphere, 
biosphere, cryosphere, hydrosphere and lithosphere (individually, “earth systems”). 
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environment, since deciphering the temporal significance of fossils requires filtering out 
the signature of changing environments. In short, to use fossils to date rocks, you need to 
know that a fossil is present in a formation because of the period of time in which that 
formation was deposited, not (merely) because of favorable environmental conditions. 
The entanglement of time, life and environment, then, has been present in paleontological 
practice from its first stirrings as a distinct specialism. 
The remainder of this chapter serves to situate my project within several ongoing 
discussions in history and philosophy of science. These are: recent philosophical 
discussions of “historical science” (Section 2), philosophical analyses of paleontology 
(Section 3), and discussions of scientific practice associated with the “practice-turn” in 
history and philosophy of science (Section 4). The last of these sections contains my 
reflections on my methodological approach, such as it is. Before coming to this, however, 
it will be helpful to review some themes in recent philosophical work on the historical 
sciences. This is the task of the next two sections. 
 
2  Philosophy and the Historical Sciences 
Like many uncharted areas of philosophical inquiry, the analysis of the historical 
sciences began with a few narrowly defined projects before expanding to embrace new 
questions and approaches. I call these traditional projects the “vindicatory,” 
“comparative,” and “explicative” projects, respectively. The projects are not entirely 
distinct and have often been pursued in tandem. Still, it is useful to separate them for 
analytical purposes. To this end, I begin with some reflections on historical inference and 
the rock record. 
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The geological record, taken at face value, is a repository of physical and 
chemical patterns. Rock layers are stacked, one upon the other; mineralogical features 
grade and shift, often in complicated ways; and throughout the column, the nature and 
characteristics of emplaced fossils vary tremendously. Geochemistry adds a further 
dimension to the complexity: one consisting of shifting patterns of elemental and isotopic 
composition. All these patterns can be exploited to unravel the pathways of geohistory, 
and to understand how life and its environment have interacted over a range of spatial 
and temporal scales (Knoll 2003). Still, there is nothing intrinsically historical about 
patterns in the configuration and composition of sedimentary rocks. Instead, these 
patterns are historical only by interpretation—by inferences that move from patterns to 
conclusions via mediating warrants. “History means interpretation,” the historian E.H. 
Carr wrote in his little book, What is History? (Carr 1961, 23). And if this is true of 
human history, still more is it true of geo-history, where the historian’s “documents” are 
not documents at all, but are instead material objects like stones and fossils. As Robert 
Chapman and Allison Wylie put it: 
 
“[Traces of the past] don’t speak.” Material evidence is inescapably an interpretive 
construct; what it “says” is contingent on the provisional scaffolding we bring to bear. 
(Chapman and Wylie 2016, 4) 
 
Chapman and Wylie are concerned with archaeological practice, but their message is a 
general one: when it comes to historical science, it is interpretation all the way down. 
There is no “self-warranting” foundation that scientists can build their interpretations 
upon as a means of ensuring their objective validity. Instead, historical inference is a 
bootstrapping operation, which proceeds by the assembly and iterative refinement of 
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provisional foundations (or “scaffolds”). These foundations “are known to be tenuous,” 
and are routinely broken down and rebuilt when circumstances call for it. Nonetheless, 
they tend to function reasonably well—so well, in fact, that scientists are often willing to 
place considerable confidence in their conclusions, despite their provisional and 
interpretive nature.4 The past may be inaccessible to direct observation, but this does not 
mean it is unknowable, provided we exercise a bit of ingenuity. 
 This final claim is the jumping-off point for many philosophical investigations of 
historical reconstruction. To take a representative example, Patrick Forber and Eric 
Griffith (2011) observe that while “[our] epistemic access to past events is limited, often 
severely so,” nonetheless “some claims about prehistory enjoy strong epistemic support” 
(1). Adrian Currie begins his (2017) article on historical methodology on a similar note: 
 
Our access to the past is fragmentary: geological processes like subduction ensure 
that mineral traces are destroyed; the probability of an organism fossilizing and its 
remains surfacing are miniscule; our picture of pre-Socratic philosophy is pieced 
together from passing mentions in incomplete texts. In the face of such destruction, 
some philosophers and scientists are pessimistic about uncovering past facts; perhaps 
history’s mysteries will remain so. And yet, historical scientists frequently produce 
firmly supported, well-founded, and plausible narratives. (Currie 2017, 930)5 
 
Finally, here is Derek Turner, whose concern is a particular deficit that historical 
scientists face—their (supposed) lack of access to experimental methods: 
 
4 Currie refers to this as the “unreasonable effectiveness” of trace-based reasoning (Currie 
2018). 
5 Currie repeats this trope in his (2014): “Historical scientists appear to operate under 
evidential scarcity. Signals from the past degrade over time, and the large-scale, complex 
nature of historical targets undermines experimental access. And yet historical scientists 
frequently provide rich, detailed and plausible hypotheses” (188). 
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Like all scientists, paleontologists need to subject their hypotheses and theories to 
rigorous empirical tests. In many areas of science, empirical testing involves 
experimentation: researchers carry out a series of trials while varying the initial 
conditions a little bit each time in order to see how those changes affect the 
outcomes…[But] no one can manipulate or experiment with the past. This simple fact 
creates a major methodological problem for paleontologists: how can they test 
hypotheses about prehistoric life without being able to experiment on the things they 
wish to study? (Turner 2009a, 201) 
 
Lest the reader conclude that the historical sciences are epistemically handicapped, 
Turner follows with a word of encouragement: 
 
Contrary to the impression that one might get from textbook presentations of the 
scientific method, it really is possible to carry out rigorous empirical tests without 
actually performing any experimental manipulations on the objects of interest...The 
development of these techniques for carrying out nonexperimental empirical tests is a 
major—and largely unsung—scientific achievement. (Turner 2009a, 201) 
 
Never mind the non-experimental techniques that Turner mentions. The thing to notice is 
how his philosophical project is set up. After observing that historical scientists are in a 
tough spot, epistemically speaking, a typical analysis of the historical sciences shows 
how this is overcome: how historical scientists beat the odds in warranting substantive 
claims about the past. Call this the “vindicatory project” in philosophy of the historical 
sciences. Its aim is to reveal the methodological, or perhaps the metaphysical, basis of 
success in the historical sciences, and to defend them from criticisms like that of Henry 
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Gee (a senior editor of Nature, and a paleontologist), that “No science can ever be 
[really] historical” (Gee 1999, 8).6 
 Closely related to the vindicatory project is the “comparative project.” This works 
by contrasting the historical sciences (usually taken to include geology, paleontology, 
evolutionary biology, archaeology and cosmology) with a different category of science 
(usually the “experimental sciences”).7 The project intersects with the vindicatory project. 
Turner, in his (2009a), pivots from the observation that one cannot experiment on the past 
to the claim that the historical sciences nonetheless possess non-experimental resources 
for evaluating hypotheses. (This, you will notice, is an answer to Gee’s criticism; see fn. 
6.) But comparative analyses are not always vindicatory. In other work, Turner argues 
that historical sciences are at an epistemic disadvantage relative to the experimental 
sciences, and that this places limitations on what historical scientists can ultimately 
achieve (Turner 2005a, 2007, 2016). The reason, again, is the impossibility of 
manipulating the past: a thesis Turner dubs the “asymmetry of manipulability.” While the 
asymmetry of manipulability does not preclude the historical sciences from rigorously 
evaluating empirical hypotheses, it does place them a rung below the experimental 
sciences on the ladder of epistemic prowess. This is because the experimental sciences 
 
6 What Gee seems to mean is that historical narratives are “subjective” assertions 
(basically, guesses), which “can never be tested by experiment, and [are therefore] 
unscientific” (Gee 1999, 5). The challenge for philosophers is accordingly set: to show 
that a science can be both historical and epistemically successful. 
7 Aviezer Tucker, in his paper “Historical science, over- and underdetermined,” contrasts 
the historical sciences with the theoretical sciences. The distinction mirrors that which 
authors like Cleland and Turner draw between the historical and the experimental 
sciences: namely, whereas the historical sciences are interested in inferring relationships 
between token events, the “theoretical” (like the “experimental”) sciences are interested 
in relationships between types (Tucker 2011, 826). 
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are able to actively produce new evidence, while historical scientists are stuck with those 
traces of the past that have chanced to survive to the present.8 (For a compelling response 
to this argument, see Currie 2018, Chapters 4 and 5.) 
 No doubt the leader of the comparative project is Carol Cleland, whose 2002 
paper, “Methodological and epistemic differences between historical science and 
experimental science,” set the agenda for much subsequent discussion of historical 
reconstruction (see also Cleland 2001, 2011, 2013). In this paper Cleland argues that 
scientists engage in “two very different patterns of evidential reasoning,” one of which 
predominates in the historical sciences, the other in the experimental sciences (Cleland 
2002, 474). The former pattern is basically abductive: researchers observe “puzzling 
associations” between traces and attempt to explain them by postulating common 
causes—historical events that, if they took place, would explain the association among 
the traces. The pattern in the experimental sciences, by contrast, is predictive. It seeks to 
confirm or disconfirm hypotheses about types of events by testing predictions in well-
controlled laboratory settings. Cleland’s most ingenious argument is that the patterns of 
reasoning succeed in their respective settings by exploiting a fortuitous feature of the 
world, which David Lewis labels the “asymmetry of overdetermination.” This has to do 
with the architecture of causality in time, and while the details needn’t concern us, the 
 
8 An emphasis on evidential degradation is a prominent feature of general philosophical 
discussions of the historical sciences. Probably this traces from Elliott Sober’s influential 
work on phylogenetic reconstruction (e.g., Sober 1988). As Sober and Steel say in a 
recent paper, “We are interested in how the natural processes connecting past to present 





upshot of the analysis is vindicatory: each reasoning style is well-calibrated to exploit the 
kinds of evidence at its disposal. 
 A third project in the philosophy of the historical sciences is related to the 
previous two, but is nonetheless distinct. It is the project of characterizing the nature of 
evidential reasoning in the historical sciences—a kind of reasoning, you will recall, that 
is basically interpretive (Chapman and Wylie 2016). This might be called the “explicative 
project.”9 Cleland’s account, again, has been influential. According to her, the method of 
historical science involves discriminating between mutually exclusive hypotheses 
proposed to explain puzzling associations between traces. In what Cleland calls the 
“prototypical scenario,” investigators begin by observing some puzzling association 
between traces (Cleland 2002, 480). They then form hypotheses to explain the 
association—hypotheses that postulate a common cause for the traces in the form of a 
long-past event. Ideally, the hypotheses will be mutually exclusive (and Cleland seems to 
think that they usually are). This means that the task of the scientist is to decide whether 
the common cause of the traces is X or Y; it is not to apportion causal responsibility 
between X and Y. With this task in mind, the historical scientist sets to work like a 
detective, gathering evidence with an eye to discovering a trace “that unambiguously 
discriminates one hypothesis from among a set of currently available hypotheses as 
providing ‘the best explanation’ of the traces thus far observed” (481). These “smoking 
guns” cinch the case for one causal claim over another, and while they do not identify a 
 
9 The comparative project involves an explicative component; Cleland, for example, has 
tried to characterize conflicting patterns of evidential reasoning in the historical and 
experimental sciences. Yet I want to identify an explicative project in addition to the 




hypothesis as uniquely correct, they do break the tie of underdetermination that 
characterizes most historical reasoning about past events. For this reason, most historical 
research is oriented around the search for smoking guns. 
 Cleland’s account has met with a great deal of criticism since it was first offered. 
Almost everyone who has worked on the explicative project has seen fit to take a whack 
at it, usually as a prelude to offering their own account (e.g., Bonnin 2019; Currie 2017, 
2018; Forber and Griffith 2011; Kleinhans et al. 2005; O’Malley 2016; Tucker 2011; 
Turner 2005a, 2007).10 These criticisms are compelling, and taken together they are quite 
damning.11 Still, it ought to be observed that most of Cleland’s critics have agreed with 
her project—agreed, in other words, that it is worthwhile to explicate the pattern of 
reasoning associated with “prototypical” historical investigations. Currie comes the 
closest to disagreeing (and in recent publications, he seems to have sworn off the project 
entirely). According to him, there is no “method of historical science”: “[no] simple 
model of archetypical historical methodology” (Currie 2017, 931). The historical sciences 
are simply “too disunified to admit of an ‘archetypical’ characterization,” and indeed, this 
is precisely what we should expect, since “historical scientists are nothing if not 
opportunistic”: 
 
As [historical scientists] frequently lack experimental access to their targets, and 
sometimes face incomplete and biased evidence, [they] apply whichever methods will 
maximize their epistemic reach. Identifying smoking guns, drawing together 
 
10 Ben Jeffares’s influential (2008) paper is not so critical; yet even he takes issue with 
Cleland’s implication that the historical sciences are not interested in establishing natural 
regularities. 
11 Here is a digest: historical scientists do indeed operate like detectives in many 
instances, but detective work involves more than a search for smoking guns (even in the 
somewhat special sense in which Cleland understands this term). 
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independent streams of evidence, and discovering dependencies between past entities 
are all important parts of this story. The point is this: the success of historical science 
is not due to some unified method, but due to a plurality of methods. (Currie 2017, 
949) 
 
Notice, however, that this is not so much a rejection of the explicative project as it 
is an expansion of it. Currie’s main goal in his (2017) is to “argue that testing for 
coherency between hypotheses about past entities is a common and important pattern of 
reasoning in historical science” (931, emphasis added). Historical scientists do not just 
search for “smoking guns,” or utilize convergent streams of evidence as Wylie (2011) 
and others have suggested (e.g., Forber and Griffith 2011; Vezér 2015). In addition, they 
consider how hypotheses about the past “hang together”—that is, they perform coherency 
tests. It is because other accounts of historical methodology fail to notice the importance 
of coherence testing that Currie moves to reject the notion of a singular historical 
methodology. But regardless of whether he is right (my suspicion is that he is), it is clear 
that he is here engaged in a variant of the explicative project. He just wants to expand the 
stable of historical methodology beyond a single stall—he does not want to burn it down. 
 And why should he? It is a perfectly good stable, after all. Each of the methods 
philosophers have analyzed is a legitimate way of warranting hypotheses as reliable, and 
of adjudicating conflicting claims about the past. Such contributions are valuable, not 
least because the historical sciences were long neglected by philosophers alongside other 
sciences that lack powerful explanatory theories (Love 2014). Showing that the historical 
sciences possess reliable methods thus contributes substantially to their philosophical 
vindication. (Notably, Currie’s early efforts to explicate historical methodology were in 
service of an overarching “optimism” about the epistemic prospects of the historical 
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sciences: a kind of vindicatory aim.) Still, one might wonder whether the historical 
sciences really require more vindication. Nearly two decades of work has been 
undertaken in the name of rehabilitating the historical sciences, much of it broadly 
successful (Dresow 2019a). Arguably this has removed the initial motivation for pursuing 
not only the vindicatory project, but the comparative project as well. If we agree that the 
historical sciences exist on a par with the non-historical sciences—or at least that they 
harbor no major epistemic handicaps—then it is hard to see the point of further 
comparisons. This is doubly the case if we acknowledge, with Currie, that the historical 
sciences are every bit as messy, disunified and pluralistic as the rest of the sciences (a 
claim that suggests that meaningful comparisons are likely to be elusive). 
For similar reasons, the explicative project is in need of a rethink. In the past, this 
project has concerned itself with the “methodology” of the historical sciences: “how do 
historical scientists go about generating knowledge, and how does this work?” (Currie 
2018, 137). A common presumption is that there is such a method—a more-or-less 
unitary way that historical scientists go about supporting and adjudicating claims about 
the past. But if this presumption is wrong—if the historical sciences lack a unitary 
method, even at a high level of abstraction—then attention must shift elsewhere: to more 
circumscribed patterns of reasoning (e.g., Currie 2015, 2017, 2018; Bokulich 2018, 
2019), or else to the skilled practices involved in reconstructing the past (e.g., Wylie 
2015; 2019; Wylie 2016). Instead of characterizing historical reasoning as a means of 
promoting epistemic optimism (methodological vindication), philosophers should 
interrogate how scientists assemble an understanding of the past through an iterative and 
deeply social process, “in the absence of infallible foundations” (Chang 2004, 234). That 
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is, they should investigate the work involved in historical reconstruction, and the way this 
makes possible the kinds of inferences upon which the enterprise of geohistory depends. 
(For cognate proposals, see Tamborini 2019 and Currie 2021.) 
Chapman and Wylie (2016) provide an example of what the project looks like in 
action. Their study of evidential reasoning in archaeology is premised on “the conviction 
that considerable wisdom is embodied in the creativity and skilled practice of 
archaeologists” (Chapman and Wylie 2016, 6). In order to make this wisdom explicit, the 
authors target “key instances of exemplary practice, critical turning points, innovations, 
and instructive failures in the use of archaeological data as evidence” (Chapman and 
Wylie 2015, 7). In other words, they perform a case-based analysis of evidential and 
material practices in archaeology, aimed at isolating “the norms of evidential reasoning 
that have taken shape in the context of...practical experience working with archaeological 
[materials].” Such norms are poorly captured by “idealized accounts of ‘scientific’ 
[reasoning],” they claim, since these were assembled in response to internal philosophical 
debates about issues like underdetermination and scientific realism (Chapman and Wylie 
2016, 7). Instead, analyses of scientific reasoning are illuminating to the extent that they 
are made responsive to the details of practice in a particular domain: to how scientists 
actually build, analyze, integrate and adjudicate evidential arguments. This is the heart of 
the “turn to practice” in philosophy of science—a topic I will return to in Section 4. 
In the next section, I take up the subject of philosophical treatments of 
paleontology. It is not a review of everything that has been written in this area. Happily, 
the philosophical literature on paleontology is now large enough that any such review 
would be a heavy lift. (For a dated but more comprehensive literature review, see Turner 
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2014.) Rather, the section identifies some themes and tropes in the philosophical 
literature on paleontology, and suggests a way forward. It also makes contact with the 
small philosophical literature on stratigraphy, thus identifying the crucial interdisciplinary 
nexus that later chapters will explore. 
 
3.  Paleontology in Philosophical Focus   
Philosophical interest in paleontology is a relatively recent development. 
Elizabeth Lloyd was perhaps the first philosopher to devote considerable time to 
conceptual issues in paleontology. Her pioneering work on species selection and 
“emergent fitness”—some of it coauthored with Stephen Jay Gould—remains an 
important contribution to an ongoing debate in paleontology and evolutionary theory 
(see, e.g., Lloyd 1988; Lloyd and Gould 1993; Gould and Lloyd 1999).12 Likewise, Todd 
Grantham’s “Hierarchical Approaches to Macroevolution,” published in the Annual 
Review of Ecology and Systematics, remains a useful exploration of some theoretical 
issues in macroevolution (Grantham 1995). Subsequently, Grantham explored the role of 
fossils in phylogenetic reconstruction and the epistemology of “taxic paleobiology” (see 
below), making him arguably the first philosopher to specialize on philosophical issues in 
paleontology (Grantham 1999, 2004, 2009). He was joined in the early 2000s by Derek 
Turner, who contributed a number of important studies, first on the reconstruction of 
animals from fossil remains, and then on the reconstruction of evolutionary trends and the 
 
12 A somewhat more difficult work to locate is Interactions, co-authored by the 
paleontologist Niles Eldredge and the philosopher Marjorie Grene (Eldrege and Grene 
1992). Certainly this is not a book about paleontology (it is about the evolution of social 
systems), but it incorporates a paleontological perspective in its emphasis on hierarchical 
structures and multi-level causation. 
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role of contingency in macroevolution (Turner 2000, 2005b, 2009b, 2010, 2011; Inkpen 
and Turner 2012). And the number of philosophers interested in paleontology has only 
grown in recent years.13 
It is customary in the philosophical literature on paleontology to distinguish two 
projects in which paleontologists are centrally involved.14 The first is the reconstruction 
of organisms from fossil remains—an activity Cuvier called “resurrection in miniature” 
(see the Preface), and which today goes by the name of phenotypic reconstruction.15 The 
second is the reconstruction of evolutionary patterns based on large datasets, in particular, 
counts of taxonomic appearances and disappearances in the fossil record. This has no 
generally accepted name, although the approach that uses large datasets to characterize 
evolutionary patterns in the fossil record is called “taxic” because it involves counting the 
taxa found at particular times and places (Eldredge 1979; Grantham 2009). I will call it 
macroevolutionary reconstruction, to distinguish it from the narrower project of 
reconstructing the evolutionary history of individual lineages or groups of lineages 
(evolutionary reconstruction).16 Evolutionary reconstructions are similar to what the 
philosopher Brett Calcott has called “lineage explanations” (Calcott 2009). 
 
13 Especially noteworthy are the contributions of Adrian Currie, Alan Love, Joyce 
Havstad, Leonard Finkelman, John Huss and Alisa Bokulich. 
14 The source of this convention seems to be Turner, who writes in his (2009) that 
paleontology includes “at least two very different kinds of research” (202). He reiterates 
this in his Paleontology: A Philosophical Introduction, in a section titled “Organismic vs. 
evolutionary paleontology” (Turner 2011, Ch. 1). 
15 According to Turner (2009a), this research aims to answer such questions as: “what did 
[the organisms] eat, and what ate them? Were they solitary or sociable? In what sort of 
environment did they live? How did they die? How did they reproduce?” (202; see also 
Currie 2015, 189). 
16 Currie (2015) regards this latter project as part of the investigative project of 
phenotypic reconstruction, which he takes to include two broad questions. The phenotype 
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The decomposition of paleontology into two (or three) main research areas 
reflects a narrowness of focus in philosophical studies of paleontology. For the most part, 
philosophers have been content to dwell on the biological parts of the field to the 
exclusion of its more geological parts; that is, they have been content to study paleo-
biology (in particular, evolutionary paleobiology) as opposed to paleontology sensu lato. 
This constriction in focus is not without motivation. In recent decades, paleobiology has 
become a thriving research area, and important work in the history of science has 
highlighted the conceptual and institutional importance of the “Paleobiological 
Revolution” of the 1970s (Sepkoski and Ruse 2009; Baron 2011; Sepkoski 2012, 2013, 
2017).17 Still, the constriction in focus has been so severe—and for the most part, so 
uniform—that it risks going unnoticed (Love 2011). This is doubly the case when 
philosophers make no effort to distinguish between paleontology and paleobiology, as for 
example Turner’s Paleontology: A Philosophical Introduction does not. This is a book 
about evolutionary paleobiology—the “new paleontology,” as Turner calls it in his (2014, 
495). But never is its focus on evolutionary paleobiology philosophically motivated. 
Instead, Turner draws “a rough distinction between two kinds of research that 
paleontologists do”—phenotypic and macroevolutionary reconstruction, in my 
 
question asks what the organism looked like, what it ate and how it was viable (cf. Turner 
2009a, 202). The evolution question asks “which historical forces are to blame for that 
phenotype’s evolution” (189). Although Currie’s emphasis in his (2015) is on phenotypic 
reconstruction, he nonetheless observes that reconstructing past organisms “is not the 
only, or even the central, business of paleobiology. More important is study [sic] of large-
scale macroevolutionary patterns revealed in the fossil record [macroevolutionary 
reconstruction]” (189). 
17 The Paleobiological Revolution was a “campaign to upgrade the status of 
paleontology...by introducing a quantitative, theoretical agenda capable of producing 
independent contributions to evolutionary theory” (Sepkoski 2017, 53). 
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terminology—and then declares that he will focus on the latter (Turner 2011, 2). The 
reader could be forgiven for concluding that this is the main business of modern 
paleontology, and indeed Currie says as much in his (2015). 
But even a reader that abstains from such judgments is likely to be misled by 
Turner’s division of the field into organismal and evolutionary components (Turner 2011, 
2). This is because in addition to phenotypic and (macro-) evolutionary reconstruction, 
paleontologists are involved in a variety of other projects, from reconstructing past 
climates, environments, and ecological networks, to reconstructing past sea and gas 
levels, plant and animal distributions, continental and landscape configurations, and 
large-scale biogeochemical processes and trends. Many paleontologists are also involved 
in reconstructing patterns of evolutionary descent—an activity known as phylogenetic 
reconstruction (or sometimes phylogeny reconstruction). Unlike the other projects I have 
listed, the reconstruction of evolutionary relationships has received extensive attention 
from philosophers, and several studies have even examined the role of fossil and 
stratigraphic data in phylogenetic inference (Sober 1988, 2008; Grantham 1999, 2004). 
Still, for the most part, philosophers have been interested in adjudicating competing 
methods of constructing phylogenies, without worrying too much about where the data 
come from (see Velasco 2013). 
 
Kinds of historical reconstruction—a partial list 
 
1. Phenotypic reconstruction (the reconstruction of past phenotypes) 
2. Phylogenetic reconstruction (the reconstruction of evolutionary relationships) 
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3. Evolutionary reconstruction (the reconstruction of the history of a taxon, or 
group of taxa, in relation to a set of environmental factors) 
4. Macroevolutionary reconstruction (the reconstruction of evolutionary patterns 
and trends at large spatial and temporal scales) 
5. Macroecological reconstruction (the reconstruction of ecological patterns and 
trends at large spatial and temporal scales) 
6. Paleoecological reconstruction (the reconstruction of past ecological 
communities, patterns of distribution and abundance, niche characteristics, 
etc.)18 
7. Paleoenvironmental reconstruction A: depositional conditions (the 
reconstruction of past depositional environments) 
8. Paleoenvironmental reconstruction B: earth systems (the reconstruction of 
past states of the oceans and atmosphere, as well as the past operation of 
earth’s geochemical cycles) 
9. Paleobiogeographic reconstruction (the reconstruction of past distributions 
and movements of plants and animals) 
 
I do not want to give the impression that philosophical studies of paleontology have been 
exclusively concerned with two (or three) types of historical reconstruction. This would 
 
18 An older sense of “paleoecology,” still in circulation, holds that paleoecology is “the 
study of past environments that contribute to applied problems and theory in the 
geological sciences [i.e., the physical earth sciences], particularly facies analysis and the 
reconstruction of past environments” (Kitchell 1985, 91 fn). Here I am using 
“paleoecology” in a somewhat newer sense; the older sense would view the primary 
activity of paleoecology as (7). 
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be particularly unfair to Adrian Currie, who in his recent work has begun to investigate 
some cases of truly geo-historical reconstruction in paleontology and geology (Currie 
2017, 2018, 2019). Instead, what I want to suggest is that philosophical studies of 
paleontology have only recently and tentatively moved beyond a near-exclusive 
preoccupation with the “new paleontology,” evolutionary paleobiology. And this 
constriction of focus has had certain undesirable effects, in particular, a tendency to 
ignore more geological aspects of the science (staples of the “old” field or stratigraphic 
paleontology). 
The tendency to ignore stratigraphy is particularly egregious in light of the central 
role that stratigraphic frameworks play in much paleontological, including 
paleobiological, research.19 As a popular textbook in paleobiology puts it, rock 
stratigraphies provide “the essential framework that geologists and particularly 
paleontologists use to accurately locate fossil collections in both [time] and [space]...A 
stratigraphy, illustrated on a map and in measured sections, is required to monitor 
biological and geological changes through time and thus underpins the whole basis of 
Earth history” (Benton and Harper 2009, 23, 25). Erwin and Valentine, writing from the 
standpoint of Neoproterozoic and Cambrian paleobiology, have a similar take: 
 
The development of [a] high-resolution geologic timescale [for the Ediacaran and 
Cambrian Periods] and the correlation of geologic sections from every continent 
through biostratigraphy, chemostratigraphy and magnetostratigraphy have been 
essential to any detailed study of rates of geological and evolutionary change. With 
 
19 To be clear: I am not claiming that stratigraphy is a part of paleontology (although the 
research project called “biostratigraphy” most certainly is). I am only claiming that 
stratigraphy is critical for much paleontological research, and that to understand 
paleontology, one must understand its intersection with stratigraphy. 
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the framework in hand we can now calculate such rates and, for example, determine 
how closely various evolutionary events correlate with changes in the physical 
environment that may have been causally related. (Erwin and Valentine 2013, 28) 
 
Finally, here is Shen et al. (2011), writing about the paleobiology of mass extinctions: 
“Detailed time scales for extinctions and recoveries are essential for understanding the 
physical, ecological, and chemical changes and for testing possible causes” (Shen et al. 
2011, 1367). In short, paleontologists both use and contribute to stratigraphic frameworks 
in order to (1) fix the order of events in the rock record, (2) aid in the determination of 
rates of change, and (3) facilitate the integration of biological and geological information 
over a range of spatial and temporal scales. 
 It is therefore noteworthy that “stratigraphy” is absent from the indexes of both 
book-length treatments of paleontology written by philosophers (Turner 2011; Currie 
2018). Likewise few articles in philosophical journals deal with stratigraphic concepts or 
practices in any detail.20 (This is beginning to change, largely in virtue of the pioneering 
work of Alisa Bokulich, e.g., 2019, 2020.) I can think of two reasons why this may be the 
case, both of which may be partly to blame in this case. The first has to do with 
stratigraphy’s historically less-than-stellar reputation among the geosciences. The second 
has to do with how the historiography of paleobiology interacted with early work in the 
philosophy of paleontology. 
Begin with the former. As the stratigrapher Andrew Miall admits, stratigraphy 
“has a reputation as a dull descriptive science” (Miall 2015, 271). During most of the 
 
20 Two early exceptions are David Kitts’s The Structure of Geology, which deals with 
geological notions of time in the 7th chapter, and Robert Frodeman’s Geo-Logic, which 
deals with certain aspects of stratigraphic practice in the 6th chapter. 
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twentieth century, an education in stratigraphy consisted in “lists of formation names and 
detailed descriptions of lithologies and fossil content, with little in the way of 
enlightenment about what it all meant.” The stratigraphic paleobiologist Steven Holland 
echoes this assessment: 
 
If your undergraduate experience in stratigraphy was anything like mine, it was 
overwhelmingly dull. It was all about nomenclature and classification and endless 
lists of formation names. There were apparently no questions to be asked and the goal 
of stratigraphy was to devise boxes into which to place all kinds of geologic data. 
(Holland 1999, 409) 21 
 
More humorously, the stratigrapher P.D. Krynine is reported to have said, in 1941, that 
“[stratigraphy] can be defined as the complete triumph of terminology over facts and 
common sense” (Folk and Ferm 1966). All this seems to suggest that stratigraphy is a 
science unworthy of philosophical attention. It is all drudgery and nomenclature—an area 
bereft of interesting questions and laden with baroque terms like “turbidite” and 
 
21 No one has discussed the excesses of geological terminology with more wit than John 
McPhee. Recalling his own geological education, McPhee writes: “I used to sit in class 
and listen to the terms come floating down the room like paper airplanes. Geology was 
called a descriptive science, and with its pitted outwash plains and drowned rivers, its 
hanging tributaries and starved coastlines, it was nothing if not descriptive...There 
seemed, indeed, to be a little of the humanities in the subject. Geologists communicated 
in English; and they could name things in a manner that sent shivers through the bones. 
They had roof pedants in their discordant batholiths, mosaic conglomerates in desert 
pavement. There was ultrabasic, deep-ocean, mottled green-and-black rock—or 
serpentine...There were festooned crossbeds and limestone sinks, pillow lavas and 
petrified trees, incised meanders and defeated streams...Someone developed enough 
effrontery to call a piece of our earth an epieugeosyncline...All of that...was difficult 
enough for the layman to remember before the diffractometers and the spectrometers and 
the electron probes came along to present their multiplex cavils” (McPhee 1998, 31–34). 
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“epeirogeny.” Given philosophers’ preferences for big questions and bold explanatory 
theories, is it any wonder that stratigraphy has gone mostly unnoticed? 
Yet this line of thinking is misguided for several reasons. To begin, stratigraphy 
was the centerpiece of nineteenth century geology—a fashionable and absurdly 
successful science that is responsible for no less a wonder than the geological time scale 
(O’Connor 2007; Rudwick 2014; see also Chapter 2). To dismiss it because it is 
supposedly boring or burdened with strange terms is philistinism of the worst kind.22 But 
even accepting that philosophers should not bother with “dull descriptive science[s],” this 
label does not attach to the current field of stratigraphic geology, for as Holland writes: 
“stratigraphy [in recent decades] has undergone a conceptual revolution” (Holland 1999, 
409, emphasis added). The occasion for this revolution was the development of new 
models of stratigraphic architecture (so-called “sequence models”), as well as the advent 
of new methods of correlation, like high-resolution event stratigraphy (see Chapter 5). 
Together, these have comprehensively reconfigured research in stratigraphy, with 
ramifying consequences for other sciences, including paleobiology. As Miall observes: 
 
The modern science of stratigraphy...operates by the dynamic interplay between an 
array of deductive models and hypotheses which express our understanding of earth 
system science in the sedimentary realm. Most of these are qualitative, in the sense 
that they depend on descriptive data, but all are characterized by rigour in the 
protocols for field data collection, description and processing. (Miall 2015, 277–278) 
 
22 For a reflection on the importance of descriptive science from a scientific perspective, 
see Grimaldi and Engel (2007). For a historical reflection on the treatment of descriptive 




 So much for stratigraphy’s bad reputation. The other explanation for why 
philosophers have neglected stratigraphy has to do with the prominence of evolutionary 
paleobiology in recent philosophical discussions of paleontology. This phenomenon dates 
from about 2009, when David Sepkoski and Michael Ruse edited a collection of essays 
called The Paleobiological Revolution: Essays on the Growth of Modern Paleobiology.23 
This was followed in 2012 by Sepkoski’s monograph, Rereading the Fossil Record, 
which bears the subtitle The Growth of Paleobiology as an Evolutionary Discipline. 
Sandwiched between these publications was Turner’s Paleontology: A Philosophical 
Introduction, which styles itself “a (mostly) non-partisan guide, with a strong 
philosophical slant, to some of the big ideas and questions about evolution that came out 
of the paleobiological revolution” (Turner 2011, 11). Together, these publications served 
to consolidate early philosophical interest in paleontology around a small number of 
topics, as well as a particular conception of paleobiology as an evolutionary discipline. 
What does this have to do with stratigraphy? Here the details of the history (and 
the historiography) matter. During the middle decades of the twentieth century, a number 
of American paleontologists grew dissatisfied with what they saw as the subordination of 
paleontology to stratigraphic geology (e.g., Knight 1947; Newell and Colbert 1948). 
Paleontology was a separate science, they insisted, and a biological science at that. Still, 
it remained the case that “the majority of teachers of paleontology...[were] stratigraphers 
or petroleum geologists, concerned entirely with the application of paleontology to 
geology” (Newell 1948/9, quoted in Sepkoski 2012, 58). As a consequence, little 
 
23 This collection contained a number of essays by philosophers, for example, Grantham 
(2009), Huss (2009), Laubichler and Niklas (2009), Ruse (2009) and Turner (2009a). 
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progress was being made towards an understanding of fundamental biological questions 
arising out of the fossil record.24 J. Brookes Knight, an invertebrate paleontologist, put 
the point tartly in his 1947 presidential address to the Paleontological Society of 
America: 
 
[What] we today call a paleontologist, particularly that jellylike variety without a 
backbone, incapable of standing erect on his own two feet, the invertebrate 
paleontologist, is not a paleontologist at all. He is a geologist, a stratigraphical or 
“soft-rock” geologist. He has considerable familiarity with invertebrate fossils, to be 
sure, but he is a geologist nevertheless. (Knight 1947, 284) 
 
This sentiment, and the rhetoric of subordination, would continue to find voice in 
paleontology into the 1960s and 1970s. Invertebrate paleontologists were insufficiently 
biological, the criticism ran, and for this reason had been excluded from important 
discussions, including discussions of evolutionary theory (Sepkoski and Ruse 2009; 
Sepkoski 2012). Gould (1970) went so far as to complain that invertebrates had been 
treated as if they lacked a history (by which he meant a history of directional change; see 
Dresow 2017). As such, when he and others hoisted the revolutionary flag in the 1970s, it 
was natural that they should fold the rhetoric of subordination into their campaign to 
upgrade the status of paleontology within evolutionary theory. Here, for example, is 
Gould, writing in the main organ of the Paleobiological Revolution, Paleobiology: 
 
Invertebrate paleontology has cast its institutional allegiance with geology—more by 
historical accident than by current logic. When it operates as a geological discipline, 
 
24 The quoted passage is from a memo that Norman Newell (an invertebrate 
paleontologist) distributed to his colleagues at the American Museum of Natural History 
in “1948 or 1949” (Sepkoski 2012, 57). 
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paleontology has tended to be an empirical tool for stratigraphic ordering and 
environmental reconstruction. As a service industry [of academic and economic 
geology], its practitioners have been schooled as minutely detailed, but restricted 
experts in the niceties of taxonomy for particular groups in particular times. (Gould 
1980, 98) 
 
This theme has been amply reproduced in the secondary literature on the 
Paleobiological Revolution. Turner, for example, attempts to capture the spirit of the 
Paleobiological Revolution in a series of seven slogans, the first of which is 
“Paleontology has more to contribute to biology than to geology.” Sepkoski expresses a 
similar sentiment in Rereading the Fossil Record: 
   
The dilemma faced by paleontologists in establishing paleontology as a legitimate 
evolutionary discipline...involved both asserting the theoretical value of the fossil 
record and repositioning paleontology within the larger matrix of evolutionary 
biology...Instead of being an “idiographic” field concerned mostly with digging up, 
describing, and cataloguing individual fossils, paleontology would now focus on 
large-scale quantitative analyses of patterns in the history of life...The image of the 
paleontologist would change, too. Gone was the picture of a dusty fieldworker who 
spent his life absorbing the minutiae of a single group of extinct organisms. The new 
model paleontologist was trained in biology as well as geology, was adept at 
quantitative analysis, was prepared to employ general theoretical models to explain 
how evolution worked, and might be more comfortable seated at a computer than at a 
fossil preparation table. (Sepkoski 2012, 2–3, emphases added) 
 
All this is quite right, of course. Still, there is a danger we might misinterpret statements 
like these, and read into the Paleobiological Revolution lessons that history does not 
teach. One such lesson is that paleontology (or at least the “new” paleontology, 
evolutionary paleobiology) is essentially a bioscience, and not a geoscience at all. No 
philosopher to my knowledge has made so blunt a claim. Yet Turner comes close in his 
(2011); and since his work was foundational for the philosophy of paleontology, it is not 
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implausible that this perspective helped to set the trajectory of the field. Turner, at least, 
recommended this trajectory in his (2014). A good “starting point” for philosophy of 
paleontology, he suggests, “is to focus on the ways in which scientists like Gould drew 
upon philosophy, and in particular on the distinction between idiographic and nomothetic 
science, to help clarify the goals of the new paleontology” (Turner 2014, 495). Patterns of 
analytical attention suggest that this suggestion was heeded; much early philosophy of 
paleontology was philosophy of paleo-biology, and much of this was framed by the 
interests of Gould and others. But as I have argued in this chapter, paleontology is not 
just paleobiology by another name, nor is it a science that has been rendered obsolete by 
the advent of paleobiology. Instead, it is a thriving and diverse science, much of it 
oriented around biological questions, yet still very much a member of the earth sciences 
(see Chapter 5). 
 The upshot is that philosophers cannot approach paleobiology as if it were just 
another biological discipline, or a branch of evolutionary biology. Paleontologists are 
indeed biologists, but they are geologists too, and increasingly geochemists. That is, they 
are hybrids, and the hybrid nature of paleontological research demands philosophical 
scrutiny in its own right. How do geosciences marshal their collective resources to 
interdisciplinarily reconstruct geohistory? What roles does paleontology play in these 
projects, and how does it rely on other disciplines, like stratigraphy? And how do the 
demands of geohistorical research structure patterns of multidisciplinary collaboration 
and exchange? These questions have only rarely been asked, and when they have been 
asked, answers have tended to focus mostly on the borrowing of explanatory resources 
(see, e.g., Currie 2015, 2018). This dissertation will examine them from a different angle: 
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the angle of investigative practice (see especially Chapters 3 and 5). I explore what this 
means in the next section. 
 
4.  Philosophy and Scientific Practice 
         The final task of this chapter is to say something about my methodology. This is 
not an easy task, since philosophers tend to be remarkably unreflective about their 
methods, and I am no exception (Daly 2010). To make matters worse, my chapters range 
from standard philosophical analyses to more discursive treatments to historical 
investigations. This diversity precludes a conventional statement of methodology; yet it 
will nonetheless be useful to locate my project within some broad methodological 
currents in philosophy of science. Further, since I have criticized certain extant 
philosophical treatments of the historical sciences on methodological grounds, it will be 
useful to attempt a statement of what sets my approach apart. 
As I noted in Section 1, philosophers have a well-known bias towards generality 
(Nickles 1987). The reasons for this are many and mutually reinforcing, but an important 
one is the centrality of abstraction as a mode of reasoning within the discipline (Love 
2008a; Chang 2011). Abstraction consists in the exclusion of details from an inquiry for 
the purpose of facilitating understanding over different degrees of exclusion. There are 
many reasons for employing it. Traditionally, philosophers have abstracted to “get behind 
appearances”—to see past the frills and ornaments of the world in order to discern things 
in their real aspect and relation (Horsten and Leitgeb 2009). More recently, philosophers 
have abstracted as a means of model-building: facilitating comprehension by drawing 
attention to particular features of complex situations (Williamson 2018). Philosophers of 
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science “abstract from...the actual practice of science to reconstruct patterns of scientific 
activity...analyzing or criticizing [them] in terms of how well [they] serve the ends of the 
scientist” (Wimsatt 1974, 673). In all these cases, the use of abstraction is motivated by 
the belief that details obscure what is philosophically relevant about a concept or 
situation. The devil may live in the details, but the good God is in heaven, and faced with 
the choice, most philosophers prefer the heaven of ideas to the shifting contingencies of 
the material world. 
There is a tendency to think of abstraction and generalization as coupled: as if 
abstraction is only valuable as a means of extending the scope of a claim, and generality 
only achievable by way of abstraction (Love 2008a). But in fact the two concepts come 
apart (Chang 2011). There are ways of achieving generality that do not rely on 
abstraction, and (more important for our purposes) uses of abstraction that do not aim to 
generalize. Most philosophical research employs abstraction in some form, but the kind 
and degree of generality sought differ widely between research projects. My project 
aspires to only a modest degree of generality—I am not interested in how historical 
reasoning works in general, nor in how the historical sciences as a whole investigate the 
past. My concern is rather to explicate a particular collection of practices involved in 
reconstructing and explaining the past. To do this, I will make use of abstraction as a 
means of characterizing “significant patterns of scientific activity”; but my goal is not to 
generalize—it is to complexify. Scientific research is immensely complex, and there are 
limits to what can be learned from highly abstract models, constructed in response to 
internal philosophical debates. A challenge for philosophers is to make sense of this 
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complexity without abstracting it away; to dissect complexity, as opposed to retreating to 
scales of resolution where it loses its urgency and its capacity to puzzle.  
This approach fits broadly within a recent movement in philosophy of science, 
variously termed the “practice-turn” and the “turn to practice” (Ankeny et al. 2011; Soler 
et al. 2014; Potochnik 2017). This is the second major “turn” in the past sixty years of 
philosophical research into the sciences, and depending on how you look at it, is either a 
continuation of, or a reaction against, the “historical turn” of the 1960s. In the historical 
turn, it was argued that a more careful look at the history of science would uncover 
problems and complexities not evident from a perusal of contemporary scientific 
publications (Bird 2008; Barker and Kitcher 2014). This made it a kind of practice-turn, 
since advocates of historically-based philosophy of science urged that attention be paid to 
what scientists actually said and did, as opposed to sanitized presentations of scientific 
achievements (see especially Toulmin 1953; Kuhn 1962; Laudan 1977). Yet it can also 
be regarded as a preamble to the practice-turn, since historically-minded philosophers 
fixated on a small number of topics (like theory change and scientific rationality), and 
thus neglected vast areas of scientific practice (like forms of experimentation not guided 
by high-level theoretical claims). Early institutional forms of integrated history and 
philosophy of science (HPS) were built on this restriction (Schickore 2011; Laudan and 
Laudan 2016). Indeed, it was only in virtue of this highly circumscribed agenda that HPS 
was able to gain an institutional toehold—one that began to crumble away as its agenda 
broadened (Baigrie 1994; Dresow 2020). 
This broadening began in earnest in the 1980s, when a group of philosophers led 
by Ian Hacking took a closer look at the procedures and apparatus used to produce 
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phenomena in the laboratory (Hacking 1983; Franklin 1986; Galison 1987; Gooding 
1990). According to Andrea Woody, this was “[arguably] the first work in philosophy of 
science to advocate explicitly and self-consciously for a turn to practice,” and while it 
was indebted to the “historical turn” of the 1960s, it also had its own set of motivating 
concerns (Woody 2014, 124). Chief among them was the desire to dethrone theories from 
their leading place in historical and philosophical studies of the sciences. Theories were 
all very well, of course; but in their single-minded focus on theories, philosophers had 
neglected other fine things, like experiments and apparatus. Experimental work has “a 
life of its own,” independent of high-level theory (Hacking 1983); but this life is 
glimpsed only darkly through the glass of theory-centric approaches. The solution lay in 
shifting attention from thinking to doing, and from representing to intervening. So 
influential was this proposal that, in later years, the practice-turn has appeared to some to 
be little more than a rebellion against so-called “theory bias” in philosophy of science 
(Soler et al. 2014). 
But is this true, and if not, what does the practice-turn in philosophy of science 
really amount to? Despite the importance of “practice” in contemporary philosophical 
discussions of the sciences, this question has received surprisingly little detailed 
philosophical attention. According to Ankeny et al. (2011), the core of the practice-turn 
consists in seeing science as a process, and of re-framing traditional debates in 
philosophy of science in terms of “[the] activities...associated with and required for the 
generation of knowledge” (305). According to Waters (2014), it consists in “broadening 
the scope of philosophical attention to investigation, and hence towards analyzing how 
the integration of practical know-how, concrete knowledge, investigative strategies and 
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theoretical knowledge provides the basis for systematic investigation of the biological 
world” (121). But perhaps the most interesting answer belongs to Andrea Woody, as 
given in her contribution to a volume exploring the practice-turn in science studies (Soler 
et al. 2014). In this chapter, Woody analyzes the turn to practice as “a cluster of related, 
and potentially interdependent changes, each consisting of a retreat from a particular 
sort of abstraction” (Woody 2014, 123, emphasis added). The first is a turn from 
“conception to representation”—that is, from a focus on theories as “abstract conceptual 
objects characterized predominantly by their logical structure” to a focus on the activity 
of representing using models and diagrams. The second is a turn from the “a priori to 
[the] empirical”—from analyses couched in terms of “syntactic and semantic conditions 
generated through a priori analysis” to “accounts based on the examination of the 
reasoning invoked by scientists in particular contexts.” The third is a shift from 
conceptualizing scientists as “ideal agents to human practitioners,” which embodies an 
increased sensitivity to the importance of tacit or embodied knowledge, orienting 
assumptions (including background knowledge and ladening theory) and the cognitive 
limitations of human agents. Finally, Woody notes a mounting interest in the social 
nature of scientific knowledge, which she limns as a “shift from the perspective of the 
individual scientist to that of particular disciplinary communities and their interactions.” 
 
The inherently social nature of contemporary scientific practice introduces a variety 
of issues surrounding how knowledge is structured and transmitted, how knowledge 
is intertwined with issues of authority, expertise, trust, and divisions of labor, and 
how [the social structure of science] is established and perpetuated to coordinate 




Thus, for Woody, the turn to practice is a turn away from analytical tendencies 
associated with an interest in the ideal structure of scientific knowledge, and towards 
tendencies associated with a broader array of interests in scientific knowledge, its 
production and its use. That is, it is a turn within the epistemological study of science 
from highly abstract and general accounts (focused on the structure and validation of 
scientific knowledge), to more local, contextualized and “naturalistic” accounts (focused 
on the acquisition, transmission, representation and adjudication of knowledge). The 
common denominator here is knowledge, as well as an epistemological orientation that 
places scientific reasoning and its products at the center of the philosophical universe. It 
is in virtue of this orientation that practice-based philosophy of science maintains 
continuity with earlier projects in the field, even as its interests shift to more local topics, 
and its methods to more contextually sensitive modes of analysis. 
There is another tradition in practice-based philosophy of science: one that 
consists less in “a retreat from particular forms of abstraction,” and more in a turning 
away from traditional epistemological concepts and problems (see, e.g., Rouse 2002; 
Waters 2004, 2019; Love 2008b; Wimsatt 2008).25 This is a shift that trades in the 
customary philosophical focus on scientific reasoning for an analysis of science as a 
process involving collaboration, coordination and multiform scaffolding (in the form of 
goals, standards, institutional forms, etc.). In other words, it is a shift from an 
epistemological to a processual view of science; or if you prefer, from an epistemology 
framed in terms of knowledge to one framed in terms of investigation (or “practice”). 
 
25 Ankeny et al. mention “truth, fact, belief, certainty, observation, explanation, 
justification, [and] evidence” as concepts that can be “usefully re-framed in terms of 
activities” (Ankeny et al. 2011, 305). It is concepts like this that I have chiefly in mind. 
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Leonelli (2016) speaks of “a broader perspective on scientific epistemology that 
emphasizes its processual and embodied nature and seeks to understand science by 
studying the practices and instruments through which research is carried out” (69). This is 
more or less what I have in mind. And while some would withhold the title 
“epistemology” from such a perspective, it is nonetheless concerned with the conditions 
for knowledge acquisition and transmission, and in this sense, at least, is epistemological. 
  This dissertation fits better in the second tradition than the first. So, while I am 
concerned with scientific knowledge and its acquisition, my approach does not consist in 
asking traditional epistemological questions in new ways, or in reframing epistemological 
problems in terms of cognitive agents and their “epistemic activities” (Ankeny et al. 
2011; Chang 2011). Rather, I am concerned to make sense of scientific investigation in 
particular, local contexts: that is, to understand how scientists work and why their 
investigations go the way they do. So, when I discuss justification in Chapter 2, my goal 
is not to provide a new perspective on scientific justification; instead, it is to better 
understand how nineteenth geologists got on with their work in the absence of the kind of 
justification that philosophers expect to see in successful sciences. Similarly, in 
discussing scientific explanation (Chapter 3), my goal is not to say how historical 
scientists explain past events; rather, it is to understand how communities of scientists 
construct and assess explanatory models, and to characterize the kinds of work that 
contribute to ongoing explanatory projects. Finally, in Chapter 4, which concerns the 
controversy surrounding uniformitarianism, I eschew the old question of whether 
uniformitarianism is conceptually coherent. Instead, I try to understand what is at stake in 
ongoing discussions of uniformitarianism in geology as a means of understanding why 
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the topic remains an object of contention. All these projects are epistemological, I 
contend, but only in the broad sense that trades in a focus on traditional epistemological 
topics for a more dynamic understanding of the scientific process. 
 My orientation is also thoroughly, and unapologetically, historical; and in this 
sense, I straddle the two methodological “turns” in recent philosophy of science. Chapter 
2 concerns a methodological problem in nineteenth century geology; Chapter 3 develops 
a case study spanning over fifty years of research into the end-Permian mass extinction; 
Chapter 4 uses historical analysis to make sense of the controversy surrounding 
uniformitarianism in geology; and Chapter 5 is a historical study of stratigraphic 
paleobiology. It is an irony that most philosophical studies of the historical sciences have 
taken an ahistorical approach (an irony that is not lost on Currie, who notices his own 
ahistorical approach in Rock, Bone and Ruin). Of course, there is nothing wrong with 
analyzing historical science in an ahistorical way, but given how rich the history of 
historical reconstruction is, there is great scope for more historical modes of analysis. If 
there is anything methodologically distinctive about this dissertation, it is the mingling of 
these historical modes of analysis with analytical resources from the philosophical 
tradition. Indeed, this dissertation is a good example of a “local integration” of history 
and philosophy of science of the sort I advocated in my (2020). 
 
5. Forward 
 I began this chapter with rocks. Let me end with them as well. 
 Throughout history, rocks have functioned as a paragon of muteness. Stones are 
“in some sort...better than tribunes,” Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus declares, “For that 
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they will not intercept my tale...A stone is silent, and offendeth not, But tribunes with 
their tongues doom men to death” (Titus Andronicus, Act III, Scene 1). Stones, unlike 
tribunes, tell no tales. 
Shakespeare was writing before the birth of professional geology, so perhaps he 
can be forgiven for perpetuating this trope. But as Marcia Bjornerud (2012) observes, 
stones speak clearly to those who listen. Or perhaps we should say: to those who have 
acquired the capacity to hear. The next chapter explores how nineteenth century 
geologists gained the ability to hear messages recorded in stone, as well as an important 



























1.  Assembling a Geological Time Scale 
The geological time scale is “a layer cake of odd names,” many of them 
established in a burst of amazingly fruitful research during the first half of the nineteenth 
century (Gould 1987a, 76). Historian Mott Greene describes it as “a triumph of 
intellectual attention to singularity unequaled in the history of human thought” (2009, 
171). Others have called it “the tool ‘par excellence’ of the geological trade” (Gradstein 
2012, 1), and “an invaluable tool for geoscientists investigating virtually any aspect of 
Earth’s development, anywhere on the planet” (Walker et al. 2013, 259). Less 
sentimental types have called the scale “a residue of nineteenth century geology” (Erwin 
and Valentine 2013, 13), or else “a rickety old contraption, held together by nineteenth-
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century rules and current European formality” (Ward and Kirschvink 2016, 12). Yet 
while some may enjoy a pot-shot at this icon of their field, geologists of all stripes share a 
profound admiration for the scale and what it represents: nothing less than a synthesis of 
the geological history of our planet—a geohistory. 
 By the end of the eighteenth century, it was widely appreciated that the earth was 
ancient—far more ancient than the few thousand years accorded to it by modern 
creationists (Rudwick 2005). But scientists remained without a strategy for ordering its 
far-flung “pages” and “chapters” (rock bodies) into a coherent story (a geohistory). In 
this, they faced a situation “not unlike the hypothetical...dilemma that historians would 
face if they knew that modern cultures had antecedents...but did not know whether 
Cheops preceded Chartres or, indeed, whether any culture, however old and different, 
might not still survive in some uncharted region” (Gould 1987a, 76–77). While it was 
simple to infer that rocks near the bottom of the pile were older than those near the top (at 
least in local areas undisturbed by tectonic activity), geologists lacked a reliable way of 
comparing the ages of widely separated rocks and of ordering these into a coherent 
sequence. This meant there was no way of saying whether a stack of rocks in 
Pembrokeshire was as old as a stack of rocks in the Appalachians, notwithstanding that 
they might resemble one another in superficial appearance. 
All this had changed by the middle of the nineteenth century. In an explosion of 
“conceptual innovation [and] empirical expansion,” the newly christened science of 
geology had burst from the gates, and set to work disclosing the long and eventful history 
of the planet (Rudwick 1985, 3). In less than fifty years, a multinational community of 
researchers had ordered the pile of formations into a concatenation of systems, “defined 
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by the ever-changing history of life, and recorded by a set of names accepted and used in 
the same way from New York to Moscow” (Gould 1987a, 77). Remarkably, the major 
features of this history are still recognizable today, at least for the largest divisions of the 
geological column (see Figure 3). Yet no less remarkably, the practice most responsible 
for this success—the measurement of time using fossils—lacked an adequate theoretical 
foundation during the early decades of the nineteenth century. It is this observation that 
supplies the focus for the present chapter. In particular, I will ask how the absence of a 
theoretical justification caused no real disruption in stratigraphic geology during the first 
half of the nineteenth century. My answer will be that geologists managed to solve the 
“problem of nomic measurement,” so named by Hasok Chang (2004)—or if they did not 
solve it, at least they found a way of lessening its sting.1 The solution was nowhere 
explicitly formulated, yet it was widely understood that ongoing research had rendered 
the foundations of paleontological correlation increasingly secure. This chapter aims to 
explore the logical basis of this (largely implicit) judgment. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, I introduce 
Richard Boyd’s notion of a start-up problem, and suggest that the subject of this chapter 
can be characterized as a “start-up problem in scientific practice.” In Section 3, I provide 
a crash course in nineteenth century geology, which is followed, in Section 4, by a 
discussion of the problem of justifying fossil-based measurement. In Section 5, I consider 
how this problem was overcome in practice: by a piecemeal strategy, as opposed to a 
 
1 The problem of nomic measurement arises when researchers want to measure an 
unobservable quantity X based on an observable quantity Y, but the relationship between 
X and Y is insufficiently characterized. I will discuss the problem further in section 4. 
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theoretical fix-all. I conclude in Section 6 with a synopsis and a brief reflection on the 




Figure 3  A nineteenth century representation of the geological time scale in customary 
tabular format (see Rupke 1998). Notice that many of the system names are the same as 





2.  A Start-Up Problem in Scientific Practice 
This chapter addresses what might be called a “start-up problem in scientific 
practice.” I owe the term “start-up problem” to Richard Boyd (1992), who speaks of “the 
start-up problem [in philosophy of science]” as the problem of explaining “the first 
emergence of approximately true theories within a research tradition, and thus the 
emergence of the reliable methods they determine [i.e., justify]” (139, emphasis added). 
The start-up problem is a problem, Boyd thinks, because scientific methods are deeply 
theory-dependent, and as a consequence, it is not an option to explain the emergence of 
successful scientific theories by appealing to the methods they make possible. In addition, 
it is not an option to explain their emergence by reference to a more basic theory-
independent methodology because no such methodology exists. The upshot, Boyd thinks, 
is that “the emergence of epistemically successful scientific methods must have depended 
on the logically, epistemically, and historically contingent emergence of a relevantly true 
theoretical tradition rather than vice versa.” Or, to render this as a motto: No 
epistemically successful scientific method without a pre-existing theoretical justification. 
 The start-up problem I deal with in this chapter is not the same as Boyd’s start-up 
problem, for the important reason that it is not concerned with “the emergence of an 
approximately true scientific theory.” Instead, it is concerned with the emergence of a 
methodological practice in the absence of a justifying theory, and indeed, in the absence 
of much interest in providing such a theory. The practice is paleontological correlation 
and consists in the “fitting together” of rock layers in different parts of the world based 
on their fossil contents. It is important because, prior to the second half of the twentieth 
century, it was the best way for geologists to compile information from individual 
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outcrops into regional frameworks, and ultimately, to synthesize these into a global time 
scale. As Roland Goldring puts it: “Until outcrops...are correlated by time lines, there is 
no way of gaining any real appreciation of the temporal distribution of past environments 
across an area or within adjacent basins and ranges; let alone of clarifying what was 
going on at distant points on the globe” (Goldring 1991, 156). This means that absent a 
reliable means of correlating rocks over long distances, the project of reconstructing 
geohistory is scarcely possible at all. 
 But why were fossils so important for stratigraphic correlation? To answer this 
question, we must familiarize ourselves with some features of stratigraphic geology in the 
nineteenth century. The next section provides a crash course in nineteenth century 
stratigraphy, which will position us, in Section 4, to explore our start-up problem in 
scientific practice. 
 
3.  A Crash Course in Nineteenth Century Stratigraphy 
Stratigraphy is the study of layered rocks (“strata”), but on a more elementary 
level, it is all about time (Torrens 2002). Stratigraphers are interested in determining the 
ages of rocks, and in using this information to delineate a sequence of geological units 
that can be recognized throughout a region, and even throughout the world. This 
involves, first, delineating packages of strata that represent discrete units of time, and 
second, fitting these packages together through a process called correlation. Correlation 
refers to the practice of matching geological units found in different localities, or to be 
more precise, of establishing a correspondence between geographically separated parts of 
a single geological unit. Sometimes called “temporal correlation,” it is the way geologists 
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seek to establish the time-equivalence of rock layers, and by this means, to build a 
framework applicable over a maximally wide geographical extent.2 The trick is to show 
that rocks observed in different exposures are actually the same age. Rocks do not come 
time-stamped, after all, and since geological evidence is notoriously jumbled and 
fragmentary, considerable difficulties confront the project of assembling a time scale 
from the scattered windows afforded by natural and artificial exposures. 
These difficulties were acutely felt by those nineteenth century geologists who set 
about unraveling local sequences and matching them with sequences in other parts of the 
world. The basic problem was the absence of a criterion for matching time-equivalent 
rocks in widely separated areas. Rock type, or mineralogy, had once appeared a 
promising criterion. According to the famous theory of German scientist Abraham 
Werner, all rocks on the earth’s surface had precipitated from a universal ocean in order 
of their densities (Berry 1987). So granites, having the highest density, precipitated at the 
earliest period, and less dense rocks like sandstones and limestones precipitated later. 
Had this posit been correct, temporal correlation would have been a straightforward 
affair, since all that would have been required to locate a rock in the pile of formations 
would have been information about its mineralogical characteristics. Yet Werner’s 
system was untenable, as observations of intrusive granite sufficed to show.3 This did not 
discredit mineralogy as a guide to delineating rocks representing discrete units of time, 
 
2 There are also non-temporal forms of correlation, but these are not my concern here. 
3 Intrusive rocks are formed when liquid magma penetrates existing rock; so the existence 
of intrusive granite indicates that less-dense rocks can be deposited before granite, 
contrary to Werner’s account. 
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but it did suggest that rock type alone could not supply a “measuring rod of history”—a 
means of placing rocks in their right temporal sequence (Gould 1987a, 81). 
Enter fossils. Around the turn of the nineteenth century, the surveyor William 
Smith had shown that fossils can be used to distinguish a number of discrete formations 
in England and Wales. The most famous result of this survey was a map that depicted the 
succession of British Secondary strata at an unprecedented level of detail.4 Smith 
produced his map “by collecting fossils from particular localities and strata, precisely 
noting their geographical and stratigraphical placement, and identifying analogous strata 
in other locations by finding similar fossils” (Sepkoski 2017, 62). He called the fossils 
peculiar to a stratum “characteristic fossils.” Together they functioned as a kind of 
stratigraphic reference system, since finding a characteristic fossil told you that the 
surrounding rock belonged to this part of the pile as opposed to that part. Although Smith 
was not terribly concerned with reconstructing geohistory (his concerns were rather 
structural than geohistorical), his method was quickly adopted by those with more 
geohistorical interests (Rudwick 1996). A famous example is Sir Roderick Impey 
Murchison, who declared in 1839 that “the zoological contents of rocks, when coupled 
with their order of superposition, are the only criteria of their age” (9, emphases in 
original). 
Smith’s work came close to supplying a paradigm for stratigraphic geology in the 
sense of a model of exemplary practice. In the years following his publication, no 
geologist could eschew the task of collecting fossils from stratigraphic sections, or at the 
 
4 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the term “Secondaries” (or “Secondary 
rocks”) referred to a collection of well-stratified and fossil-rich limestone and shales 
(e.g.) that rested atop the more structurally complex “Primaries” (see Rudwick 1985). 
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very least describing them in his notebook. Yet Smith’s accomplishment did not quite 
rise to the status of an exemplar in the Kuhnian sense (Rudwick 1985). This is evident 
from the fact that, in the early decades of the nineteenth century, doubts persisted about 
the priority of fossil evidence in stratigraphic correlation. At issue was precisely the 
matter that Smith regarded as settled: the reliability of fossils as markers of stratigraphic 
position. The matter was unsettled because—contrary to Smith’s claim to have uncovered 
a “Law of Strata”—Smith had in fact discovered no law that could underwrite the 
extension of his method to other parts of the world, or indeed to other parts of the pile. 
What Smith had discovered was that fossils could be used with great reliability to 
distinguish a large number of Secondary formations, and that these identifications could 
be used to correlate rocks across England and Wales (Rudwick 2005). But it remained 
open to question whether the existence of certain fossils in a rock reflected the period of 
time in which that rock was formed (as Smith’s method of characteristic fossils required), 
or whether it sometimes reflected something else, like the presence of certain conditions 
at the era of “fossil potting.” The problem was a serious one, and it was clear to many 
that it would need to be sorted out before long-distance paleontological correlations could 
be regarded as anything more than provisional. 
 
4.  The Problem with Paleontological Correlation, Characterized 
Here is the basic issue. By the 1830s, no one denied that fossils had a role to play 
in stratigraphic correlation. Yet there remained a question as to what exactly this role 
should be, particularly when geologists ventured beyond the relatively well-behaved 
Secondary formations of Great Britain and continental Europe. The question was 
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important since the use of fossils in correlation had both empirical and theoretical 
vulnerabilities. On the empirical side, what was missing was a demonstration that fossil 
assemblages had indeed succeeded one another in an orderly way in time, not only at a 
single location, but everywhere in the world these fossils assemblages happened to occur. 
Absent this demonstration, it would not be possible to infer the age of a rock from the 
identity of its enclosed fossils, since fossils that occur throughout the column carry no 
temporal signature. However, in the early decades of the nineteenth century, knowledge 
of the temporal ranges of fossils remained highly fragmentary and almost necessarily 
parochial.5 This meant that the use of fossils in correlation rested on substantial empirical 
assumptions, which many in the early century regarded as unwarranted, if not downright 
implausible (Rudwick 1985). 
On the theoretical side, what was missing was an explanation of why the 
stratigraphic record is amenable to paleontological correlation. Perhaps it could not be 
shown on empirical grounds that the history of life consists in a linear succession of 
mostly discrete floras and faunas. Still, if it could be shown that this succession is 
expected on theoretical grounds, then the absence of an empirical demonstration could be 
blunted. And by the 1830s, several proposals to this effect had been proposed. On the 
continent, Georges Cuvier had articulated a theory of revolutions, which held that 
massive calamities in earth’s past had served to establish divisions between successive 
periods in the history of life (Rudwick 2005; Sepkoski 2021). Later, Élie de Beaumont 
 
5 This is not to say that geologists lacked evidence that the history of life was broadly 
directional. It was suspected, for example, that fossils like ammonites were confined to 
Secondary strata, and that mammals were confined to Tertiary strata. What they lacked 
was detailed information about the spatial and temporal ranges of (most) fossil taxa; and 
this raised the possibility that apparent trends in the fossil record were just that. 
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proposed a similar theory, which held that major periods in geological history were 
terminated by “epochs of elevation” associated with marine and terrestrial extinctions. 
These theories enjoyed considerable popularity for a time—at least before the 1840s, 
when de Beaumont effectively recanted. Still, they were far from universally accepted, 
especially in Great Britain, where the most famous revolution was a bloodless one, and 
political history after Cromwell was rather less tumultuous than it was in France. 
A related theoretical idea was that the earth was slowly cooling from an 
incandescent state (Rudwick 2008).6 Because it was believed that organic life must have 
a constant relationship to the state of the earth’s surface, it seemed to follow that the 
community of living things must have changed in order to keep pace with the state of the 
earth. Advocates of this view did not interpret these changes in evolutionary terms; 
rather, they tended to imagine a trickle of extinctions followed occasionally by new 
creations, or else migrations from different climate zones. Yet even apart from this, the 
view was based on a false premise. The earth is not slowly cooling from an incandescent 
state, and the drama of life’s relationship with climate is significantly more complicated 
than the directionalist theories of the nineteenth century could comprehend. 
Without an empirical demonstration that the fossil record is suitable for 
correlation, or a theoretical argument that the record can be trusted in the absence of such 
a demonstration, geologists faced the following dilemma. In order to use the fossil record 
to correlate strata over large distances, it must be the case that fossil assemblages 
succeeded one another in an orderly way in time throughout the sampling area. However, 
 
6 This idea was shared among advocates of geological catastrophes and (some of) their 
opponents. For the former, it supplied a plausible mechanism for transient disruptions of 
the earth’s surface (Rudwick 2005). 
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to determine whether fossil assemblages succeeded one another in this way, some method 
is needed to determine whether a succession in one part of the world—e.g., a sequence 
showing the transition from fauna A to fauna B—is contemporaneous with a succession 
in another part of the world (which also shows the transition from A to B). But this is 
what fossils are called upon to do—in particular, fossils belonging to faunas A and B. 
The result is a circularity. Since the practice of correlation presupposes that the transition 
from A to B happened at the same time over the relevant area, it cannot establish that this 
was the case—something T.H. Huxley pointed out in an 1862 address to the Geological 
Society of London: 
 
For anything that geology or paleontology are able to show to the contrary, a 
Devonian fauna and flora in the British Islands may have been contemporaneous with 
Silurian life in North America, and with a Carboniferous fauna and flora in Africa. 
Geographical provinces and zones may have been as distinctly marked in the 
Palaeozoic epoch as at present, and those seemingly sudden appearances of new 
genera and species, which we ascribe to new creation, may be simple results of 
migration. (Huxley 1862, xvi) 
 
To mark the absence of “any method by which the absolute synchronism of two strata 
can be demonstrated,” Huxley coined the term homotaxis, meaning similarity of 
arrangement (of fossil successions at distinct locations). His point was that 
paleontological correlation could not establish that fossils succeeded one another in a 
regular way in time. All it could establish is that fossils occur in a regular vertical order in 




The problem can be characterized as an instance of what Hasok Chang (2004) 
calls the “problem of nomic measurement.” This is a generic epistemic problem in start-
up situations, and it has the following structure: 
 
(i)  We want to measure quantity X;      
(ii)  [But] quantity X is not directly observable, [so] we infer it from another 
quantity Y, which is directly observable. 
(iii)  For this inference we need a law that expresses X as a function of Y. 
(iv)  But the form of this function f cannot be discovered or tested empirically, 
because that would involve knowing the values of both Y and X, but X is the 
unknown variable that we are trying to measure. (Chang 2004, 59) 
 
In the present case, X is time (i.e., the age of a stratum), Y is faunal composition and f is 
the form of the relationship between time and faunal composition over a specified area. 
Early nineteenth century geologists tended to assume that observed fossil successions 
reflect temporal successions, not just at a single location, but at many locations separated 
by hundreds or even thousands of kilometers. But this was just an assumption, and as 
Huxley said: “It may be so; it may be otherwise.” The reason is that fossils measure time 
only with the assistance of an empirical assumption: that the fossil record preserves a 
worldwide directional signal, and that certain events recorded at widely separated 
exposures were effectively synchronous. And this assumption cannot be decisively 
validated on the strength of fossil evidence alone. 
 Nonetheless, it was verified, at least to the satisfaction of most geologists. The 
next section considers how this was done. In particular, it examines the kinds of evidence 
relevant to assessing the temporal significance of homotaxial patterns, as well as the 




5.  Validating Paleontological Correlation 
 It is a remarkable fact about nineteenth century geology that geologists were 
aware of the problem with paleontological correlation and yet seemed to be little 
bothered by it. Yes, there were doubts—not only about particular paleontological 
correlations, but also about the tendency to assign fossil evidence priority in correlational 
practice (Rudwick 1985). But the dominant note in the period was one of optimism and 
confidence regarding the promise of fossil-based correlation. Indeed, by the time Huxley 
coined the term “homotaxis” in the 1860s, the tendency to award fossil evidence the right 
of way in stratigraphic practice had been widely accepted for more than a decade. 
Were these geologists behaving rashly? Did they overreach in thinking that a 
geological time scale could be articulated and refined using fossil data alone? In this 
section, I will suggest that the answer to these questions is “no.” Nineteenth century 
geologists had good reason to think that the succession of fossil assemblages in strata 
reflected a real historical succession, at least when the appropriate cross-checks had been 
performed. Moreover, they had reason to think that certain events in the rock record, at 
least, were approximately synchronous over broad geographical areas. 
 Consider a sequence of three fossil assemblages (A, B and C) with suspected non-
overlapping ranges in time.7 How can the geologist know whether the observed 
succession of faunas (A>B>C) reflects a true temporal sequence as opposed to a sequence 
of laterally arranged depositional environments, say? To begin, if it is true that the 
assemblages succeeded one another in the hypothesized temporal order, then it should 
 
7 The line of reasoning pursued in this paragraph is unchanged if A, B and C name taxa 
(e.g., individual species or genera) as opposed to assemblages (see, e.g., Harper 1980). 
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never be the case that C appears beneath B at an exposure, or that C or B appears beneath 
A (Harper 1980). Likewise, it should never be the case that these supposedly sequential 
assemblages appear together in a single stratum (A with B, B with C, etc.). Observing any 
of these forbidden sequences or associations at any exposure is sufficient to disprove the 
hypothesis that A, B and C form a non-overlapping temporal sequence. (Sufficient, that 
is, if no plausible explanation of the anomaly exists, such as the inversion of a whole 
succession of strata or the reworking of sediments following deposition.) And while the 
situation is more complicated if we hypothesize that A, B and C succeeded one another in 
time with overlapping temporal distributions (e.g., A>A(B)>B>B(C)>C), it remains 
forbidden that—for example—C should appear before A at any exposure (although it can 
be expected that B will sometimes appear before A, and C before B—just not that often). 
To what extent can cross-checks of this sort vindicate the claim that assemblages 
that succeed one another in strata also succeeded one another in time? Certainly they 
cannot prove this. Even if every observed succession is compatible with the hypothesis 
that A, B and C succeeded one another in time, this does not establish that they in fact did 
so. Perhaps in every case the apparent temporal succession was due to accidents of 
preservation, and A, B and C in fact existed for exactly the same interval. Or perhaps A, B 
and C did succeed one another in time, but only at the examined sections. In other, 
unexamined sections, B existed well before A and endured long after C. There is nothing 
conceptually incoherent about these proposals, but the crucial point is that they become 
less plausible as more stratigraphic sections are examined. Once Thomas Jefferson hoped 
that Mastodons might survive in the vast American interior, but as more of the country 
was explored, this hope became difficult to sustain. In a like fashion, some geologists in 
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the 1830s were happy to postulate that land plants might have existed in the Cambrian 
Period; but by the 1850s, these notions had been mostly confined to the fringes of the 
geological community (Rudwick 1985). 
The reason they had become untenable was the absence of certain kinds of 
evidence—in particular, evidence of land plants interbedded with Cambrian marine 
fossils. Consider that to postulate that A and B coexisted for a significant period of time is 
to suggest the likelihood that at some exposures, at least, members of A should be found 
in association with members of B—in particular, if either A or B contains a taxon that is 
(1) widespread in distribution and (2) abundantly preserved in a variety of depositional 
environments (Harper 1980). If members of A and B are not observed in association at 
any exposure, the claim that A and B coexisted for a significant period of time becomes 
harder to swallow, and may come to seem indefensible as more exposures are examined. 
The claim can never be disproved using fossil evidence alone (perhaps land plants did 
exist in the Cambrian, despite never being observed in conjunction with any 
characteristic Cambrian animals). Yet at some point, the failure to observe A and B in 
association will tip the balance of evidence in favor of the claim that A and B did not 
coexist for a significant period of time. Notice that when A and B are taken to be 
successive assemblages, this pattern of reasoning can lend support to the claim that B 
succeeded A at approximately the same time throughout its range: that for the purposes of 
stratigraphic correlation, the transition from A to B can be taken to mark a time-horizon 
wherever it is preserved.8 
 
8 Again, the reason is that, were the transition from A to B not roughly synchronous 
throughout their respective ranges, we would expect to find members of A and B 
preserved in association at some exposure(s). 
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So, one can use features of documented homotaxial patterns (in particular, their 
invariance over a sampling area) to infer the probable existence of real temporal 
successions. Moreover, by factoring in additional features (like the geographic range of 
marker taxa), one can make certain inferences about absolute synchronicity, at least 
within a reasonable margin of error, corresponding to a far shorter amount of time than 
the lifespan of an average taxon. Negative evidence can bolster these inferences (with 
usual caveats), since highly staggered successions are expected to produce telltale 
associations at certain exposures. Taken together, this is encouraging.  
Still, it would be nice if there was some independent way to evaluate particular 
correlations. For example, if we could measure the age of at least some strata without 
using fossils, then we could check and see whether fossils were indeed a reliable guide to 
long-distance correlation. Today this is possible through a variety of absolute dating 
techniques and alternative methods of correlation. But in the nineteenth century, 
unfortunately, absolute dating methods were unavailable. To assign even a relative date 
to a rock formation, fossils were almost everywhere the best bet. 
Yet there were multiple ways of using fossils to measure time, at least for the 
youngest strata (the so-called “Tertiary formations”). Charles Lyell, for instance, 
proposed to measure the relative age of rocks using “the common relation which [their 
fossil contents] bear to the existing state of the animate creation” (Lyell 1835, 58). The 
thought here is simple. If species tend to go extinct at something like a constant rate, then 
one can use the ratio of extinct to extant species in a formation to assign that formation a 
relative age. Formations containing a larger percentage of extant species are likely to be 
younger than those containing a smaller percentage of extant species, all else being equal. 
 73 
 
Mollusks supplied the chronometer of choice because of their numerical abundance. (In a 
less abundant group, biases of preservation could interfere with the temporal signal from 
extinction.) So Lyell set to work tallying the mollusks of the Tertiary formations—or 
rather, he contracted a paleontologist to do it—resulting in his famous division of the 
Tertiary Period into the Pliocene, Miocene and Eocene Epochs (Rudwick 2008). 
How does this provide an independent check on paleontological correlations? 
Both strategies, it is true, use fossils to measure time. But they use fossils in different 
ways; and this provides an opportunity to cross-check their results. For Lyell, what 
matters is the ratio of extinct to extant species, not the particular taxonomic identities of 
species in a stratum.9 For Smithian stratigraphy, by contrast, specific taxonomic identity 
is everything.10 This suggests that if two strata correlated on the basis of characteristic 
fossils also contain a similar ratio of extinct to extant species, then we have two 
independent lines of support for the correlation. But did Lyell or anyone else actually 
perform cross-checks of this kind? 
Yes—sort of. Lyell was a friend of Smithian stratigraphy, and for this reason 
probably felt no great need to explicitly verify Smithian methods (Rudwick 1985). Still, 
several comments in Principles of Geology suggest that he was aware of the value of 
such cross-checks (or at least that he perceived that an agreement with Smithian 
correlations would add credibility to his chronometer). In discussing “[the] Eocene strata 
of Paris and London,” for example, Lyell notes that they “are marked by the presence of a 
 
9 Moreover, as Charles Darwin observed, ““[The success of this method presupposes] 
that the rate of change is everywhere the same...[and] that species become extinct in [the] 
same ratios over the whole world” (Allmon 2016, 684). 
10 Here the key assumption is that fossil assemblages succeed one another at about the 
same time wherever in the world they are found. 
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vast variety of peculiar extinct species of testacea [shelled mollusks], as well as of other 
animal and vegetable remains” (Lyell 1835, 397). This indicates that Smith’s method of 
characteristic fossils can be used to correlate these formations. At the same time, “it 
should be observed that had the geologist collected the fossils of the crag in Norfolk, the 
blue clay of London, and the white limestone of Paris, and [considered] these formations 
merely with reference to the number of recent [extant] shells contained in each, he would 
have seen...that the Parisian and London strata differed widely from the crag, and agreed 
very closely with each other.” In other words, measurements of the ratio of extinct to 
extant mollusks in the Paris and London strata agree with the correlation of these strata 
on the basis of characteristic fossils. So two methods, each employing different central 
assumptions, returned the same measurement. This is an example of a successful 
“coherence test” in the sense outlined by Bokulich (2019).11 
Did geologists solve their problem of nomic measurement, then? In a sense they 
did. To solve the problem, geologists needed to show, first, that the fossil record 
preserves a directional signal, and second, that events in the record taken to mark time-
horizons were roughly synchronous over the relevant areas. And by the middle of the 
nineteenth century, both of these claims had been rendered increasingly plausible. In both 
cases, the reasons for supporting the claim flowed not from an overarching theory, but 
instead from judgments of plausibility anchored in knowledge of local stratigraphic 
sections. Yet they were none the weaker for this—and in fact, the absence of a widely 
recognized theory of paleontological correlation probably saved the practice from 
 
11 In a coherence test, two independent methods are used to produce a measurement (e.g., 
a date). The methods are then assessed for convergence, not in order to generate a more 
accurate measurement, but rather to probe for possible sources of error.   
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disruption, since the most celebrated theories of early nineteenth century geology were 
neither universally accepted nor particularly long-lived. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 This chapter has been about a start-up problem in scientific practice: how were 
geologists in the nineteenth century able to solve their problem of nomic measurement? 
Roughly speaking they had two options. The first was to articulate a theory that showed 
that the fossil record preserves a directional signal and that faunal transitions preserved in 
the record were roughly synchronous over large geographical areas. The other was to 
warrant these claims in the absence of an overarching theory. Contrary to the expectation 
that epistemically successful methods require the existence of approximately true 
scientific theories, geologists took the second route in this case and were successful in 
doing so. Their success did not place their practice beyond the reach of all doubt, as 
Huxley’s criticisms suffice to show. Yet by the middle of the nineteenth century, most 
reasonable doubts about the practice had effectively been assuaged. 
 What, if anything, does this teach us about how scientists operate in start-up 
situations? I think there are two philosophical lessons here, one relatively obvious, the 
other less so. The obvious lesson is that methods can be judged to be epistemically 
reliable in the absence of a justifying theory—or at least reliable enough to warrant 
continued application in a domain. In start-up situations, what matters is not whether a 
method meets a stringent criterion of epistemic reliability; rather, it is enough that it be 
shown to be preferable to other methods in terms of its ability to handle outstanding 
problems and generate fruitful research. Justification in start-up situations, in other 
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words, is comparative and pragmatic. Possibly this is a feature of scientific justification 
more generally. Most scientific research is unfinished, and most of this occurs at the 
frontiers of advancing knowledge, where the terra firma has long ago yielded to the terra 
incognita (Nickles 2009; Guttinger and Love in preparation). In this soggy and bracing 
environment, scientists cannot afford to be overly exacting in their standards of 
justification. That is, in the “context of pursuit,” much justification depends on methods 
of heuristic appraisal as opposed to methods of retrospective assessment (see Laudan 
1980; Wimsatt 1981; Nickles 1988). 
The less-obvious lesson is an elaboration of this final point. In start-up situations, 
we can expect matters of justification to be keyed to forward-looking judgements of 
heuristic utility as opposed to retrospective assessments of epistemic success. Nickles 
(1987) calls the quality that is scrutinized in processes of heuristic appraisal “generative 
potential.” It consists in the ability of a methodology or research program “to handle 
problems still outstanding and to generate interesting new questions for research” 
(Nickles 1987, 47). In early nineteenth century geology, judgements of generative 
potential clearly favored the fossil-based research program (Rudwick 1985; Herbert 
2005). In its ability to handle apparent anomalies and to generate new questions for 
research, it had no serious competitors after the 1830s. Doubtless this is a key to 
explaining its success, even before the piecemeal justification of particular correlations 
could shore up its flanks. Paleontological correlation may have had uncertain epistemic 
bona fides, but after some early anomalies were dispatched, it was—and remained—
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1.  Introduction 
Explanation is a perennially hot topic in philosophy of science (Salmon 1989; 
Woody 2015). Since the middle of the last century, philosophers have shown a keen 
interest in what scientific explanations are, what distinguishes good from bad 
explanations, and what makes explanatory power a theoretical virtue (if it is one). In 
addition, many philosophers have become interested in the question of how scientific 
representations contribute to explanation despite containing prominent idealizations and 
abstractions (e.g., Potochnik 2017). In scrutinizing these issues, philosophers have tended 
to regard explanations in one of two ways: either as formal arguments (as in the 
deductive-nomological framework) or as communicative acts (e.g., answers to why-
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questions or representations of causal patterns).1 Yet the topic of explanation presents 
many aspects, not all of which yield to a focus on individual explanations (Woody 2015). 
In particular, this focus fails to illuminate the temporal dimension of explanation 
considered as an open-ended and collaborative process. Here we are not concerned with 
single explanations, but rather with the temporally extended activity of explaining 
complex phenomena or systems. Here too we are not concerned with single explainers (or 
at least we needn’t be), but rather with teams of explainers working jointly or in 
competition. In short, we are concerned with the dynamics of explanation—a subject that 
has received surprisingly little attention, despite its evident importance for understanding 
how science works.2 
This chapter is about the dynamics of explanation in geohistory. More 
specifically, it is about how geohistorical explanations develop over time, as well as 
certain of the factors responsible for generating this pattern. The chapter takes as its 
jumping-off point an observation from Currie (2014): that explanations of “[h]ighly 
contingent, disunified events” tend to “shift from simple to complex as time goes by” 
 
1 A third option is to regard explanations ontically: that is, as nonrepresentational 
physical entities as opposed to representations of those entities (Wright and van Eck 
2018). The present discussion presumes a non-ontic—that is, a representational—view of 
explanation.  
2 I do not mean to imply that the dynamics of explanation has received no philosophical 
attention. The vast literature on scientific reduction contains insights on how theoretical 
explanations change over time (see van Riel and Van Gulick 2019). In addition, 
philosophers interested in mechanisms have gone to great lengths to explore the process 
by which mechanistic explanations are constructed and refined (e.g., Bechtel and 
Richardson 1993; Craver and Darden 2013). The latter is the kind of inquiry I have in 
mind when I speak of the dynamics of explanation. 
 79 
 
(1173).3 Yet it goes beyond this observation by seeking to account for this pattern in 
terms of investigative processes involved in characterizing complex phenomena, as well 
as their interaction with allied explanatory practices. I argue that to understand the 
dynamics of historical explanation, it is necessary to attend to various kinds of non-
explanatory work—work that is undertaken to increase our descriptive understanding of a 
phenomenon, not to test a particular explanatory claim (Feest 2017). Doing so reveals 
that an important reason historical explanations “shift from simple to complex” over time 
is that non-explanatory work tends to multiply the demands placed on would-be 
explainers. As a result, the complexity of explanatory hypotheses tends to increase—
although as I suggest in this chapter, the pattern is sometimes violated for reasons that are 
both explicable and important for understanding the dynamics of explanation in general. 
My discussion of the dynamics of explanation makes contact with another 
important topic in philosophy of science: the problem of what organizes research into 
complex phenomena. According to an old philosophical tradition, the main organizational 
scaffolding of scientific research is provided by explicitly articulated theories and models 
(Fagan 2011; Love 2014). These structure research by setting a context of expectation 
that tells researchers what to attend to and what to ignore. Yet in the historical sciences, 
explicitly articulated theories and models are hard to come by (Currie 2018). Historical 
scientists thus need something else to “guide the search for relevant new facts” (Currie 
and Sterelny 2017, 17). Happily, hypotheses or “narratives” can play this role, 
“[extending] our reach into the past...by enabling the identification of relevant evidence” 
 
3 The notion of complexity in focus for Currie is causal complexity: an explanation is 
complex in proportion as the causal structure it represents is complex. When I speak of 
the complexity of explanations in this chapter, it is this notion of complexity I intend. 
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(ibid., 19).4 Given the prevalence of underdetermination in the historical sciences (which 
makes the problem of identifying relevant evidence especially acute), it follows that a 
majority of research in the historical sciences should be oriented around the testing of 
explanatory hypotheses (see, e.g., Turner and Currie 2017). 
As I indicated, this chapter is primarily about the dynamics of explanation in 
geohistory. Yet the account I develop does not cohere with the suggestion that most 
historical research is oriented around the testing of explanatory hypotheses. I do not deny 
that historical scientists propose and evaluate explanatory hypotheses—but this does not 
mean that most historical scientists, most of the time, are laboring to produce evidence 
that either confirms or disconfirms particular explanatory claims.5 Instead, they are 
engaged in a variety of activities that may be relevant to the evaluation of explanatory 
hypotheses, but that have different immediate goals, like the construction of a high-
resolution time scale for understanding an event (Erwin 2006b). To achieve a more 
rounded perspective, I propose that historical reconstruction can be analyzed in terms of 
structured problem agendas—suites of research tasks and associated criteria that pertain 
to different aspects of complex phenomena (Love 2008, 2014; Currie 2019a). Seen in this 
light, historical reconstruction is a distributed activity, and non-explanatory work is a 
 
4 “Hypothesis” refers throughout to a claim assessed as (probably) true or false in light of 
evidence (Fagan 2011). A narrative is a kind of hypothesis that purports to explain an 
event by adducing a sequence of events that leads up to, or comprises, the focal event 
(Currie 2014). 
5 Some are. Erwin and Vogel, for example, tested the causal relationship between 
volcanic eruptions and extinctions by examining the temporal proximity of “the largest, 
best constrained pyroclastic events” and extinction levels, and found no correlation, 
ostensibly disproving an explanatory hypothesis (Erwin and Vogel 2014, 893). 
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vital mode of participation in a project whose internal structure serves to distribute the 
epistemic burden over a large (and typically multidisciplinary) community of researchers. 
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, I explore 
Currie’s claim “that historical science exhibits a progressive pattern [from simple to 
complex explanations],” as well as his claim that, in the early stages of an investigative 
project, a majority of hypotheses will be simple “one-shot hypotheses” (Currie 2019b, 8). 
I suggest that while Currie provides a plausible kinematics of historical explanation—an 
analysis of pattern—his account of the relevant dynamics is less satisfactory. To begin 
the task of articulating a more adequate dynamics, I explore one of the major 
investigative projects in the contemporary geosciences: research into the end-Permian 
mass extinction. Section 3 explores three phases in the explanation of the extinction, 
encompassing an increase, and then a decrease, in the complexity of explanatory models. 
Section 4 explores what factors were responsible for this trajectory, paying special 
attention to the role of non-explanatory activities. In Section 5, I consider what the case 
of the end-Permian mass extinction teaches us about the dynamics of explanation in 
geohistory; I also consider how the concept of a structured problem agenda can help us in 
thinking about the organization of geohistorical research and the dynamics of explanation 
more generally. Finally, in Section 6, I provide a brief synopsis of the main arguments of 
the chapter.  
 
2. Historical Explanation: From Kinematics to Dynamics 
According to Currie, explanations of historical events and processes “shift from 
simple to complex as time goes by” (Currie 2014, 1173). This pattern of progressive 
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development has three stages. First, “a series of simple narratives are generated”; then, 
“[the narratives] are explored and tested against the historical record”; and finally, “[the] 
surviving narratives are woven together into complex narratives” (Currie 2019b, 8). Or as 
Currie writes in his (2014): 
 
(1) A series of competing simple narratives are put forward 
(2) Some hypotheses are abandoned due to empirical failings 
(3) Surviving hypotheses are synthesized into complex narratives (1175) 
 
Currie (2014) is careful to note that this pattern is not without exceptions: “presumably 
there are cases where simple narratives are entirely appropriate,” and there is no reason 
for researchers to move from step (2) to step (3). In addition, Currie does not say that 
progress in the historical sciences is limited to the synthesis of more complex narratives 
out of simpler ones. Along with articulating narratives of increasing complexity, a 
“complete” picture of progress in the historical sciences would include things like “the 
incorporation of new technologies and methods for uncovering traces and testing 
hypotheses, the postulation of new explanations, the incorporation of theories from other 
sciences and the explanation of historical regularities” (Currie 2014, 1176). Yet when it 
comes to the pattern of historical explanation, Currie thinks that his three-stage pattern 
will exhibit a dominant relative frequency, at least when the explanatory target is a 
“complex, contingent episode” (Currie 2019b, 1). Nearly all attempts to explain complex, 
contingent episodes will begin with a giant burp of explanatory hypotheses, followed by a 
process of sifting and rejection, and culminating in a period of synthesis, wherein 
surviving hypotheses are reconciled and set in a more complex narrative structure. 
Exceptions to this pattern are possible, but are unlikely to be very common. 
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 I regard Currie’s account as providing a kinematics of historical explanation; it is 
an account of the trajectory of historical explanations that is little concerned with the 
“forces” underlying that trajectory. Currie writes, for example, that “historical 
explanations shift from simple to complex as time goes by” (Currie 2014, 1173). This is a 
statement about pattern. It concerns the development of explanatory projects over time, 
but it does not say why historical explanations exhibit a trend towards greater 
complexity—it simply observes that they do. A dynamics of historical explanation, by 
contrast, answers the why question. It explains why historical explanations tend to grow 
more complex in terms of the factors responsible for generating this pattern. Certain of 
Currie’s statements suggest that he is interested in this dynamical question. In his (2014), 
for example, Currie observes that Carol Cleland’s account of historical reconstruction 
“does not explain the shift from simple to complex narratives” (1176, emphasis added). 
Currie’s own account, by contrast, does explain this feature, since it emphasizes not only 
“the empirical rejection and confirmation of hypotheses,” but also their amalgamation to 
form new, more complex hypotheses (i.e., narratives). Here then is the outline of a 
dynamics: one that is centrally concerned with the testing, rejection and amalgamation of 
explanatory hypotheses. 
I am prepared to accept Currie’s account of the kinematics of historical 
explanation; historical explanations really do become more complex as time goes by, at 
least in a large number of cases. Yet I am less satisfied with his observations regarding its 
dynamics. The reason is the central place they award to the formulation and testing of 
explanatory hypotheses (“narratives”), and their consequent neglect of non-explanatory 
work—work that may be relevant to the evaluation of explanatory hypotheses, but that is 
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not undertaken in the interest of testing any particular explanatory claim.6 Non-
explanatory work is a bit of a wastebasket category, and includes a variety of projects in 
stratigraphy, geochronology, geochemistry, taphonomy and systematics, to name just a 
few areas.7 Yet it is worth naming since these projects constitute a major focus of 
research in the geohistorical sciences, and since their primary goal is to characterize 
complex phenomena, as opposed to producing evidence bearing on an explanatory claim. 
An important thesis of this chapter is that non-explanatory work is every bit as important 
in determining the trajectory of explanatory projects as hypothesis-testing itself, and 
indeed more important in some cases. Further, it has “a life of its own,” to steal a phrase 
from Ian Hacking (1983). Non-explanatory work is not just a sideshow to the “real 
business” of hypothesis-testing. 
Currie is not deaf to the significance of non-explanatory work. In his discussion of 
“one-shot hypotheses” (see below), Currie highlights the importance of studies that aim 
to explore the dynamics of hypothesized causal factors (Currie 2019b, 15; see also 
Novick et al. 2020). These studies fit my definition of non-explanatory work since they 
are designed to increase our descriptive understanding of a phenomenon (as opposed to 
 
6 Currie (personal communication) suggests that he is giving an ontic account of the focal 
pattern: since history is causally complex it demands a complex explanation, which 
scientists come to realize when their attempts to confirm simple hypotheses end in 
failure. This may be; still, his account contains observations about the investigative 
practices involved in the explanatory process, and it is here that I find it wanting. 
7 These projects count as “non-explanatory” for the simple reason that they have as their 
immediate aim the exploration or description of a subject domain, not the testing of an 
explanatory hypothesis (see Feest 2017). In some cases, it may be hard to say whether a 
project’s aim is description, explanation or both. That is fine: all I wish to achieve with 
my category of “non-explanatory work” is to pick out a set of practices whose proximate 
aims are straightforwardly descriptive. 
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testing an explanatory claim). My quibble is not that Currie ignores non-explanatory 
work; it is rather that he gives it insufficient weight in articulating an idealized view of 
historical explanation. My goal is to explore a less idealized view: one that gives due 
weight to the interaction of characterization and explanation that drives so much research 
in the sciences of geohistory. 
 There is another element of Currie’s account that warrants mentioning. Early in 
the career of an explanatory project, a majority of hypotheses will be “one-shot 
hypotheses,” Currie thinks (Currie 2019b). These are monocausal explanations “of 
complex, contingent [events]” that researchers “treat as mutually exclusive with other 
possible explanations of the [event]” (1). They are also simple. Each one-shot hypothesis 
“takes a complex history and accounts for it with a single factor” (2). This makes the 
prevalence of one-shot hypotheses puzzling, since the past is complicated—and if the 
past is complicated, then why should historical scientists prefer hypotheses whose very 
simplicity makes them unlikely to be correct? Currie’s response is that these simple 
hypotheses provide two kinds of productive scaffolding. First, they help scientists isolate 
hypothetical difference-makers: “empirically tractable dependencies between variables,” 
which may or may not be relevant to explaining a focal event (1). Second, they provide 
“raw materials” for constructing “more complex—and likely more adequate—
explanations.” Scientists are not justified in their preference for one-shot explanations 
because these hypotheses are likely to be correct; rather, they are justified in their 
preference because one-shot explanations facilitate fruitful inquiry and learning, 
regardless of whether they are correct or not. 
Putting all this together, we can distinguish three main questions that arise out of 
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Currie’s account of historical explanation. These are: 
 
(1) What accounts for the fact—if it is a fact—that early in the career of an 
investigative project, many hypotheses are simple, “one-shot hypotheses”? 
(2) What accounts for the fact—if it is a fact—that historical explanations shift from 
simple to complex as time goes by? 
(3) Is the practice of articulating one-shot hypotheses reasonable given that the world 
is complex, and therefore unlikely to yield to simple hypotheses? 
 
In this chapter I will concentrate on questions (1) and (2). Given my answers to these 
questions, question (3) does not arise, or at least does not arise with the same urgency as 
it does for Currie. Nonetheless, I will touch on the justification of one-shot hypotheses in 
Section 5, when I take a second look at Currie’s characterization of “one-shot 
hypotheses.” 
So far, this discussion of historical explanation has been highly abstract. An 
example can help us see these issues in the flesh, and will guide us in answering the 
several questions outlined above. With this in mind, let us turn to scientists’ attempt to 
explain the most devastating event in the history of life on Earth: the end-Permian mass 
extinction, some 252 million years ago (Ma). 
 
3. Explaining the Apocalypse 
 The end-Permian mass extinction was the greatest biological calamity in the 
history of the planet. It is estimated that around fifty percent of marine families and 
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perhaps ninety percent of marine species perished in the debacle—a loss of diversity 
unequaled in any other extinction event (Raup 1979; Jin et al. 2000). On land, more than 
sixty percent of vertebrate families seem to have vanished, along with an unprecedented 
number of insects (Labandeira and Sepkoski 1993; Benton 1995).8 So profound was the 
destruction that the biosphere lay mostly fallow for several million years after the 
extinction, and after that wore a strikingly different aspect. In the words of Douglas 
Erwin, one of the foremost experts on the extinction: “the Permo-Triassic [P–Tr] 
boundary [was] a fundamental turning point in the history of life, bringing the world of 
the Paleozoic to a close, and, in the aftermath of the extinction, constructing the world of 
today. Despite all the evolution of the past 251 million years, today’s oceans still reflect 
the winners and losers of events at the close of the Permian” (Erwin 2006b, 7). 
         Stephen Jay Gould once remarked that no problem in paleontology has attracted 
more attention than the causes of mass extinctions. “The catalog of proposals would fill a 
Manhattan telephone book and include almost all imaginable causes: mountain-building 
of worldwide extent, shifts in sea-level, subtraction of salt from the oceans, supernovae, 
vast influxes of cosmic radiation, pandemics, restriction of habitat, abrupt changes in 
climate, [et cetera]” (Gould 1977, 134). Almost all of these causes were offered as 
explanations of the great Permian extinction—especially prior to the 1970s, when 
geologists’ overall picture of the event remained poorly drawn (see Rhodes 1967 for an 
early review of the literature). Beginning in the 1970s, however, a tentative consensus on 
 
8 The evidence for a mass extinction among plants is more equivocal, with a recent study 
finding no evidence of a Late Permian mass extinction (Nowak et al. 2019; for a differing 
view, see Retallack 1995). Still, the Permo-Triassic boundary marks a major change in 
floral patterns, and no coal seems to have formed in the first 10 million years of the 
Triassic, suggesting a major impoverishment of the flora (Benton and Newell 2014).   
 88 
 
the cause(s) of the extinction began to solidify. Peter Ward describes this consensus as 
follows: 
  
By the end of the Paleozoic Era, some 250 million years ago, there was but a single 
“supercontinent” [Pangea], composed of a united North America, Europe, Asia, and 
Africa. Two effects of this gigantic, tectonic embrace…produced the extinction. First: 
The Earth’s climate had changed. Because of its immense size, huge areas of the 
supercontinent could no longer be cooled or warmed by steadying maritime influence, 
and the interiors of this gigantic continent thus grew hotter in summer and colder in 
winter. Second, when the contents coalesced, the level of the oceans fell dramatically, 
causing the wide interior seas found on virtually every continent at that time to 
disappear. It was within these shallow seas that most Paleozoic marine life had lived. 
(Ward 2004, 7) 
 
The two processes, Ward observes, “were linked.” As the climate of Pangea grew more 
arid, shallow seas evaporated more quickly, and this led to further aridification since 
inland seas have an ameliorating influence on climate. At the same time, falling sea-
levels (produced in part by the merger of the continents, which put a brake on seafloor 
spreading) drained the shallow seas surrounding Pangea, further reducing the living space 
of shallow-water organisms (Valentine and Moores 1970, 1973; Schopf 1974). The 
destruction was indiscriminate. Among the denizens of shallow water marine 
environments, “the extinctions appear to [have] affect[ed] many marine groups in a rather 
similar manner” (Schopf 1974, 139). It was also slow. Apropos of an event caused by the 
gradual deterioration of climate and the associated draining of shallow-water habitats, 
Permian extinctions were scattered over a period of perhaps ten or twenty million years 
with a crescendo at the end. No catastrophe this—the end-Permian extinction was a 






Figure 4  A reconstruction of continental positions during the Permian, showing a major 
reduction in the area of shallow marine seas (shaded regions) from the earliest (“Permian 
A”) to the latest (“Permian D”) Permian. (From Schopf 1974) 
 
There are three things to notice about this explanation: 
1. The overall model is relatively simple. Continents once separated by oceans fuse 
into a single landmass, slowing seafloor spreading and causing a marine recession 
that drains the inland seas and the continental shelf. At the same time, the fusing of 
continents into a single landmass alters the climate, increasing seasonality and 
further accelerating the disappearance of the shallow seas. There is more than one 
process at work here (e.g., plate tectonic movement, marine recession, climate 
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change), yet the extinction model unites them into a relatively straightforward 
mechanism, with a reduction in living space and biotic provinces as its focal point. 
2. The kill mechanism is primarily designed to knock off shallow-water marine 
organisms. This is because, during the 1970s and 1980s, the end-Permian extinction 
was thought to have “primarily affected marine organisms”; “[the] relatively few 
terrestrial plants and vertebrates,” by contrast, “[were] not so strongly disturbed” 
(Gould 1977, 137). Two analyses of the fossil record of terrestrial vertebrates, the 
first by C.W. Pitrat (1973) and the second by Everett C. Olson (1982), found no 
evidence of a mass extinction around the Permian-Triassic boundary. As such, there 
was no reason to fret about whether a proposed kill mechanism could produce an 
extinction of land animals and plants (although increased extremes of temperature 
and altered nutrient availability could be invoked to do away with those lineages that 
were known to have gone extinct near the P–Tr boundary). 
3. The model is designed to explain an extremely slow-moving crisis, with individual 
extinctions staggered over a period of ten million years or more. As the paleontologist 
and expert on P–Tr boundary sections Curt Teichert observed in 1990, “The way in 
which many Paleozoic life forms disappeared towards the end of the Permian Period 
brings to mind Joseph Haydn’s Farewell Symphony where, during the last movement, 
one musician after the other takes his instrument and leaves the stage until, at the end, 
none is left” (231). Because of this, no catastrophic agent is needed to produce the 
extinction; instead, what is needed is a mechanism capable of producing a steady 




 Fast forward to the early 1990s, and the “tentative consensus” described above 
had begun to fray. Investigators continued to regard the extinction as a lengthy one—
Holser and Magaritz (1992), for example, put the length of the extinction between 5 and 
10 million years (making it the longest of the Phanerozoic mass extinctions). And nearly 
everyone remained convinced that it was accompanied by a drop in sea-level, perhaps 
exceeding 250 meters (Holser and Magaritz 1987). Yet new lines of evidence “from 
virtually every branch of the earth sciences” had begun to significantly complicate the 
overall picture, imposing a range of new demands on would-be explainers (Erwin 1996, 
74).9 In response, explanatory models began again to proliferate. Perhaps the extinction 
was caused by volcanic outgassing associated with the eruption of the Siberian flood 
basalts—the largest continental volcanic episode of the past half-billion years (Campbell 
et al. 1992).10 Or perhaps it was caused by increased levels of marine anoxia brought on 
by the erosion of the exposed continental shelf (Holser et al. 1991). In any event, it was 
clear that an updated model of the extinction was sorely needed, and that any model 
worth its salt would have to be consistent with the new evidence pouring in from across 
the geosciences, including the emerging isotopic record of the Late Permian (see Section 
4.1). 
Both the excitement and the confusion of this period are encapsulated in Erwin’s 
 
9 For example, new continental reconstructions indicated that the supercontinent Pangea 
formed during the Middle Permian, too early to have caused the extinction by drift-
induced reduction in marine shelf area (Erwin 2006). Still, the idea that the extinction 
owed to a reduction in marine living space held on (with falling sea-levels implicated in 
the real estate crash), and likewise the idea that Pangea had something to do with the 
extinction, especially on land. 
10 This could have triggered an extinction by bringing about rapid global cooling, and 
perhaps influencing sea-levels (see Campbell et al. 1992). 
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1993 monograph, The Great Paleozoic Crisis. In this work, Erwin reviews the evidence 
pertaining to the end-Permian extinction (paying special attention to new evidence, like 
the evidence from isotopic studies), and uses it to construct a novel “scenario for the end-
Permian mass extinction” (Erwin 1993, 255). He calls this scenario the “Murder on the 
Orient Express hypothesis,” after the Agatha Christie story in which the eponymous 
murder is carried out by all the passengers on the train working together.11 In a like vein, 
Erwin sees the end-Permian extinction as the work of “a multitude of events occurring 
together, in particular the increased climatic and ecological instability associated with the 
regression [sea-level drop] and a combination of greenhouse warming and possible 
oceanic anoxia from increased atmospheric CO2” (Erwin 1993, 256). Or as he describes 
the model in his (1994): 
 
The extinction began with the loss of habitat area as the regression dried out many 
marine basins, converting the two-dimensional coastlines of the mid-Permian into 
more linear coastlines. The increased exposure of Pangea as the regression progressed 
exacerbated climatic instability. This instability, coupled with the effects of 
continuing volcanic eruptions and an increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide (with 
some degree of global warming), led to increasing environmental degradation and 
ecological collapse...Some degree of oceanic anoxia may [also] have developed...The 
final phase of the extinction occurred in the earliest Triassic. The rapid transgression 
[sea-level rise] destroyed near-shore terrestrial habitats, causing the shifts in spores 
and pollen and perhaps much of the decline in insects and tetrapods. (Erwin 1994, 
235) 
 
It is clear that this explanation is more complicated than the earlier one. In 
addition to regression and increased seasonality, we now have volcanoes pumping carbon 
dioxide into the atmosphere, (probable) marine anoxia and (not mentioned in the above 
 
11 *Spoiler alert. 
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quotations) the release of methane gas hydrates from a deep ocean reservoir. These new 
processes are not “overkill,” so to speak—they arose from particular demands of the 
evidential situation, and were needed to explain all the pertinent evidence. Yet in spite of 
this, many paleontologists found Erwin’s model difficult to swallow. Maybe the end-
Permian extinction was produced by “fateful combination of...several misfortunes,” with 
regression and anoxia knocking off the marine invertebrates, and extremes of 
temperature, followed by a later (Triassic) transgression doing in the terrestrial 
vertebrates and insects (Fortey 1997, 207). But other investigators preferred to lay the 
blame at the feet of an extraterrestrial object, or to ascribe a larger share of the 
responsibility to the flood basalt eruptions in what is now Siberia. In any event, all parties 
agreed that more research was needed: for example, better biostratigraphic correlations, 
more isotopic studies with improved stratigraphic sampling, and new ways of estimating 







Figure 5  The Murder on the Orient Express hypothesis, with its dual triggers (marine 
regression and Siberian Trap volcanism) and multiple downstream kill mechanisms. 
Notice that the Siberian Trap eruptions are here represented as very much a secondary 




Fast forward again, this time to the present day. The end-Permian mass extinction 
is universally recognized to be a complex affair involving the interaction of multiple 
earth systems and the biota. But it is now known to have been incredibly rapid as well, 
with land and sea extinctions taking place at roughly the same time. Partly for these 
reasons, the Murder on the Orient Express hypothesis (with its three phases spread over 
millions of years) has been abandoned. In its place, “a consensus has emerged that 
Siberian trap volcanism caused the extinction via pCO2 changes and possibly CH4 
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[methane] influx, leading to hypoxia [insufficient oxygen], global warming, and the 
expansion of anoxia in OMZs [oxygen minimal zones]” (Wood and Erwin 2018, 870; see 
also Wignall 2015; Benton 2018).12 The “consensus” does not command complete assent, 
especially when it comes to the involvement of methane gas hydrates. Yet while 
significant uncertainties remain, it is noteworthy that the new picture represents a 
streamlining of the scenario presented in Erwin (1993), “in which unrelated bad things 
happen together by chance” (Knoll et al. 2007, 308). 
 
 
12 More precisely, the eruption of the Siberian Trap basalts is believed to have liberated 
vast amounts of carbon dioxide and sulfate aerosols, which led to runaway global 
warming and increased acid rainfall. It may also have liberated large amounts of methane 
(a potent greenhouse gas), either from contact metamorphism or from the destabilization 
of methane gas hydrates in underwater reservoirs. The combined effect of global 
warming and acid rain was to denude the landscape, causing massive erosion that flushed 
the shallow seas with nutrient rich soils and siliciclastic debris. This led (by an uncertain 
mechanism) to the spread of anoxic and sulfidic conditions in the sea, precipitating the 
marine extinction, while terrestrial extinctions “presumably resulted from aridity, acid 
rain, loss of soils, and perhaps short-term effects of wildfires and damage to the ozone 






Figure 6  A new “consensus” model for the end-Permian mass extinction. In this figure, 
causal links are depicted with solid arrows, and possible second-order controls with 
dashed lines. Notice that, while the figure contains more boxes than Figure 5, the 
extinction mechanism itself has been streamlined, with all effects flowing from a single 
triggering cause. (From Benton and Newell 2014) 
 
 
So have explanations of the end-Permian mass extinction grown more complex 
over time? This question is difficult to answer, since there have always been multiple 
hypotheses on offer (not equally well-supported, but still “live options”), and we lack an 




First, the recent “consensus” on the explanation of the end-Permian extinction is 
not significantly more complicated than the original one. Each posits a single trigger 
(volcanic outgassing and the formation of Pangea, respectively) that sets in train a variety 
of downstream kill mechanisms. The number and variety of enlisted kill mechanisms is 
probably greater in the newer model (different articulations of each model differ in the 
particular processes they incorporate), yet the overall difference in complexity is a fairly 
modest one. 
Second, the Murder on the Orient Express hypothesis is more complicated than 
either of the two “consensus” hypotheses. Assuming that the Murder on the Orient 
Express hypothesis was the best-supported extinction model in the early nineties (a not 
unreasonable assumption), the complexity of best-supported hypotheses thus describes a 
convex upward curve. The question then becomes what accounts for the initial 
complexification and later streamlining of explanatory hypotheses for the end-Permian 
mass extinction? The answer to this question illustrates a general point about the 
dynamics of explanation for complex historical phenomena. 
 
4. Characterizing the Apocalypse: Non-Explanatory Work as a “Driver” of 
Explanation 
Currie (2014, 2019b) claims that historical explanations tend to become more 
complex as time goes by. He further claims that this pattern owes to the “exploration” of 
an initial pool of hypotheses, followed by the amalgamation of non-refuted alternatives 
into more complicated narratives. I accept this pattern, but am interested in developing a 
richer account of the dynamics of explanation in geohistory: one that gives appropriate 
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weight to all the activities that contribute to the process of historical explanation, and that 
can account for both the complexification and the streamlining of causal models. This 
section begins this work, using research into the end-Permian extinction to illustrate the 
basics of the new picture. 
The main claim I wish to illustrate is that the principal “driver” of explanations 
for the end-Permian extinction is non-explanatory work: things like stratigraphic 
correlation, isotopic studies and radiometric dating. These “drive” explanation by 
imposing new demands (adequacy criteria) on would-be explainers; so when it was 
determined that terrestrial animals experienced a mass extinction near the P–Tr boundary, 
extinction models that explained only the marine extinction no longer sufficed. Non-
explanatory work typically aims at characterizing complex phenomena, and the 
characterization of phenomena is an ongoing process involving the progressive disclosure 
and articulation of more and more their features (Dresow and Love in preparation). Like 
bringing an object under a microscope into focus, non-explanatory work brings the 
features of historical phenomena into focus. And frequently, though not always, this 
increases the complexity of the explanatory target, requiring researchers to construct 
more complex explanatory models to meet a growing list of explanatory demands. 
The remainder of this section attempts to answer the question posed at the end of 
the last section: what accounts for the initial complexification and later streamlining of 
explanatory hypotheses for the end-Permian mass extinction? My answer is organized 
into two parts of unequal length. In the first and longer part, I consider how developments 
in a variety of disciplines destabilized the initial “consensus” on the cause(s) of the 
extinction, and led researchers to develop more complicated models culminating in 
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Erwin’s Murder on the Orient Express hypothesis. Then, in the second part, I consider 
how the further characterization of the extinction led to a streamlining of the causal story, 
and eventually, to the solidification of a new “consensus” model. In both parts, non-
explanatory work will be front and center, just as it is in research into the end-Permian 
mass extinction. 
 
4.1  From Colliding Continents to “A Fateful Combination of Several Misfortunes,” ca. 
1970–1993 
Recall that early explanations of the end-Permian extinction were geared to 
explain the disappearance of benthic marine invertebrates, and tended to invoke the loss 
of marine shelf area as the primary kill mechanism. But as Hallam and Wignall (1997) 
observe, “this model [was] driven more by a lack of data than by any conclusive 
evidence, and the picture has become rapidly more complicated as data-gathering has 
accelerated since the mid-1980s” (94). The opening of China to western geologists was 
an especially important development, since China contains a greater number of complete 
P–Tr boundary sections than anywhere else in the world.13 These have been critical for 
dissecting fine-scale extinction patterns, correlating boundary sections around the world, 
and—most importantly—resolving the rate of the biodiversity crisis.  
During the 1970s and 1980s, nearly everyone who worked on the end-Permian 
mass extinction regarded it as a prolonged affair, beginning with the retreat of the oceans 
 
13 China has a rich tradition of paleontological research in the descriptive tradition, and 
Chinese geologists had performed extensive work on P–Tr boundary sections prior to the 
warming of Chinese-western relations (Erwin, personal communication). To say that 
China was “opened to western geologists” is therefore not to imply that the majority of 
knowledge of Chinese boundary sections was generated by western scientists. 
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at the end of the Guadalupian epoch (the chunk of time spanning the middle of the 
Permian Period) and proceeding with accelerating pace into the earliest Triassic.14 This 
belief is now extinct. Two studies published in 1994 were especially important in 
changing researchers’ attitudes regarding the rate of the extinction. The first, coauthored 
by Steven Stanley and Yang Xingling, aimed to determine whether the apparently 
lengthy extinction at the end of the Permian was actually the result of an imperfect fossil 
record. Stanley and Yang were interested in whether the high rates of extinction recorded 
for the Guadalupian epoch were real, or whether they were produced by artificial range 
truncations (since the last known fossil of a particular taxon is unlikely to correspond to 
the last living member of that taxon). They devised three tests of the fossil record, which 
collectively indicated that high Guadalupian extinction rates were not artifacts of an 
imperfect record—the end-Guadalupian extinction was real and “occurred as a brief 
pulse, at or near the end of the age” (Stanley and Yang 1994, 1341). Since the end-
Permian mass extinction also occurred as a brief pulse, it follows that “Late Permian 
faunas experienced a double mass extinction”—a one-two punch of biological 
devastation, with five to ten million years of relative calm in between (ibid., 1340).15 This 
conclusion was reinforced by a second study based on the rich Chinese fossil record, 
which also identified extinction spikes at the end of the Guadalupian and at the P–Tr 
boundary (Jin et al. 1994). 
 
14 This statement should perhaps be qualified to exclude Chinese geologists, whose views 
on the extinction were not widely known among western geologists prior to the 1990s 
(most articles and monographs were published in Chinese or Russian). 
15 The end-Guadalupian mass extinction was not as severe as the end-Permian extinction, 




 These studies were performed by paleontologists: not for the purpose of testing a 
particular explanatory claim, but for the purpose of characterizing the temporal structure 
(duration and rate) of the extinction itself. Yet the task of articulating a temporal 
framework for the end-Permian mass extinction is not primarily a task for 
paleontologists. Instead, it is a task for stratigraphers and geochronologists, who seek to 
ascertain the relative order and absolute timing of events in the rock record, respectively. 
For much of the twentieth century, studies of the end-Permian extinction were hindered 
by the lack of a well-constrained temporal framework for understanding the event 
(Hallam and Wignall 1997). The age of the P–Tr boundary, the relationship between 
boundary sections in different parts of the world, and the completeness of boundary 
sections were all objects of considerable uncertainty (Erwin 1993; Hallam and Wignall 
1997). Yet things began to change in the 1980s, with the development of a new 
biostratigraphy based on the ubiquitous marine fossils known as conodonts (marine 
animals that left behind tooth-like jaw elements in great abundance). For a hundred years 
before this, the P–Tr boundary was recognized by the first occurrence of the ammonoid 
Otoceras woodwardi, or sparing this, the first appearance of the bivalve genus Claraia 
(Erwin 1993). But Otoceras faunas lived only in moderate to high latitudes, whereas the 
majority of high-quality boundary sections were deposited in low latitudes (Hallam and 
Wignall 1997). This made correlating boundary sections difficult, and frustrated the 
project of articulating a high-resolution biostratigraphic framework for understanding 
patterns of extinction and survival. 
Happily, conodonts permit a much finer subdivision of boundary sections than 
ammonoids, and in 1997, the Permian Subcommission of the International Union of 
 102 
 
Geological Sciences introduced a high-resolution framework in which conodont zones 
are used to define stage boundaries (Figure 7). This resolved many persistent correlation 
problems, and produced, for the first time, “a detailed picture of events during the 
Permian-Triassic (P–Tr) transition” (Erwin et al. 2002, 364). Conodont biostratigraphy 
indicated, for example, that there are numerous complete boundary sections in the 
tropical Tethys region, an important biogeographical province that had previously been 
regarded as lacking complete boundary sections (Wignall 1996).16 Still, conodont 
biostratigraphy was hardly a panacea, and important problems remained after the 
adoption of the improved framework. An especially acute one concerned the correlation 
between terrestrial and marine rocks.17 After early indications that terrestrial vertebrates 
may have avoided a mass extinction near the P–Tr boundary, evidence for a mass 
extinction had begun to accumulate during the 1980s (e.g., King 1991). Still, evidence for 
a correlative marine and terrestrial mass extinction remained sparse, with many 
interpreting the terrestrial extinction as a gradual one beginning in the Late Permian and 
continuing into the Early Triassic. This raised the possibility that distinct kill mechanisms 
may have operated in the marine and the terrestrial realms—a catastrophic one in the seas 
and a slower one on land. But if this were the case, then researchers faced the problem of 
determining how these mechanisms were related to one another. Erwin (1993, 1994), for 
example, postulated that increased oxidation of organic matter (from the marine 
 
16 The absence of complete boundary sections was in turn taken to indicate that the 
Tethys region had experienced a major regression, or sea-level drop, near the P–Tr 
boundary. 
17 Conodonts are exclusively marine animals. They are therefore not useful for 
correlating (establishing a temporal correspondence) between marine and terrestrial 
rocks, except in rare cases where marine and terrestrial rocks interfinger. 
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regression) led to climatic instability by raising levels of atmospheric CO2, with the 
subsequent transgression delivering the coup de grâce to land animals by destroying 
near-shore terrestrial habitats. But this was simply conjecture, however plausible in light 





Figure 7  A stratigraphic framework for the mid-Permian to Early Triassic interval, 
showing conodont zones in the right-hand column and traditional stage-level divisions in 
the center. Notice that conodont zones permit a relatively fine division of the geological 
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column—a prerequisite for characterizing patterns of extinction and survival at a high 
level of resolution. (From Hallam and Wignall 1997) 
New evidence from geochemistry complicated the picture even more. 
Fluctuations in the ratio of “light” to “heavy” isotopes in sedimentary successions reflect 
changes in ocean chemistry, “and, through a complex network of feedback loops, 
[changes in] climate, biological abundance, atmospheric composition, continental 
weathering, and ocean circulation” (Erwin 1993, 186). Isotope studies are therefore a 
means of determining the geological setting of events in the fossil record, and the Late 
Permian saw some of the largest isotopic shifts in the past 500 million years (Holser et al. 
1987, 1989). Carbon isotopes in particular underwent a dramatic swing, indicating that a 
huge amount of “light” (organic) carbon was added to the oceans and atmosphere around 
the P–Tr boundary (Holser et al. 1991).18 The cause of the swing was difficult to 
determine, and uncertainty lingered about whether the swing came just before or just after 
the extinction (and therefore whether it represented the cause of the extinction or its 
effect). Yet the crucial point is that, once it was known, the carbon swing could not be 
ignored in explanatory models of the extinction. A massive perturbation of the carbon 
cycle around the time of the largest mass extinction in history is not something that can 
be simply set aside. As such, a major focus of extinction models since the nineties has 
been to explain the aberrant behavior of the carbon cycle; and as Erwin (2006b) notes, 
“many of the disagreements over the cause of the mass extinction are really a 
disagreement over the cause of [the] shift in carbon isotopes” (51). 
 
18 This shift is evidently global—a fact that conodont biostratigraphy helped greatly to 
establish (see Erwin 1993, Ch. 7). Because of this, the carbon swing can be used to mark 
the P–Tr boundary; something that is especially useful in sections that lack fossils. 
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Carbon isotopes are just one geochemical witness to the events of the Late 
Permian. Isotopes of oxygen, sulfur and strontium also provide clues regarding features 
of the physical environment—features like climate, volcanism and tectonic activity. Like 
the carbon isotopic record, the record of other isotopes is not always easy to read; Erwin 
(2006b) calls the evidence from stable isotopes “abundant, consistent and ambiguous” 
(185). Yet it is undoubtedly important, and already in the early nineties, studies of 
oxygen and sulfur had generated some key insights, like the probable stagnation of ocean 
waters during the Late Permian (Holser et al. 1991). This insight was not exactly new—
sedimentological evidence like the existence of black shales had earlier pointed to the 
probable stagnation of the Permian oceans (Rhodes 1967). Yet isotopic evidence 
provided an important check on (sometimes ambiguous) sedimentological evidence, and 
in the end, provided investigators with more to explain than had previously been the case. 
Figure 6 represents several isotopic shifts, which have now become explanatory targets in 
their own right. (Figure 5 does not represent these shifts, but was also constructed, in 
part, to explain the evidence from stable isotopes.) 
 
This narrative is far from comprehensive; but already it is apparent that two 
decades of non-explanatory work transformed the target of explanation in a number of 
ways: 
 
1. Temporal anatomy. Instead of one drawn-out extinction, research in paleontology 
and stratigraphy disclosed “a considerably more complex event involving an 
initial [end-Guadalupian] extinction separated by a period of radiation in the latest 
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Permian before the wholesale slaughter at the end of the Permian” (Wignall and 
Twitchett 1996, 1155). 
2. Rate. Instead of a ten million year extinction event, research in paleontology, 
stratigraphy and geochronology resolved the duration of the end-Permian mass 
extinction to less than five million years, and possibly less than three million 
years (Erwin 1994). (The end-Guadalupian extinction was believed to be similarly 
brief, but this conclusion was based on more limited data.) 
3. Extinction patterns. Instead of an indiscriminate extermination of benthic marine 
invertebrates, research in paleontology and stratigraphy disclosed a “complex 
[pattern of extinction and survival], with some clades disappearing right before 
the boundary, others diversifying right up to the boundary, and still others 
seemingly oblivious to [the] extinction” (Erwin 1994, 231). On land, the picture 
of extinction patterns also “changed dramatically,” with new research 
“confirm[ing] the presence of a major end-Permian mass extinction” (Hallam and 
Wignall 1997, 110). 
4. Geological context. Finally, research in geochemistry disclosed an increasingly 
rich picture of the environmental context of the extinction, including major 
disruptions to several geochemical cycles, whose causes and mutual relationships 
remained to be determined. 
 
Altogether, this made for a more multifaceted explanatory target than researchers 
confronted during the 1970s, and one that multiplied demands on would-be explainers. In 
response, researchers devised more complex explanatory models—models that could 
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explain complex extinction patterns in the sea and on land, and that could account for the 
“abundant, consistent and ambiguous” evidence from stable isotopes (Erwin 2006b, 185). 
The most complex hypothesis was also the most authoritative: Erwin’s Murder on the 
Orient Express Hypothesis. This was not the end of the story, however, and in the 
decades following the mid-1990s, further non-explanatory work would lead to a 
considerable streamlining of extinction models for the end-Permian, while growing the 
roster of explanatory resources. 
 
4.2  Building a New Consensus, 1993–Present 
  Since the younger Pliny described “a black and menacing cloud, split by twisted 
and quivering flashes of fiery breath,” volcanoes have been a symbol of environmental 
calamity (Walsh 2006, 148). It is appropriate, then, that the greatest environmental 
calamity in earth’s history is associated with one of the largest episodes of sustained 
volcanism since the planet’s fiery youth: the eruptions of the Siberian Trap basalts about 
250 million years ago.19 
 Since geologists are wary of coincidences (and since coincidence in time is an 
important way of inferring causation in geohistory), one might think that volcanism 
would always have topped the list of suspects for the end-Permian debacle. Yet early 
 
19 Flood basalt eruptions are not like the eruption of Vesuvius that Pliny witnessed—an 
explosive event that blasted rock, ash and volcanic gasses high into the stratosphere. In a 
flood basalt eruption, runny lavas ooze out of fissures in the ground to form large sheets 
of igneous rock called basalt. The Siberian eruptions were particularly profligate of 
basalt, exuding enough lava to cover an area as large as the United States up to a 
kilometer deep (Erwin 2006b). Evidently there were Vesuvius-style (“pyroclastic”) 
eruptions happening at the time too: a nasty combination (Wignall 2015). 
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attempts to date the Siberian flood basalts produced an extraordinarily wide range of 
ages, from about 280 to 160 Ma (Benton and Twitchett 2003). “According to these 
ranges, geologists [before] 1990 could conclude only that the basalts might be anything 
from Early Permian to Late Jurassic in age, but probably spanned the [P–Tr] boundary” 
(Benton and Twitchett 2003, 361). Merely spanning the boundary, however, was not 
enough to implicate volcanism in the extinction, especially if the major volcanic episodes 
happened well before or after the extinction pulse at the P–Tr boundary (as many 
geologists believed they did). For this reason, most extinction models elaborated before 
the 1990s ascribed to volcanism “a relatively minor role in the [P–Tr] crisis” (see Figure 
5) 
 But more on this in a moment. In his 1993 book, Douglas Erwin referred to the 
question of rate as “[p]erhaps the most critical question in evaluating…various extinction 
mechanisms” (Erwin 1993, 225). The reason is that different kill mechanisms operate on 
different characteristic time scales, from the very slow (e.g., marine regression, climate 
change) to the very fast (e.g., bolide impact, volcanic winter). The discovery that the end-
Permian extinction had been fast, unfolding over a period of less than three million years, 
dealt a heavy blow to the original “consensus” model, which relied upon the formation of 
Pangea and the reduction of shallow sea habitat to bring about the (marine) extinctions. 
Still, it remained unclear in the early nineties just how fast the extinction had been. 
Erwin’s Murder on the Orient Express hypothesis required several million years to 
operate; anything faster would “[suggest] a single trigger,” as opposed to the patchwork 
of processes operating on a range of characteristic time scales (Erwin 2006b, 190). The 
model was therefore damaged by the discovery, in 1998, that the carbon shift took place 
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over a span of 165,000 years or less, “suggesting a catastrophic addition of light carbon 
[to the global ocean]” (Bowring et al. 1998, 1039). It was further damaged when Samuel 
Bowring and colleagues constrained the duration of the extinction to less than 200,000 
years (Shen et al. 2011), and then, in 2014, to a mere 60,000 years (plus or minus an 
uncertainty of 48,000 years) (Burgess et al. 2014). These studies additionally showed that 
the marine and terrestrial extinctions were effectively simultaneous (within the margin of 
error of the dating method), and that the surge of light carbon took place over a 10,000-
year period just before the extinction, eliminating the possibility that the carbon swing 
represents the effect of the extinction as opposed to its cause. Here, then, is an instance 
where non-explanatory work served to lighten an explanatory burden, since a 
simultaneous land and sea extinction is a simpler explanatory target than an out-of-sync 
extinction unfolding at different rates on land and in the sea. 
 Which brings us back to volcanoes. Russian geologists first suggested that 
Siberian Trap volcanism might be implicated in the end-Permian mass extinction during 
the 1980s, when the age of the Siberian Trap basalts was little known (Benton and 
Twitchett 2003). Still, the broader geoscience community did not take notice until 1992, 
when a joint team of Russian and American geologists reported a radiometric date of 248 
Ma (+/– 4 m.y.) for a volcanic intrusion cutting through the flood basalts in Noril’sk in 
Northern Siberia (Erwin 2006b). Since intrusions must form after the rocks they intrude 
through, this constrained the age of the Siberian Traps to >~248 Ma—younger, that is, 
than the P–Tr boundary. Subsequent work by Paul Renne and colleagues dated the 
Siberian flood basalts to 250 Ma (+/– 1.6 m.y.) and the P–Tr boundary to 251.2 Ma. (+/– 
3 m.y.): a degree of propinquity that is hard to ignore (Renne et al. 1995). More recent 
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dating using improved techniques has tightened the correlation still further. It is now 
thought that the Siberian flood basalts began erupting ~300,000 years before the 
extinction, and that they continued erupting for ~500,000 years into the Early Triassic 
(Burgess and Bowring 2015). It has even been proposed that a particular episode of 
volcanism—corresponding to a change from lava eruptions to sill complex formation 
(lateral intrusion of lava into adjacent sediments)—triggered the extinction and the 
carbon shift by liberating “vast amounts of greenhouse gases” from underground coal 
reserves (Burgess et al. 2017, 3). If this is true, it represents a considerable streamlining 






Figure 8  A time series for the abrupt change in emplacement style of the Siberian Trap 
basalts during the Late Permian, from lava eruptions involving the vertical movement of 
lava (1b) to sill complex formation involving the lateral movement of lava into adjacent 
sediments (1c–e). This lateral movement is proposed to have triggered the extinction by 
liberating vast amounts of greenhouse gasses, depressing the accelerator on the “runaway 
greenhouse” that ultimately wreaked havoc on marine and terrestrial ecosystems. (From 




 This is not all that has happened since 1993. In a remarkable volte-face, “the most 
favoured cause” of the end-Permian debacle prior to the 1990s—and a popular 
explanation of the carbon shift—proved to be false (Hallam and Wignall 1997, 132). Sea-
levels were not falling in the Late Permian, squeezing out marine invertebrates and 
ramping up the oxidation of organic matter on the continental shelf. Instead, they were 
rising, as detailed fieldwork using the new conodont biostratigraphy made clear (Wignall 
and Hallam 1992, 1993). Since multiple lines of evidence suggest widespread ocean 
stagnation in the latest Permian, rising seas may have washed the continental shelves with 
anoxic water, suffocating any organisms that could not escape the oxygen minima 
(Wignall and Twitchett 1996).20 Stir in evidence of warming associated with flood basalt 
eruptions and you have the makings of a new model: one in which volcanism triggers 
runaway global warming and acid rainfall that (1) denudes the land, (2) increases nutrient 
delivery to the oceans and (3) promotes the shoaling of anoxic and euxinic water on the 
continental shelf (Figure 6).21 Terrestrial animals likely succumbed to extreme heat and 
drought associated with warming, or else were snuffed out by the effects of acid rain on 
 
20 In any event, it is clear from new techniques for studying ancient redox conditions that 
anoxia was widespread during the Late Permian, especially in shallow waters (Feng and 
Algeo 2014; Clarkson et al. 2016). But here too, the picture is fast becoming more 
complicated. Instead of a gradual spread of anoxic conditions, the inferred pattern of 
redox changes now suggests a complex spatial and temporal dynamics, whose 
relationship to “both evolutionary dynamics and the global carbon cycle” remains 
unresolved (Clarkson et al. 2016, 2). Resolving these relationships will be critical to 
filling out new models for the end-Permian extinction (see, e.g., Schobben 2020). 
21 Euxinia is a condition whereby hydrogen sulfide (H2S) accumulates in oxygen-free 
waters, which can lead to deadly hydrogen sulfide poisoning or to hypercapnia (a buildup 
of carbon dioxide in biological tissues, which can be lethal). 
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plant life (Benton and Newell 2014; Benton 2018).22 Marine animals either suffocated or 
were poisoned, or else saw their living space eliminated when anoxic waters from the 
deep sea intersected with lethal temperatures from the surface (Knoll et al. 2007; Song et 
al. 2014; Jurikova et al. 2020).  
 This narrative has grown quite long; still, I have only scratched the surface of the 
non-explanatory work that has overwhelmingly driven explanations of the end-Permian 
extinction since the mid-1990s. As ever, attempts to characterize the phenomenon itself 
have been central (using an ever more sophisticated array of techniques and 
methodological approaches). Yet research into associated phenomena, like Siberian Traps 
volcanism, has also paid explanatory dividends: in this case, by growing the roster of 
explanatory resources upon which explanations of the extinction can draw. It is now 
possible to say, not only that the extinction is associated with the eruption of the Siberian 
Trap basalts, but that the extinction seems to have been triggered by a particular episode 
of volcanism corresponding to “an abrupt change...from dominantly flood lavas to sill 
intrusions [the lateral transfer of lava into adjacent sediments]” (Burgess et al. 2017, 1). 
Here we have a case where both the “explanantia and explanand[um] are subject to 
ongoing processes of investigation,” and where more precisely characterizing the 
explanantia is critical for researchers tasked with hitting a moving target: that is, with 
explaining a constantly changing explanandum (Feest 2017, 1166). 
My purpose in this chapter is to explore an enriched picture of the dynamics of 
explanation in geohistory—one that goes beyond a narrow concern for the testing of 
 
22 There is also evidence for massive wildfires near the P–Tr boundary, which would 
have contributed to deforestation and, ultimately, to “catastrophic soil erosion” that 
exacerbated marine anoxia and euxinia (Shen et al. 2011, 1372). 
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explanatory hypotheses. So far, I have done this mostly by illustration. In the next 
section, I return to the questions posed at the end of Section 2 to explore what the case of 
the end-Permian extinction has to teach us about the dynamics of historical explanation in 
general. I also consider the problem raised at the end of Section 1: what organizes 
research into complex historical events if not (just) particular explanatory hypotheses? 
 
5. Discussion 
5.1  Revisiting the Three Questions 
I began this chapter by isolating three questions from Currie’s account of 
historical explanation. These were: 
 
(1) What accounts for the fact—if it is a fact—that early in the career of an 
investigative project, many hypotheses are simple, “one-shot hypotheses”? 
(2) What accounts for the fact—if it is a fact—that historical explanations shift from 
simple to complex as time goes by? 
(3) Is the practice of articulating one-shot hypotheses reasonable given that the world 
is complex, and therefore unlikely to yield to simple hypotheses? 
 
My criticism of Currie was that he has not yet given satisfactory answers to these 
questions, in particular (1) and (2). For this reason, his account of historical explanation 
remains a kinematics—a description of pattern—as opposed to a dynamics. I have 
indicated in passing what I believe the answers to (1) and (2) to be. In this section, I will 
flesh these answers out, referring back to the case study to illustrate general points. I will 
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also comment on question (3): not to supply a direct answer, but to introduce a 
clarification that changes the scope of the question. 
 Questions (1) and (2) can be answered together. Early in the career of an 
investigative project, the features of an explanatory target will tend to be poorly 
characterized (and some features will not be known at all—think of the carbon shift near 
the P–Tr boundary). Since the complexity of an explanatory model tends to reflect the 
constraints on explanation supplied by ongoing characterization, explanatory models 
formulated during the early stages of an investigative project will tend towards 
simplicity.23 Yet as characterization proceeds to supply more constraints on explanation 
in the form of an expanded roster of adequacy criteria, researchers will be forced to 
entertain more complex explanations. This trend towards increased complexity is not 
irrevocable—sometimes, ongoing characterization will eliminate constraints on 
explanation, or disclose a configuration of constraints that favors a simpler explanation of 
the target phenomenon than an earlier configuration. Still, as ongoing characterization 
brings more features of historical phenomena into focus, the most typical result—it seems 
to me—is a multiplication of constraints favoring the development of more complex 
models. This accounts for Currie’s observation that, in the historical sciences, 
explanations “shift from simple to complex as time goes by” (1173).24 
 
23 Whether they will tend to be “one-shot hypotheses” is a separate matter, which I will 
consider below. 
24 This is the “demand-side” of the story, at any rate. The “supply-side” concerns the 
provision of explanatory resources that support complexification, and here too non-
explanatory work is often paramount (see, e.g., Novick et al. 2020 on the role of 
experiments in furnishing explanatory resources). 
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The case of the end-Permian mass extinction illustrates this picture nicely. Before 
the 1970s little was known about the temporal structure of the end-Permian mass 
extinction, and even its magnitude was in doubt. A prominent review cautioned against 
“over-dramatizing” it: “Certainly several major taxa of Paleozoic invertebrates became 
extinct, but the pattern of extinction shows little uniformity…[and] Late Paleozoic 
extinction rates were by no means unique” (Rhodes 1967, 57, 72). Land animals in 
particular were “little reduced,” and plants seem to have experienced “no dramatic 
episode of extinction” (57). Rhodes singled out two features of the end-Permian 
extinction as requiring explanation. First, researchers needed to explain “the degree and 
extent of late Permian and early Triassic extinction[s]” (uncertain though these were). 
Second, they needed to explain “the time-lag between the disappearance [of Paleozoic 
taxa] and [their] replacement [in Triassic times]” (71). These explanatory requirements 
were not terribly onerous, and indeed, Rhodes went so far as to suggest that “we [may] 
need no ‘special’ explanation [for the end-Permian extinction] over and above the 
explanation of normal extinction” (71). Few paleontologists seem to have agreed with 
him; still it is remarkable that, in 1967, a leading paleontologist could suggest that all 
“special” explanations of the end-Permian mass extinction are superfluous—that nothing 
in our knowledge of the Late Permian compels us to entertain extinction models beyond 
the “null” model. Never again would the evidential situation supply so few constraints on 
explanations of the extinction. 
Consider, by contrast, the list of “observations [that] must be accommodated 
within any acceptable model for the extinction” according to Erwin et al. (2002). Few of 
these “observations,” it should be said, were known prior to 1970. 
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(1) There is widespread evidence for shallow anoxia and some evidence for deep-
water anoxia […] (2) The δ-13 C excursion occurs in both marine and terrestrial 
sections, and in the marine sections in China corresponds within precision with the 
primary extinction horizon […] (3) The age of the extinction in southern China and 
the eruption of the major phase of the Siberian flood basalts are coincident within 
experimental error. (4) The marine extinction occurred in ~500 [thousand years] and 
during a rise in sea-level, not a regression. (5) There is no evidence for latest Permian 
glaciation. (6) Evidence suggestive of rapid global warming has been accumulating 
from Russia, Australia, and possibly South Africa. (7) The increase in fungal spores, 
indicating a disturbance in terrestrial ecosystems, begins before the marine extinction 
in many sections […] (8) Possible, although not yet conclusive, evidence of impact 
has recently been advanced [...] (9) The early onset of the fungal spike and the deep-
sea anoxia suggest the possibility that disruption began on land and in the deep sea 
before shallow-marine ecosystems were affected. (Erwin et al. 2002, 377) 
 
Is it any mystery that, faced with this growing array of things-to-be-explained, 
explanatory models grew significantly more complex during the 1980s and 1990s, 
culminating in Erwin’s Murder on the Orient Express hypothesis? 
I noted above that the trend towards increased complexity is not irreversible, and 
that explanations of the end-Permian extinction constitute one instance of simplification 
following complexification. The reasons for this were twofold. First, certain constraints 
on explanation were eliminated—researchers now regard evidence of impact as highly 
dubious, for example, eliminating the need to explain this evidence away. (No extinction 
model attempts to account for the presence of shocked quartz near the P–Tr boundary, 
because there doesn’t seem to be any!) Second, a more exact timeline for the extinction 
and associated phenomena prompted a streamlining of explanatory models; so, for 
instance, the discovery that the marine and terrestrial extinctions were virtually 
simultaneous removed the need to explain discrepancies in the timing and rates of the 
marine and terrestrial extinctions. Likewise, the discovery that the extinction took place 
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over <100,000 years pointed strongly to a single trigger, damaging hypotheses like the 
Murder on the Orient Express hypothesis, which posited several causal drivers operating 
on different time scales (see Erwin 2006b). 
So much for the first two questions. What about the third? Recall that a one-shot 
hypothesis is an explanation that researchers treat as mutually-exclusive with other 
hypotheses, and that “takes a complex history and accounts for it with a single [causal] 
factor” (2). This makes it sound as if one-shot hypotheses adduce only a single causal 
process, and indeed, some of Currie’s examples conform to this model. (Maybe 
sauropods became gigantic because an increase in atmospheric oxygen enabled them to 
grow bigger, full stop.) Yet other of his examples consist of a single triggering event with 
multiple downstream sequelae, like the impact hypothesis for the K–Pg extinction 
(Alvarez 1997). In this hypothesis, a bolide impact (the “trigger”) sets massive tidal 
waves rolling, sparks wildfires, and infuses the stratosphere with aerosols that reduce 
incoming sunlight, denude the land and acidify the oceans (“kill mechanisms”). Here the 
geometry of causation resembles a branching tree as opposed to a straight line connecting 
a discrete cause with its effect. It indicates that some one-shot hypotheses can be 
indefinitely complex, belying Currie’s claim that one-shot hypotheses are invariably 
simple (see Figure 6). 
Why does this matter? It matters because if one-shot hypotheses are not invariably 
simple, then no special difficulty attaches to their justification in a complex world.25 In 
 
25 There remains a difficulty with justifying simple one-shot hypotheses for complex 
events, so Currie’s project in his (2019b) is not misguided. He just errs in saying that a 
special difficulty attaches to the justification of one-shot hypotheses if these are defined 
to include all explanations (simple or complex) featuring a single trigger. 
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addition, there is no reason to think that one-shot hypotheses should be confined to the 
early stages of investigative projects (i.e., that they will be mostly absent from the latter 
stages of an investigation). Perhaps Currie is right that monocausal hypotheses will be 
disproportionately represented at early stages of investigation—these hypotheses, which 
“[take] a complex history and [account] for it with a single [causal process],” really are 
simple, and may be most viable when the evidential situation is most impoverished. Yet 
other one-shot hypotheses, like those postulating a single trigger and multiple 
downstream sequelae, can suffice at many junctures in an investigative project, since they 
can exhibit considerable internal complexity and, for this reason, can satisfy even 
complex sets of adequacy criteria. Whatever the case, there is nothing anomalous about 
the most recent “consensus” model for the end-Permian mass extinction, which is a “one-
shot hypothesis” by Currie’s definition, albeit a fairly complex one. 
 
5.2  What Organizes Research into Complex Historical Events? 
There remains the question of what organizes research into complex historical 
events if not the imperative to confirm or disconfirm explanatory hypotheses. Here I 
would like to offer a particular and a general answer. The particular answer, for the case 
of the end-Permian mass extinction, is features of the event itself (as represented in 
extinction models and more general frameworks for understanding the event).26 It is these 
features that provide the basic organizational scaffolding for ongoing research; so for 
 
26 By “features of the event,” I have in mind things like its temporal structure (what 
happened, when and for how long), patterns of extinction and survival, and elements of 
its geological context, including the behavior of earth systems and the environmental 
effects of massive volcanism. 
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example, sustained interest in the temporal structure of the extinction has resulted in a 
decades-long cooperative project aimed at articulating a high-resolution time scale for the 
extinction and associated phenomena (like Siberian Trap volcanism). Yet the features of 
complex historical events are not always transparent, especially in the early stages of an 
investigation. An event like the end-Permian extinction is an “epistemically blurry object 
of research” in the language of Feest (2017). It is an object whose nature and exact 
contours are unclear (or at least not as clear as researchers would like them to be). For 
this reason, a great deal of research is dedicated to providing a better descriptive 
understanding of the event itself; and since it is features of the event that provide the 
main organizational scaffolding for research in this area, a recursive cycle arises in which 
a more articulated understanding of the extinction multiplies the number and variety of 
research tasks, including tasks that are relevant to the evaluation of explanatory models. 
The wider relevance of these observations can be made clear by turning to the 
general answer. Broadly speaking, research into complex historical events can be 
understood in terms of lists of interrelated research questions, or things to be done: 
structured problem agendas (Love 2008, 2014).27 These tasks include both 
characterization and explanation (Love 2015); so to take the example of the carbon shift, 
a characterizational task is to constrain the magnitude, timing and extent of the shift, and 
 
27 Currie makes a similar suggestion in his (2019a). Specifically, he suggests that 
research into mass extinctions can be analyzed as a problem agenda whose “central 
concerns involve characterizing, finding evidence of, and explaining both particular 
events in the fossil record, and patterns across it” (7). A difference between Currie’s 
analysis and mine is that Currie seems to regard the problem agenda of mass extinctions 
as primarily a paleobiological problem agenda, whereas I regard paleobiology as just one 




an explanatory task is to explain the source of the isotopically light carbon. Crucially, 
these tasks are related—the explanation of the carbon shift will be different depending on 
whether it is a global or merely a regional shift, or whether it came before or after the 
extinction. But in any event, all tasks must be addressed if the extinction is to be 
understood in all its multidimensional complexity. Further, since the tasks involve 
different features of the event (e.g., temporal, biological, geochemical), a range of 
disciplinary specialisms must be recruited to tackle the various components of the 
agenda. 
This emphasis on diverse specialisms suggests an alternative account of how 
scientists locate relevant evidence. Recall from Section 1 the argument that most 
historical research is oriented around the testing of explanatory hypotheses (e.g., Currie 
and Sterelny 2017). Since historical events are massively underdetermined (the thought 
goes), and since historical sciences lack general theories to structure inquiry, historical 
scientists require explanatory hypotheses to locate evidence and overcome 
underdetermination. But historical scientists are by no means lost in the wilderness 
without explanatory hypotheses to guide them.28 For one thing, disciplinary specialists 
can enlist a range of protocols for locating evidence independent of explanatory 
hypotheses. Geochemists, for example, have protocols for locating and analyzing data on 
ocean geochemistry that can be used to reconstruct carbon cycle dynamics during the late 
Permian (see Jurikova et al. 2020). This research addresses a component of the P–Tr 
problem agenda, but because of its explicit disciplinary province, no problem of locating 
 
28 This does not imply that explanatory hypotheses never provide important scaffolding 
for locating relevant evidence. What I deny is simply that explanatory hypotheses are 
required to fulfill this role. 
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relevant evidence arises. It should also be observed that many explanatory hypotheses 
emerge from efforts to characterize particular features the past, as opposed to the other 
way around. For example, Paul Wignall and Anthony Hallam arrived at their model for 
the end-Permian extinction by the application of an approach that Hallam had long used 
to study sea-level changes during the Phanerozoic (e.g., Hallam 1981, 1984).29 Now, it is 
true that Wignall and Hallam had “[a] hunch that marine anoxia was at least heavily 
implicated in the marine extinctions,” since evidence for marine anoxia near the P–Tr 
boundary was well-known at the time (Hallam 2004, 121). Still, to claim that an 
explanatory hypothesis provided critical scaffolding for their research is at best half-true. 
Here the hunch provided a pointer, but the location of relevant evidence owed more to the 
procedures for identifying evidence embedded in the broad methodological approach. 
Where does this leave hypothesis-testing? Certainly I do not wish to deny that 
historical scientists test hypotheses—as I noted in Section 1, some research activities in 
geohistory really are designed to put explanatory statements to the test. My position is 
rather that most research activities in geohistory are not of this sort (they are non-
explanatory work). So accounts of historical reconstruction that put hypothesis-testing 
front and center paint a distorted picture of research in the area.30 Or at least they present 
 
29 The methodological approach involved detailed stratigraphic and facies analysis 
(Wignall and Hallam 1992, 1993). The model involved rising seas and the onshore 
movement of anoxic water (which Hallam and Wignall 1997 argue can be found in every 
mass extinction event). 
30 Several recent studies of the experimental sciences have reached similar conclusions. 
For example, O’Malley, Elliott and Burian (2010) have argued that research into 
microRNA is best characterized in terms of an “iterative movement” between different 
types of investigation that involves “not only the proposal and testing of hypotheses but 
also exploratory, technology-oriented and question-driven modes of research” (407). 
Fagan (2011) argues that in stem cell biology research aimed at testing explicit 
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a distorted picture in proportion as they cleave to a standard view of hypothesis-testing in 
which research activities are designed to produce evidence that either confirms or 
disconfirms explanatory statements. This is distorted since it implies that most research 
activities in geohistory are oriented towards explanation, while in fact most activities aim 
to generate a better descriptive understanding of a subject domain. Further, while 
descriptive understanding is invaluable for constructing and evaluating explanatory 
models, this should not be taken to imply that apparently descriptive research is in fact 
explanatory research in disguise.31 Even if researchers share an interest in constructing 
and adjudicating explanatory models, “much of their empirical work is directed toward 
figuring out what they are actually investigating” (Feest 2017, 1167).32 And this “figuring 
out” is a matter of characterization, not explanation (Colaço 2020; Dresow and Love in 
preparation). 
 
hypotheses is “not the whole story,” and suggests that philosophers pay attention to the 
various activities involved in the construction of models, as well as to the way in which 
“the structure of models…reflects the organization of their respective communities” 
(259). Finally, Feest (2017) suggests that philosophers’ preoccupation with explanation 
has led them to overlook the fact that “objects of research” in the cognitive and 
behavioral sciences are seldom clearly delineated, and claims that “the research process is 
better analyzed as one that tries to construct adequate descriptions of epistemically blurry 
objects of research” (1175). 
31 A reviewer points out that this claim is sensitive to how we delineate explanatory 
research. For example, a study with descriptive aims might nonetheless be regarded as 
“explanatory” if it makes a significant contribution to an explanatory project (adding or 
subtracting constraints on explanation, say). This strikes me as a perfectly sensible thing 
to say, and fully compatible with my thesis much “explanatory” research (in this sense) 
has proximate aims that are unrelated to the evaluation of explanatory hypotheses. 
32 Feest is here talking about the cognitive and behavioral sciences, but her point applies 
with equal force to the sciences of geohistory. 
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There is a broader view of “hypothesis-testing” that one might adopt, which 
retains a central place for explanatory hypotheses in historical research (Currie, personal 
communication). According to this view, an explanatory hypothesis includes both a 
characterization of a phenomenon and an explanation of that phenomenon; and since 
ongoing research can reveal flaws in either the characterization or the explanation, much 
(or all) research in geohistory is really hypothesis-testing. This view, I should say, runs 
together two different kinds of hypotheses: (1) hypotheses about the phenomenon itself, 
or descriptive hypotheses, and (2) hypotheses about the cause of the phenomenon 
(explanatory hypotheses proper). Yet this is not my complaint. My complaint is that this 
view implies that all characterizational activities are attempts to test some component of 
an explanatory hypothesis, and this is at variance with how researchers in geohistory 
understand their own research. A stratigrapher engaged in correlating P–Tr boundary 
sections is not attempting to test an explanatory hypothesis; rather, she is trying to 
unravel the sequence of formations spanning the P–Tr boundary. Hence, even if her 
results may be relevant to the evaluation of an explanatory hypothesis, it seems perverse 
to describe her as engaged in a test of that hypothesis. Likewise, a paleontologist 
interested in characterizing patterns of extinction in gastropods needn’t be doing so with 
a particular hypothesis in mind: it might be genuinely exploratory research. But assuming 
that his research bears positively or negatively on an explanatory hypothesis, does it then 
become (retrospectively) a test of this hypothesis? Only adventitiously. The research 
remains exploratory in conception. 
Philosophers have a well-known penchant for explanation, and for activities 
involved in explanatory reasoning, like hypothesis-testing (Waters 2004). Yet in 
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geohistorical research (as elsewhere in the sciences), explanation and hypothesis-testing 
are only part of the story (O’Malley et al. 2010; Fagan 2011; Feest 2017; Bokulich 2018). 
At least as large a part, I have suggested, is non-explanatory work: work aimed at 
increasing our descriptive understanding of a phenomenon. It follows that to understand 
the process of geohistorical research, one must understand how historical inquiry is 
organized to explore the contours of its research objects, and to bring explanatory 
resources to bear on complex events. In the language of this chapter, one must understand 
how different kinds of non-explanatory work function to bring historical events into focus 
and to embellish the store of explanatory resources. I have suggested that the notion of a 
structured problem agenda is useful in this connection, since it concerns how the burden 
of inquiry is distributed over a multidisciplinary research community for the purpose of 
adequately compassing a research object. The challenge for philosophers interested in 
explanation is to show how progress on different parts of an agenda is translated into 
progress in explaining a complex phenomenon. Part of the answer must involve the 
disclosure of explanatory resources to meet a changing set of adequacy criteria (see, e.g., 
Currie 2019b). Another part must involve the “increased refinement, articulation and 
specification of [research] questions with [a problem agenda itself]” (Love 2014, 52). In 
any event, there remains ample scope for future philosophical discussions of the 
dynamics of explanation, both within and without the sciences of geohistory. 
 
6. Recapitulation 
In this chapter, I explored the dynamics of explanation in geohistory using 
research into the end-Permian mass extinction as a case study. I argued, first, that a major 
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“driver” of explanation in geohistory is non-explanatory work—work that is undertaken 
to increase the descriptive understanding of a phenomenon, not to test a particular 
explanatory claim. I argued that non-explanatory work drives explanation by imposing 
(or eliminating) demands on explanation and by furnishing new resources for the 
construction of explanatory models. The tendency of such work to impose new demands 
on explanation provides a rationale for Currie’s observation that explanations of “[h]ighly 
contingent, disunified events” tend to “shift from simple to complex as time goes by” 
(Currie 2014, 1173). Explanations grow more complex when ongoing characterization 
multiplies the demands on explanation, prompting researchers to develop more complex 
explanatory models. Moreover, researchers are able to produce such models because 
ongoing characterization also grows the roster of explanatory resources from which 
explanatory models are constructed. Yet the fact that non-explanatory work sometimes 
eliminates demands on explanation means that the trend towards increased complexity is 
not irrevocable; sometimes ongoing investigation favors the streamlining of hypotheses, 
as recent research into the end-Permian mass extinction shows. Finally, I suggested that 
to achieve a better understanding of the dynamics of explanation in geohistory and 
elsewhere, it is necessary to grapple with the question of how research into complex 
phenomena is organized. One useful resource for thinking about this question is the 
notion of a structured problem agenda. A challenge for philosophers is to show how 
progress on different parts of a problem agenda is translated into progress in explanation; 
in other words, to show how the process of explanation depends upon the coordination of 
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1.  “The Present is the Key to the Past” 
 In 1946, a twenty-seven year old geologist named Reginald (Reg) Sprigg stopped 
for lunch near an abandoned lead-silver mine in Southern Australia. He had been sent to 
map the area in order to determine whether any valuable metals exist in the vicinity of the 
old Ediacaran mines, some 300 kilometers north of Adelaide. The hill on which he took 
his lunch was composed of weathered sandstones, many of them containing “flimsy clay 
partings” that Sprigg judged to be favorable to the preservation of fossil animals (Sprigg 
1988, 49). And as Sprigg inspected the partings, he did indeed find animal-like fossils: 
faint impressions of shallow disks, which he described in his notebook as “queer 






Figure 9  Sprigg’s “jellyfish,” discovered on May 31, 1946 in the quartzite flagstones 
near the Ediacaran mines, and later named Ediacaria flindersi. (From Sprigg 1988) 
  
The significance of these fossils lay in their age: early Cambrian, Sprigg thought, 
close to the dawn of “visible” life.1 Paleontologists knew that living things must have 
existed before this time, even complex multicellular animals like trilobites and jellyfish. 
But these had evidently left no record in the rocks. Perhaps they were too diminutive to 
form fossils, or perhaps their tissues were just not amenable to fossilization. Whatever the 
 
1 The past 541 million years, spanning the earliest Cambrian to the present day, is known 
as the Phanerozoic Eon, from the Greek phanerós and zōḗ, meaning “visible life.” The 
term “Phanerozoic” was coined in the 1930s, at which time little evidence for 
Precambrian life existed (McMenamin and McMenamin 1990). The period before 541 
Ma is known as the Proterozoic Eon (the period of “first life”). 
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case, multicellular organisms seemed confined as if by a law of nature to the period 
following the earliest Cambrian, when a medley of animals burst explosively into the 
fossil record. Indeed, when Sprigg returned to Adelaide with his supposed jellyfish in 
tow, the term “Precambrian paleontology” was virtually a misnomer (Schopf 2001). 
 This was soon to change, but not right away. To Sprigg’s evident disgust, his 
colleagues at Adelaide were none too impressed with his findings—not just with the 
“jellyfish,” but also with several other fossils collected during a second trip to the 
Ediacaran hills (Turner and Oldroyd 2009). His disgust was compounded when a letter 
announcing these fossils was rejected by the journal Nature (Sprigg 1988). Sprigg did 
publish two articles describing his fossils in regional journals, and exhibited photographs 
of the specimens at exhibitions in Europe and North America. Still, it took more than a 
decade for the paleontological community to take a serious interest in his findings, after 
which time the field of Precambrian paleontology was off and running. 
 The reason is that Sprigg’s fossils were older than he initially thought. In a paper 
of 1947, he had placed them “at the top of the Adelaide Series” (a group of rocks thought 
to span the uppermost Proterozoic and the lowermost Cambrian), and suggested that they 
lived at the beginning of the Cambrian Period (Turner and Oldroyd 2009, 260). Yet by 
the 1960s, it had become evident that this date was too young. Sprigg’s fossils were 
found in rocks considerably older than rocks known to be Cambrian in age, which is to 
say, rocks containing characteristic Cambrian fossils. And what’s more, fossils 
resembling Sprigg’s “jellyfish” had begun to turn up in rocks of Precambrian age all over 
the world. Increasingly, it came to seem as if these fossils might hold the key to 
understanding the early evolution of life, including its apparently explosive 
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diversification in the Cambrian Period. There was just one problem. The more 
Precambrian fossils turned up, the more bizarre the animals (?) of the “Ediacara biota” 
seemed to have been. There were radial disks that seem to have lain prostrate on the 
seafloor, bilaterally symmetrical forms lacking clear front and back ends, upright fronds 
with rigid spines, aptly-named “pizza disks,” and inverted cones that look a bit like 
Bugles. All told, they formed a motley assemblage, and seemed an unlikely prelude to the 
familiar drama of animal evolution that unfolded over the next half-billion years. 
 It is a testament to the power of convention that in the first decade of research into 
the Ediacaran fossils, nothing much seemed to be amiss (Gould 1989b; Droser et al. 
2017). Martin Glaessner, the first paleontologist of international reputation to describe 
the fossils, classified most specimens as primitive representatives of modern groups—
mostly soft corals and jellyfish, but also some annelids and arthropods. This matched an 
expectation that the “Eo-Cambrian” would be inhabited by worms and jellyfish, as well 
as other early models of still-existing designs (Sprigg 1988). Yet beginning in the 1980s, 
the phylogenetic placement of the Ediacaran fossils began to attract serious attention. 
Whereas Glaessner had emphasized resemblances in two-dimensional structure between 
Ediacaran and modern forms, new investigations lingered on their differences (Narbonne 
1998). These were so considerable that one influential paleontologist, Adolf Seilacher, 
proposed to accommodate the Ediacarans within a separate kingdom of life, the 
“Vendozoa” (later downgraded to the phylum “Vendobionta”). According to Seilacher, 
all the so-called “vendobionts” were constructed on a unique body plan, which Stephen 
Jay Gould describes as “a flattened form divided into sections that are matted or quilted 
together...like an air mattress” (Gould 1989b, 312). Seilacher additionally suggested that 
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these organisms lacked both mouths and guts, and that they received their energy by 
absorbing organic molecules directly from seawater, or else by harboring chemosynthetic 
symbionts in their tissues. Needless to say, no organisms of this sort exist in the modern 
oceans, leading Seilacher to conclude that the vendobionts constitute a failed experiment 






Figure 10  Seilacher’s illustration of the Vendozoan body plan, consisting of quilted 
“pneus,” or flexible balloon structures. Notice how very unlike jellyfish these creatures 
seem to be. (From Seilacher 1989) 
 
 
2 It is interesting to note that, by the late 1990s, no undoubted jellyfish remained among 
the Ediacara biota (Narbonne 1998). 
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 Today it is widely thought that Seilacher went too far. Ediacaran fossils do not 
form a single extinct clade, nor are they all built on a single unique body plan (see, e.g., 
Erwin and Valentine 2013, Ch. 5). Still, their phylogenetic affinities and functional 
morphology remain unresolved. In the words of leading Precambrian paleontologist 
Andrew Knoll, “Vendobionts provide a Rorschach test for paleontologists. Individual 
fossils have been interpreted as colonial cnidarians, as segmented worms, as primitive 
arthropods, seaweeds, lichens, and more [including fungi, giant protists and biological air 
mattresses]” (Knoll 2003, 167). This diversity of interpretations is rooted in the 
strangeness of the organisms themselves. Ediacaran fossils “show flashes of familiar 
biology,” but even their familiar characteristics “occur in decidedly unfamiliar 
combinations” (Knoll 2003, 173). As a consequence, efforts to reconstruct Ediacaran 
organisms suffer from an absence of analogs—even partial analogs, in many cases. While 
it is comparably easy to reconstruct a trilobite, by mapping its features onto those of a 
woodlouse or a horseshoe crab, say, it is considerably harder to reconstruct an organism 
whose phylogenetic affinities are unclear and whose characters occur in funny 
combinations. Here the core dictum of the historical scientist serves only to highlight 
their predicament. The present may be “the key to the past,” but there is no guarantee that 
this key will unbolt every door. Sometimes the past is truly alien—a “foreign country,” as 
L.P. Hartley put it in The Go-Between. In such cases, ordinary reasoning strategies are 
prone to break down, raising the question of what limits exist to our knowledge of deep 
history.3 
 
3 Recent work on ancient biomolecules has provided a new line of evidence bearing on 
the phylogenetic affinities of certain Ediacarans. In particular, it now seems probable that 
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 This chapter is about the several senses in which “the present is the key to the 
past” or fails to be. In other words, it is a chapter about uniformitarianism—possibly the 
most confounded term in the geological lexicon. Uniformitarianism has been taken to 
mean everything from “laws of nature do not vary in time and space” to “present 
processes provide the best guide to interpreting the remains of historical events” (see 
Section 2). Yet despite numerous attempts to analyze its complexity and regiment its use, 
disagreements persist about what exactly “uniformitarianism” means, as well as the 
extent to which the present really is the key to the past (e.g., Ericksson et al. 1998; 
Donaldson et al. 2002; Virgili 2007; Erwin 2011; Baker 2014; Knight and Harrison 2014; 
Romano 2015). This chapter does not aim to resolve these disputes, nor does it aim to 
settle—once and for all—what the proper understanding of “uniformitarianism” should 
be. Rather, its goal is to ascertain what is at stake in continuing debates about 
uniformitarianism in geology, and to relate these to the several “forms of understanding” 
pursued in geohistorical research (see Parker 2014). 
The remainder of this chapter is organized in four sections. In Section 2, I provide 
a brief primer on “uniformitarianism” (sometimes called the “principle of uniformity”), 
focusing on the term’s history and attempts to regiment its use. In Section 3, I turn to the 
subject of understanding, and suggest that students of geohistory pursue at least four 
distinct forms of understanding: (1) understanding what happened; (2) understanding why 
something happened; (3) understanding complex earth systems; and (4) understanding the 
geological record itself. Each form of understanding, I claim, is associated with a 
 
Dickinsonia and its relatives are metazoans (animals), although many mysteries remain 
(Bobrovskiy et. al. 2014; see also Droser and Gehling 2015). 
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different sense of “uniformitarian[ism]”: uniformitarian[ism] as (1) a reasoning strategy, 
(2) a kind of explanation (or cause), (3) an assumption about earth system dynamics, and 
(4) a kind of study, respectively. And each of these is associated with a different 
substantive question: (1) is uniformitarianism necessary; (2) when is it appropriate to give 
(non-) uniformitarian explanations of past events; (3) does the evolution of the earth 
system—including the changes associated with the Anthropocene—render 
uniformitarianism otiose; and (4) how useful are uniformitarian (or “actualistic”) studies 
of the geological record itself? Section 4 examines each of these questions in detail, and 
suggests that it is because they are severally disputed that uniformitarianism continues to 
occupy an ambiguous place in geological discourse. Finally, in Section 5, I offer a brief 
perspective on the status of uniformitarianism in the contemporary geosciences, and 
explain the title of this chapter. 
 
2.  Uniformitarianism: A Primer 
Perhaps no concept in the geological lexicon excites more passions than 
uniformitarianism, sometimes called “the principle of uniformitarianism” (or just “the 
principle of uniformity”). On the positive side, it has been called “[the] cornerstone of 
geologic philosophy” (Longwell and Flint 1955, 385), “the closest thing geologists have 
to a fundamental ‘law’” (Schoch 1989, 70), “the dominant paradigm in modern geology” 
(Marriner et al. 2010, 43) and “a fundamental operational principle, without which 
geology cannot be thought of in scientific terms” (Cloud 1961, 510). Carmina Virgili 
writes that the principle of uniformitarianism “converts the stratigraphic series [i.e., the 
vertical stack of rock formations] into an archive of the Earth's history” (Virgili 2007, 
 135 
 
576). Likewise, geologist-philosopher David Kitts claims that “[in] terms of the way a 
geologist operates, there is no past until the assumption of uniformity has been made” 
(Kitts 1977, 63). Only by assuming that geological processes have operated uniformly 
through time can we infer what the past must have been like on the basis of surviving 
material evidence. It follows that uniformitarianism is something like “a condition on the 
possibility of reconstructing geohistory.” It is an “unprovable postulate” justified on the 
grounds that—absent this postulate—no “rational interpretation of [earth’s] history [is] 
possible” (Simpson 1963, 33). 
It has not always been so. The term “uniformitarian[ism]” entered geological 
discourse through an 1832 article published in the Quarterly Review. The author was 
William Whewell, then professor of mineralogy at Trinity College, and later the 15th 
president of the Geological Society of London. His subject was Charles Lyell’s 
Principles of Geology, which had brought to boil a long-simmering debate about the rate 
and intensity of geological change. Whewell observed that geologists at the time were 
divided into two major “sects,” which he named “the Uniformitarians and the 
Catastrophists” (Whewell 1832, 125). The former regarded the course of nature as 
uniform through all geological periods, and “the changes which lead [from] one 
geological state to another [as], on a long average, uniform in their intensity.”4 The latter 
regarded the history of the earth as directional, and accepted at face value evidence 
suggesting that the globe is periodically convulsed with major paroxysms. Whewell cast 
his lot with the catastrophists, as did nearly all geologists in the first half of the nineteenth 
 
4 This meant both that the causes of geological change are the same now as they have 
ever been, and that their effect has been to maintain the earth in a kind of steady-state: the 
more things change, the more they stay the same. 
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century (see Rudwick 2008). Yet he did not deny that “the present is the key to the past,” 
which, Whewell observed, had long been the working principle of all competent 
geologists (see also Sedgwick 1832).5 What he denied was that the present teaches us that 
the course of nature has been uniform through all geological periods. This, Whewell 
thought, did not square with the geological evidence. Could the astonishing contortions of 
strata associated with mountain-building really have been produced by small causes 
acting over vast stretches of time? And what about the abrupt disappearance of whole 
communities of animals? Whewell was incredulous. 
At this point, the story gets messy. As historians have observed, Lyell ran together 
several senses of “uniformity” in his Principles of Geology (of which, more in a 
moment).6 His critics noticed this almost immediately, yet later geologists were less 
discerning, and continued to treat “the principle of uniformity” as an indivisible whole 
even as components of Lyell’s system were set aside (Gould 1987b). The most startling 
claim contained in the Principles—that the earth exists in a kind of steady state, with no 
direction to its history—was never very plausible, and was quickly separated from the 
rest of Lyell’s doctrine. Lyell himself eventually abandoned this idea, but he did not 
abandon the idea that “events in the deep past have never been of greater extent, 
suddenness, intensity, or violence...than actual causes” (Rudwick 2008, 304). It was this 
“doctrine of absolute uniformity” that came to represent his primary contribution to 
 
5 In Whewell’s day, this principle was most often associated with an emphasis on causes 
actuelles, or “actual causes” (meaning “causes acting in the observable present,” as 
opposed to “real” or “authentic” causes). Hence our term “actualism,” commonly 
regarded as a synonym for “[methodological] uniformitarianism” (see below). 




geological thought, and that later generations would complain placed geological thinking 
in a straitjacket (Lyell 1830, 87). Still, there was something to uniformitarianism—even 
critics admitted as much. The question was whether this sane core justified keeping the 
concept around. For many geologists in the second half of the twentieth century, it did 
not (e.g., Krynine 1956; Gould 1965; Valentine 1966; Goodman 1967; Shea 1982; Baker 
1998). This was typically because they took the core of the concept to be a general 
statement about scientific method—one that said little more than “geologists should 
reason scientifically”—as opposed to an indispensable claim about the nature of 
historical reasoning as such. 
What, then, is uniformitarianism? No one thing, to be sure. Stephen Jay Gould, in 
his first publication, distinguished two senses of the term—the former a claim about 
scientific procedure (“methodological uniformitarianism”), the latter a claim about how 
the world works (“substantive uniformitarianism”) (Gould 1965).7 Martin Rudwick 
subsequently distinguished four senses of “uniformity” (as in “the principle of 
uniformity”), all of which Lyell employed in his Principles (Rudwick 1972). These are: 
(1) uniformity of law, which states that natural laws do not vary in space or time, (2) 
uniformity of process, which states that the same geological processes operated now as in 
the past, (3) uniformity of rate, which states that geological processes in the past operated 
 
7 More specifically, Gould distinguished between uniformitarianism as “a procedural 
principle asserting spatial and temporal invariance of natural laws” and what Lyell called 
the doctrine of absolute uniformity (“a testable theory of geologic change postulating 
uniformity of rates or material conditions,” Gould 1965, 223). Unbeknownst to Gould, a 
similar distinction had been drawn by a number of nineteenth century geologists, 
including Whewell, who observed that Lyell’s prohibition against invoking unobservable 
causes was detachable from his claims about the rate and intensity of geological change 
(see Rudwick 2008). 
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at the same intensity as those operating today, and (4) uniformity of state, which holds 
that the earth exists in a kind of dynamic steady-state (see also Gould 1987b, 119–126).8 
In a similar vein, M. King Hubbert observed that four “common, but not necessarily 
equivalent” answers may be given to the question “what, precisely, is the Principle of 
Uniformity” (Hubbert 1967, 4). They are: 
 
1. The present is the key to the past. 
2. Former changes of the earth’s surface may be explained by reference to causes 
now in operation. 
3. The history of the earth may be deciphered in terms of present observations, on 
the assumption that physical and chemical laws are invariant with time. 
4. Not only are physical laws uniform, that is invariant with time, but the events of 
the geologic past have proceeded at an approximately uniform rate, and have 
involved the same processes as those which occur at present. (Hubbert 1967, 4) 
  
More recent commentaries have mostly recapitulated these distinctions, with a few minor 
wrinkles (e.g., the use of “strong-” and “weak-uniformitarianism” to mean a combination 
of substantive and methodological, and methodological uniformitarianism, respectively) 
(see Balizshov 1994; Knight and Harrison 2014). In addition, it is becoming customary in 
philosophical circles to distinguish “actualism” (methodological uniformitarianism, 
broadly construed) from “uniformitarianism” or “gradualism” (see, e.g., Love and Lugar 
2013; Currie 2019c). This distinction is a coherent one, yet in the interest of clarity, it 
 
8 Claim (1) corresponds to Gould's “methodological uniformitarianism”; claims (3) and 
(4) correspond to his “substantive uniformitarianism.” Claim (2) corresponds to the 
position usually called “actualism,” although actualism is sometimes defined in terms of 
the uniformity of natural laws (Claim 1), and methodological uniformitarianism is 
sometimes defined in terms of the uniformity of process (Claim 2). 
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would probably be best if uniformitarianism sensu gradualism were henceforth referred 
to simply as “gradualism.”9 
 As I stated in Section 1, my aim in this chapter is not to analyze the meaning(s) of 
“uniformitarianism” as a way of legislating terminological practice. Nor is it to tame 
“semantic chaos” by tracing the chaos of meanings to a conflation of several senses of 
“uniformity” in Lyell’s Principles or elsewhere (Romano 2015, 66). Rather, my aim is to 
determine what is at stake in continuing discussions of uniformitarianism in geology, and 
to analyze why terms like “uniformitarianism” and “uniformitarian” continue to stir 
strong feelings. To state the obvious, part of the reason indeed traces to ongoing 
conflation. So, when Ward and Kirschvink write that “uniformitarianism...is outmoded 
and largely refuted,” it is substantive uniformitarianism they have in mind, yet they draw 
from this the methodological conclusion that “[the] modern world is not the best tool for 
explaining many times and events in the deep past” (Ward and Kirschvink 2015, 5). 
Claims like this arguably trade on a confusion between substantive and methodological 
uniformitarianism (but see the discussion in Section 4.1 for a different interpretation, 
especially fn. 15). 
Still, conflations like this have become less common in recent decades, and at any 
rate, the present tensions surrounding uniformitarianism are stickier than those that arise 
 
9 Meghan Page (forthcoming) also distinguishes uniformitarianism and actualism, yet for 
her, actualism involves a commitment to the spatiotemporal invariance of natural laws, 
whereas uniformitarianism involves a commitment to constant rates of change or material 
conditions. On this view, Gould’s methodological uniformitarianism ought to be called 
“methodological actualism.” Methodological uniformitarianism then becomes a 
procedural assumption asserting the constancy of rates of change or material conditions 




out of a simple confusion of meanings. Instead, they arise out of legitimate disagreements 
over substantive issues, like whether uniformitarian models can be used to understand all 
environments preserved in the sedimentary record, and how useful actualistic studies of 
the fossil record really are. Section 4 considers these issues in detail by examining four 
substantive questions that continue to provoke debate amongst students of geohistory. 
Before coming to this, however, there remains a bit of table-setting to do. The debate 
about uniformitarianism is nowadays centered on the issue of how researchers acquire 
knowledge about the past (substantive uniformitarianism has long been regarded as 
empirically refuted). But what kinds of understanding do students of geohistory actively 
pursue? 
 
3.  Forms of Understanding in Geohistory 
The goal of geohistorical research is to increase our understanding of the past, as 
well as those records of the past that constitute our main epistemic resource. A more 
toothless claim about the aims of geohistorical research can hardly be imagined. Still, for 
all its toothlessness, the claim has a surprising amount of bite. This is because 
philosophers have not always taken historical research to be about understanding, or if 
they have, it is a particular kind of understanding they have had in mind: the kind 
conveyed by narrative explanations, say, or by common origin inferences. Forber and 
Griffith (2011), for example, claim that the goal of historical reconstruction is to craft 
causal etiologies for events known from the historical record. Likewise, Frodeman (2003) 
says that historical science is defined by the role that narrative explanations play in its 
practice. But surely this is too narrow, since many historical researchers are not interested 
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in events, but in past environments and conditions, and one does not explain 
environments and conditions with causal narratives. Better to say that historical 
reconstruction is about understanding, and then to scrutinize what this understanding 
consists in and how it is characteristically achieved. 
 This section is about the kinds of understanding pursued in geohistorical 
research—it is not about scientific understanding in general. As such, I will sidestep the 
ongoing debate about the nature of scientific understanding and follow Parker (2014) in 
delineating several “forms of understanding” pursued in a domain of research.10 These 
will in turn provide a framework for my discussion of uniformitarianism, since each form 
of understanding raises a different question that bears on the significance or applicability 
of uniformitarianism in geology. Although Parker is concerned with a different subject 
domain, I will begin with an overview of her analysis, since the forms of understanding 
she identifies are also pursued by researchers in geohistory. I will then suggest that 
students of geohistory pursue two forms of understanding that Parker does not discuss, 
and provide a brief characterization of each. 
Parker’s concern is to articulate the kinds of understanding sought by researchers 
interested in weather and climate. Based on a review of “classic papers, textbooks and 
research monographs,” she concludes that “there are at least two [forms] of 
understanding [sought] in this arena” (Parker 2014, 338). The first she calls 
understanding why an event/phenomenon occurs. This is the sort of understanding 
 
10 Forms of understanding, in Parker’s sense, can be understood as the types of 
knowledge in a domain that researchers pursue and value. (So, to identify a form of 
understanding is to identify a broad epistemic goal harbored by researchers in an area of 
inquiry.) For discussions of scientific understanding in general, see, e.g., de Regt and 
Dieks 2005; Potochnik 2017; Khalifa 2017. 
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associated with having an explanation of an event or phenomenon—one that contains an 
account of how a set of causal factors (e.g., forces, processes or conditions) interact to 
produce the focal event or phenomenon. The other is understanding a complex 
phenomenon/system, and is the kind of understanding associated with knowing your way 
around a complex research object, like “the atmosphere and climate system as a whole” 
(339). In Parker’s words, this form of understanding involves “both knowledge [that] and 
[knowledge how], that is, both knowing things about the phenomenon or system...and 
being able to synthesize and apply that knowledge to answer correctly additional 
questions about...the effects of interventions on or changes to the system.” She adds that 
unlike understanding why an event/phenomenon occurs, understanding a complex 
phenomenon/system “generally does not have a clear point of completion” (340). Instead, 
it is achieved only to a greater or lesser extent, when a community “gains significant new 
knowledge about the phenomenon or system, or refines existing knowledge, or enhances 
its ability to synthesize and apply existing knowledge to correctly answer additional 
questions.” 
Geohistorical scientists pursue both these forms of understanding. Much high-
profile research in recent decades has sought to unravel the causes of major events, like 
the explosive increase in metazoan diversity that took place near the beginning of the 
Cambrian Period. This is an example of understanding why an event/phenomenon occurs, 
and there are countless others, from efforts to understand the end-Permian mass 
extinction to efforts to explain the Paleocene-Eocene thermal maximum. But students of 
geohistory also want to understand complex systems and phenomena as such, especially 
so-called “geobiologists” and their allies, geochemists and earth system scientists. 
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Perhaps the central challenge in geobiology is to understand “how organisms influence 
the physical Earth and vice versa, and how biological and physical processes have 
interacted through our planet’s long history” (Knoll et al. 2012, 2). This subject is ripe 
with intrinsic interest, but it is also potentially useful, since understanding the history of 
the “earth-life system” may help us better understand its future behavior, including its 
likely response to perturbations associated with anthropogenic climate change. It follows 
that some geohistorical researchers, at least, are interested in applying their understanding 
“to answer correctly additional questions about [a] phenomenon or system, especially 
questions about the effects of interventions on or changes to the system” (Parker 2014, 
339). 
Yet these forms of understanding do not exhaust the forms of understanding 
pursued in geohistorical research. In addition to understanding the causes of past events 
and processes, as well as “how biological and physical processes have interacted through 
our planet’s long history,” geohistorical scientists are interested in understanding the 
geological record itself, including scales of temporal and spatial resolution and controls 
on fidelity (e.g., how accurately does a death assemblage reflect its corresponding life 
assemblage). I regard this as distinct form of understanding: first, because it has a distinct 
subject matter (it is not about what happened in the past, but rather about how we know 
about what happened in the past), and second, because it is typically pursued by specialist 
researchers in areas like stratigraphy and taphonomy. Researchers in these areas ask 
questions like: what is the temporal resolution of the fossil record in different 
sedimentary environments, and what factors can garble the signal preserved in outcrops 
and sedimentary basins? And while answers to these questions do teach us about events 
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and processes in the past (for example, they teach us about how organic remains are 
incorporated into the rock record), the understanding provided is less about particular 
events and processes as it is about the quality and resolution of historical evidence. For 
this reason, it is useful to describe it as something separate from an understanding of 
geohistory per se, namely, an understanding of the geological record. 
We can also distinguish a fourth form of understanding, which is partially 
constitutive of—but, I suggest, also distinct from—the first two forms. This might be 
called understanding what happened, or understanding what the past was like, and it 
consists in possessing a more or less detailed characterization of a historical phenomenon 
(e.g., an event, process, condition or entity). I say that this form of understanding is 
“partially constitutive” of other forms because understanding why something happened 
and understanding complex historical systems requires one to understand what happened, 
including the rates and durations of important processes (see Erwin 2006a). Yet it would 
be misleading to claim that researchers only care about what happened as a means to the 
end of giving explanations or characterizing earth-system dynamics. Learning that the 
end-Permian mass extinction was rapid, taking place over a span of <60,000 years, is a 
valuable contribution to our understanding of the past, regardless of what it tells us about 
the causes of the extinction.11 Likewise, determining that a sedimentary structure 
represents the remains of an ancient cold seep is an achievement, regardless of whether it 
prompts us to revise our view of earth-system dynamics (Bottjer et al. 1995).12 (The 
 
11 For instance, it tells us that the extinction was a veritably “catastrophic” one, as 
opposed to a more drawn-out affair. 
12 There is a confusion lurking here. Many historical inferences are justified on 
explanatory grounds; we infer that a sedimentary structure S is the remains of a cold seep 
because presupposing that S is the remains of a cold seep explains its otherwise puzzling 
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challenge of reconstructing the Ediacara biota, discussed in Section 1, is also a matter of 
understanding what the past was like.) 
In this section, I have argued that geohistorical scientists are interested in no 
fewer than four distinct “forms of understanding.” These are: understanding what 
happened, understanding why something happened, understanding complex earth 
systems and understanding the geological record itself.  But what does this have to do 
with uniformitarianism? Quite a bit, it turns out. In the next section, I argue that each 
form of understanding pursued by geohistorical researchers raises a different question 
about the adequacy or applicability of uniformitarianism. The inability to resolve these 
questions—not mere semantic chaos—is a major reason why uniformitarianism continues 
to occupy a contested place in the discourse of earth scientists. 
 
4.  Four Substantive Questions 
This section examines four questions about uniformitarianism raised by the 
distinct forms of understanding pursued in geohistorical research. Each form of 
understanding, I claim, is associated with a different sense of the term 
“uniformitarian[ism].” And each sense of “uniformitarian[ism]” is associated with a 
different question about the adequacy or applicability of uniformitarianism in the relevant 
domain (see Table 1). 
 
 
features. Yet determining that S was a cold seep is a matter of characterization as opposed 
to an explanation of a historical phenomenon. It tells us what the past was like, but it does 
not confer an understanding of why something happened (unless that “something” is the 
formation of S itself, but even this requires additional information beyond the knowledge 










A reasoning strategy Is uniformitarianism necessary? 
Understanding why 
something happened 
A kind of explanation or 
cause 
When is it appropriate to give 
(non-) uniformitarian 
explanations of past events? 
Understanding complex 
earth systems 
An assumption about 
earth system dynamics 
Does the evolution of the earth-
life system—including the 




geological record itself 
A kind of study How useful are uniformitarian 
(or “actualistic”) studies of the 
geological record itself? 
 
Table 1  The association of different forms of understanding pursued by geohistorical 
researchers with (1) a focal sense of “uniformitarian[ism]” and (2) a substantive question 




1. Is uniformitarianism necessary? (Understanding what happened/what the past 
was like) 
The first substantive question is about uniformitarianism as a reasoning strategy. 
Specifically, it is a question about uniformitarianism as a means of determining what 
happened in the past (or what the past was like). The question will be familiar to veterans 
of the uniformitarianism debate in geology. It is the question that Gould asked in his 
(1965) and that gave that paper its title. Gould’s answer, in a word, was “no.” Substantive 
uniformitarianism is a refuted theory of geological change, whereas methodological 
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uniformitarianism—the postulate that the laws of nature do not vary in space and time—
is little more than an affirmation that geology is a science (hardly necessary in 1965). It 
follows that the term uniformitarianism can be confined to the history books. This 
eliminativist line continues to find advocates among practicing geologists (see, for 
example, Shea 1982; Baker 1998; Romano 2015). 
In my view, the question “is uniformitarianism necessary?” actually contains two 
questions. The first asks whether uniformitarianism is redundant: does the principle of 
uniformitarianism simply paraphrase a more general principle of scientific reasoning, like 
the principle of parsimony or the injunction against appealing to supernatural causes?13 
And if it does not (here is the second question), is the concept of uniformitarianism a 
fruitful one? If “uniformitarianism” was suddenly erased from the geological lexicon, 
would it be necessary to reinvent it? Or would its elimination make no difference, or 
perhaps bring about a balance of benefit over harm? If there would be no reason to 
remind forgetful geologists that “the present is the key to the past,” and especially if there 
are good reasons to avoid such a reminder, then uniformitarianism is clearly unnecessary. 
So is uniformitarianism redundant? That depends on what one means by 
“uniformitarianism.” If uniformitarianism is nothing but the claim that the laws of nature 
do not vary in space and time, then the case for redundancy is strong. All inductive 
inference relies on the postulate that the laws of nature are stable; as Gould (1965) 
observes, “Without assuming [the] spatial and temporal invariance [of natural law], we 
have no basis for extrapolating from the known to the unknown” (226). But notice that 
 
13 If it does, then uniformitarianism is arguably unnecessary, since the term merely 
renames a principle or norm of reasoning better known by a different name. 
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this says nothing about geohistorical reasoning as such. It is rather a statement about the 
prerequisites of inductive inference in general. So uniformitarianism is redundant. 
Alternatively, if uniformitarianism “comes down to the issue between naturalism and 
supernaturalism” (as Lyell liked to insinuate), then uniformitarianism “dissolves into a 
principle of simplicity that is not peculiar to geology but [instead] pervades all science 
and even daily life” (Goodman 1967, 95, 99). Here again uniformitarianism comes out as 
redundant, for as Goodman puts it, the modern geologist should feel no particular need to 
“[defend] himself [sic] for practicing what he fears may not quite be a science” (99). 
But what if uniformitarianism cannot be reduced to a claim about the uniformity 
of nature, or to a gratuitous injunction against letting God figure in geological 
explanations? Is there an interpretation of uniformitarianism that is both non-redundant 
and interesting? There is, but it is a contested one. According to this interpretation, “the 
present is the key to the past” because the present earth provides a suitable model for any 
environment or process a geoscientist might want to reconstruct. This does not mean that 
the present earth contains a representative sample of all the environments and processes 
that have ever existed on the planet; everyone admits that it does not. Rather, the claim is 
that uniformitarian (or actualistic) models can be successfully applied to all sedimentary 
environments in the rock record, including those deposited under conditions that no 
longer exist on this planet. Uniformitarianism is “necessary,” it follows, because non-
uniformitarian models are un-necessary. There are no circumstances in which a non-
uniformitarian approach is warranted. In the past, many sedimentary structures were 
designated as non-uniformitarian (or “non-actualistic”) because the processes responsible 
for their formation were thought to have ceased operating (see, e.g., Cayeux 1941; 
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Pflüger and Grease 1996; Narbonne 1998). But in many or all of these cases, 
uniformitarian models have since been successfully applied.14 It follows that non-
uniformitarian models are otiose. 
The strongest statement of this position is found in Donaldson et al. (2002), who 
claim that “all studies involving Precambrian sedimentary rocks [the most common 
subjects of non-actualistic models] can be approached by means of comparisons to 
present day environments” (3). This claim has an air of authority to it; yet the authors 
clinch their argument by means of a semantic maneuver that ultimately evades the central 
issue. Donaldson et al. observe that the term “actual” (as in “actualism”) has two 
meanings. In vernacular English, it means real or factual; so something is “actual” if it 
really exists. Yet in many European languages, the word “actual” (as in the French 
actualisme or the German aktualismus) means present-day as opposed to past. The 
authors object to the custom of labeling “conditions not directly comparable to those of 
the present day” non-actualistic, following the customary European meaning (7). Instead, 
they propose to call any condition “actualistic” that can be explained “by valid physical 
and chemical laws.” Yet this confuses the issue at hand, which is whether the best way to 
approach “conditions not directly comparable to those of the present day” is “by means of 
comparisons to present-day environments.” Advocates of non-uniformitarian approaches 
suggest that the method of modern analogs is not the best way to understand all past 
environments, but the reason is not that they doubt that natural laws somehow fail to 
obtain in “non-actualistic” settings (Bottjer 1998). Their complaint is rather an epistemic 
 
14 See, e.g., Erikkson et al. (1998); Donaldson et al. (2002); Virgili (2007). 
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one: perhaps “[the] modern world is not the best tool for explaining many times and 
events in the deep past” (Ward and Kirschvink 2015).15 
What is the alternative to relying on the present world to guide interpretations of 
the past? In an article from 1995, paleontologists John Grotzinger and Andrew Knoll 
propose that “the key to the past” might sometimes be found within the past itself. Their 
topic was the anomalous reefs of the late Permian Period, which are composed of large 
volumes of aragonite and calcite marine cements, along with abundant microbial 
precipitates (microbially-induced mineral deposits). As Grotzinger and Knoll observe, the 
usual model for interpreting ancient reefs is uniformitarian (based on comparisons with 
modern reefs), and ascribes the accumulation of the “reef core” to “the upward 
propagation of an attached skeletal benthos” (578).16 It follows that to understand ancient 
reefs, researchers must first identify the organisms responsible for building the reef core, 
which in most cases are animals with calcareous skeletons like bryozoans and corals. Yet 
in the late Permian, all the usual reef-building suspects are absent. Further, it appears that 
the main frame is constructed, not by “the upward propagation of an attached skeletal 
benthos,” but rather “by marine cement growing directly on the seafloor”—a 
 
15 I picked on Ward and Kirschvink in Section 2 for sliding from the claim that 
substantive uniformitarianism is false to the claim that methodological uniformitarianism 
is unreliable. Yet insofar as methodological uniformitarianism is understood as a 
procedure in which field observations are matched with observations from modern 
environments (e.g., Frodeman 2003), the failure of the modern earth to provide a 
representative sample of environments from earth’s past is methodologically relevant. 
Perhaps this is what Ward and Kirschvink have in mind. 
16 Modern reefs are composed of corals and hard algae that overgrow one another, and in 
the process leave behind a “core” of limestone skeletons. This is the reef core. 
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phenomenon poorly represented in modern oceans. What then are we to make of these 
structures? 
Grotzinger and Knoll’s suggestion is to look backwards, to a period of earth’s 
history known as the Proterozoic. There, before the major diversification of bilaterian 
animals, reef complexes were “dominated by massive marine cements” that accumulated 
directly on the seafloor. Some of these complexes were wholly inorganic whereas others 
were microbially mediated, but in any event, the massive buildup of carbonate minerals 
was facilitated by a range of conditions not typically found in modern oceans (including 
widespread deep water anoxia and calcium-enriched surface water). There is one 
exception, however: one period of time in which this unusual combination of conditions 
reoccurred. This was the period of time immediately following the end-Permian mass 
extinction, when oxygen levels plummeted and increased continental erosion flushed the 
oceans with bountiful calcium. In light of this, Grotzinger and Knoll suggest that “the 
key” to understanding the anomalous carbonate buildups of the Permian lies in the 
Precambrian, before the dawn of abundant, complex animals. The massive carbonate 
buildups of the Precambrian “demonstrate the tremendous reef-building potential 
carbonate precipitates when suitably oversaturated surface waters mix with upwelling 
deep water” (592). By contrast, “dependence on the Recent for sedimentological analogs 
has encouraged an overemphasis on the framework contributions of animals...and an 
underappreciation of the capacity of precipitated microbialites and seafloor cements to 
build reef-like structures.” 
The question of whether the present is the key to the past thus remains unsettled. 
Perhaps it is the case that the modern world provides the surest guide, in every instance, 
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to interpreting past environments and processes. But there seem to be cases in which the 
historical record itself seems to provide the key for accessing other compartments of the 
past (for another example, see Quiroz et al. 2019).17 The answer to the question of 
whether uniformitarianism is necessary turns on whether, and how often, this is in fact 
the case. 
 
2.  When is it appropriate to give (non-) uniformitarian explanations of past 
events? (Understanding why something happened) 
The second question is related to, but different than the first. It concerns not the 
adequacy of uniformitarianism as a strategy for finding out what the past was like (a 
matter of descriptive understanding), but rather the issue of how we should explain past 
events (a matter of causal explanation). Many geoscientists think that, all things being 
equal, we should prefer uniformitarian explanations—explanations that do not postulate 
geological or biological processes operating at different rates and intensities than those 
operating today. Still, most recognize that uniformitarian explanations are not universally 
applicable, and this raises the question of when it is permissible to appeal to non-
uniformitarian causes (e.g., bolide impacts and calamitous floods), including types of 
 
17 Page (forthcoming) makes the same point. In her view, geologists ought to be 
“methodological actualists” (her term for methodological non-uniformitarians), since it is 
risky to use observed regularities to make inferences about the past when the stability of 
these regularities is unknown. While Page draws an unorthodox contrast between 
actualism and uniformitarianism (see fn. 9), her discussion highlights a methodological 
worry at the heart of this section: that sometimes the “key” to the past may be located in 
the historical record itself.  
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causes that are completely unknown in today’s world (e.g., novel evolutionary 
mechanisms).18 
That this question differs from the first can be gleaned from the fact that, after the 
general acceptance of the Alvarez hypothesis, few would deny any role for non-
uniformitarian explanations in geohistory.19 As Erwin and Valentin (2013) observe, 
“Today, geologists recognize that the rates of geological processes have varied 
considerably through the history of Earth and that many processes have operated in the 
past that may not be readily studied today” (10). In other words, geologists now realize 
that substantive uniformitarianism is false, and that it is appropriate—under certain 
circumstances at least—to postulate processes operating at different rates and intensities 
than those acting today. Still, the question remains contested because geologists differ in 
their understanding of what constitutes appropriate circumstances for invoking non-
uniformitarian explanations. So, for example, it remains an open question “[w]hether 
uniformitarian explanations can be applied to understanding events of the Ediacaran and 
 
18 Some readers may wonder whether this is the same question as the first. Earlier I asked 
whether uniformitarian models can be used to interpret all sedimentary environments 
preserved in the rock record. Here I am asking whether uniformitarian causes can explain 
all events known from the rock record. The questions are doubtless similar, especially 
since the way uniformitarian models interpret the sedimentary record is by explaining 
features of the record (e.g., rock fabrics and sedimentary structures). Yet here the 
distinction between forms of understanding is useful; for there is a difference between 
explaining features of the sedimentary record—trace evidence—and explaining events 
known from the rock record—reconstructions based on trace evidence. And one way to 
capture this distinction is to say that the former adds to our descriptive understanding—
our understanding of what happened, or what the past is like—whereas the latter adds to 
our understanding of why certain things happened. 
19 The Alvarez hypothesis proposed that the pulse of extinctions at the end of the 
Cretaceous Period was caused by the impact of a large bolide, which brought a number of 
downstream kill mechanisms in its train (Alvarez 1997). 
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Cambrian [Periods]” (Erwin and Valentine 2013, 10). “Although [the issue] has not 
usually been framed in this way,” Erwin and Valentine continue, “we [believe] that 
debates over the nature of the geochemical evidence, the processes involved in the 
construction of Ediacaran and Cambrian ecological assemblages, and the processes of 
change in developmental evolution in early metazoans all involve differences of opinion 
as to whether a uniformitarian approach is appropriate.” 
The issue, then, is not about whether the rates and intensities of geological 
processes have varied over time. Everyone agrees that they have, and virtually everyone 
agrees that the history of the earth is pockmarked with catastrophes, some of which owe 
to genuinely singular causes. The issue is rather one of standards (Love and Lugar 2013). 
Different scientists differ in their willingness to invoke “unique circumstances and 
contingent events” to explain unusual happenings in geohistory (Erwin 2015, 2). And the 
same goes for non-uniformitarian types of causes. Reverting to the case of the Cambrian 
explosion, some paleontologists are hesitant to posit that any unique evolutionary 
processes operated early in the history of multicellular animals. So Cooper and Fortey 
(1998) write that “[a] far more consistent view of evolution can be gained by [avoiding 
such postulates], and accepting that although the scarcity of ancestral forms can mean the 
earlier phase [of the Cambrian explosion] is often obscure, the latter [phase] is the result 
of standard microevolutionary processes over extended periods of time” (155). Cooper 
and Fortey prefer to postulate a long cryptic history of animals during which “standard” 
evolutionary processes operated, rather than invoke unique evolutionary mechanisms 
operative during the Early Cambrian. Erwin (2011), by contrast, thinks that non-
uniformitarian explanations are preferable, whatever their costs in reduced “consistency.” 
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This is because Erwin thinks that the evolutionary process is non-uniformitarian in 
certain respects, and that the nature of the variation available to natural selection changes 
over time as gene regulatory networks become more complex. 
It is thus clear why this second question remains unresolved. Geologists may 
agree that “the rates of geological processes have varied considerably through the history 
of Earth,” but this does not settle the question of when it is appropriate to invoke non-
uniformitarian explanations. Needless to say, most everyone agrees that they should be 
invoked “when the evidence demands it” and not otherwise. But researchers differ in 
their judgments of what the evidence demands, and therefore in their judgments of when 
it is appropriate to invoke non-uniformitarian explanations. Usually this is because of 
other explanatory commitments they hold. Erwin, for example, thinks that the kind of 
variation available to natural selection changes over time, and for this reason is willing to 
sacrifice a “more consistent view of evolution” for what he regards as a more adequate 
(non-uniformitarian) view. Others disagree, and think that theoretical postulates of this 
type supply no good reason to abandon uniformitarian explanations of early animal 
evolution. Whoever is correct, it is clear that there is more going on here than an abstract 
disagreement about the adequacy of uniformitarian explanations as such, and for this 
reason, the adequacy of uniformitarian explanations remains contested. 
 
3.  Does the evolution of the earth-life system—including the changes associated 
with the Anthropocene—render uniformitarianism otiose? (Understanding complex earth 
systems) 
The third question concerns the behavior of earth systems, and the viability of 
uniformitarianism as an assumption about earth system dynamics. Importantly, this 
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question is not centrally concerned with uniformitarianism as a means of understanding 
the distant past. Rather, it is concerned with whether knowledge of recent earth history 
provides a reliable means of interpreting the future behavior of earth systems. The worry 
is most strongly articulated in an article entitled “Limitations of Uniformitarianism in the 
Anthropocene” by Jasper Knight and Stephan Harrison (2014). In this article the authors 
ask whether “[the] changing dynamics of Earth systems in the Anthropocene, and the 
explicit involvement of human activity in Earth system processes and feedbacks” means 
that uniformitarianism is otiose—that “neither the ‘natural laws’ expounded by the 
Principle of Uniformitarianism nor reference to high-CO2 periods in the past can be used 
as guides to [future] Earth system behaviour” (2). Because anthropogenic activities are 
“push[ing] the behaviour of many [earth] systems beyond the bounds of their natural 
variability,” observations of past or present earth system dynamics may fail to illuminate 
the future behavior of these systems. Or to put the worry another way: perhaps the earth 
is evolving away from a condition in which models of climate and environmental change 
can be safely built on uniformitarian assumptions. 
As Victor Baker observes in a response to Knight and Harrison, “[the] use of 
analogs from Earth’s past to understand Earth’s future” is outside the traditional purview 
of uniformitarianism (Baker 2014, 78). Still there is a sense in which we can call 
assumptions about earth system dynamics “uniformitarian” if they conform to the 
expectation that the process dynamics and controls on earth systems are the same now as 
in the past. Or, to set our inferential sites in the other direction, the same now as in the 
future. As I noted in Section 3, an important reason geoscientists want to understand the 
past behavior of earth systems is to use this knowledge to predict the future behavior of 
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these systems, including their response to human-induced perturbation. But these 
inferences will only work if the process dynamics and controls on earth systems are the 
same now as in the past. If “Earth systems are now operating in ways that are 
substantially different to how they are believed to have operated in previous time 
periods,” projections from the past to the future will not work (Knight and Harrison 2014, 
3). Likewise, if earth systems in the Anthropocene are becoming increasingly chaotic, 
“result[ing] in both complex system behavior and unpredictable outcomes as a result of 
[complex human-induced feedbacks],” then projections from the present to the future will 
not work either. In both scenarios, the assumption of uniform process dynamics and 
controls is to blame for the poor performance of models parameterized with data from the 
geological past (including the very recent past). 
There is plenty to grumble about in Knight and Harrison’s article. The authors 
claim, for example, that “the Principle of Uniformitarianism...states that processes and 
products reflect constant conditions of external forcing,” and that “Uniformitarianism 
views systems as Newtonian, [meaning that] magnitude/frequency relationships follow a 
normal (Gaussian) distribution” (Knight and Harrison 2014, 3). Claims like these are 
idiosyncratic, to say the least, and I find no support for them in the classic enunciations of 
the “Principle of Uniformitarianism” (see Section 2). Still, the authors’ central concern 
seems to me a well founded one. If it is the case that earth systems are evolving towards 
increasingly chaotic and unpredictable dynamics, then models constructed on 
uniformitarian assumptions may indeed be in need of revision. In such a world, the 
present would no longer be the key to the past; nor would models based on the past 
behavior of earth systems be a reliable guide to the future. 
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4.  How useful are uniformitarian (or “actualistic”) studies of the geological 
record itself? (Understanding the geological record itself.) 
The final question concerns a kind of study designed to generate knowledge of the 
geological record itself, as opposed to this or that phenomenon in the past. Sometimes 
called “uniformitarian,” a more common term applied to these studies is “actualistic,” 
since they concern processes or factors currently in operation.20 An important category of 
actualistic studies goes by the name actuopaleontology—literally “the paleontology of 
the present.” These concern how information enters the fossil record, as well as controls 
on the spatial and temporal resolution of fossil assemblages. Actuopaleontology 
encompasses many different kinds of studies, but a significant one is the “live-dead 
study”: a comparison of skeletal remains from a particular setting with live samples 
drawn from the same setting (Behrensmeyer et al. 2000). The idea is to get a handle on 
the spatial and temporal resolution preserved in fossil accumulations; that is, to probe the 
quality of the fossil record by comparing the taxonomic composition of so-called “death 
assemblages” with that of corresponding “life assemblages.”21 Many live-dead studies 
since the 1960s have taught paleontologists that “death assemblages tend to retain 
excellent environmental fidelity, reflecting variation in species composition even at 
spatial scales as fine as tens of meters” (Foote and Miller 2006, 14). Yet the same studies 
have also revealed that “the fidelity of death assemblages holds only for the readily 
preservable elements of the assemblage, and sometimes more strictly only for a single 
 
20 Recall that actual here refers to “present” or “current.” “Actualism” and 
“(methodological) uniformitarianism” are commonly treated as synonyms. 
21 A death assemblage is an accumulation of partially-fossilized organic remains (called 




biologic group such as molluscs.” Fossil assemblages, then, are unlikely to be faithful 
copies of corresponding life assemblages, except for certain types of organisms, living in 
certain types of environmental settings. 
It is at once clear why actualistic studies “[constitute] a major research direction 
[in] modern paleontology” (Kowalewski 1999, 452). For one thing, the fossil record is 
notoriously imperfect, and actuopaleontology gives researchers a way of quantifying this 
imperfection for particular environments and taxonomic groups. (Other kinds of 
actualistic studies probe other aspects of the fossil record. Experiments with tumblers, for 
example, have explored how fossils decay under different environmental conditions. This 
teaches researchers about the conditions in which fossilization is most likely to take 
place, among other things.) Yet for all their utility in exploring aspects of fossilization, 
actualistic studies have their limitations as well. It is not clear, for example, what we are 
warranted to conclude from live-dead studies of contemporary environments about the 
quality of the fossil record in other geological periods. Perhaps ancient death assemblages 
preserved a similar percentage of taxonomic groups as Recent death assemblages; 
perhaps not. The point is that we do not know, or at least we do not know for a great 
many settings. (Sometimes the exceptional preservation of “whole communities” enables 
a more direct look at preservation under ordinary circumstances; but even here 
uncertainties remain.) More generally, paleontologists have questioned how often 
“[actualistic] observations [are] applicable…to the fossil record,” since conditions on the 
earth and associated taphonomic processes have changed considerably over time 
(Kowalewski 1999, 452). 
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There are (at least) two responses to this criticism, neither of which suffices to put 
the worry to rest. The first is given by Michał Kowalewski in the commentary cited 
above. Kowalewski admits that present-day observations may in many cases be 
inapplicable to the fossil record, yet he claims that “present-day observations...should not 
be discarded because they may be useful indirectly” (Kowalewski 1999, 452). He gives 
as his example the study of beach ridges, or “cheniers,” in the tidal flats of the Lower 
Colorado Delta. Now, the way cheniers are identified in unconsolidated rock is through 
the “shell luster features” of the shells composing the chenier. But shell luster is rarely 
preserved in consolidated rocks, and at any rate, cheniers tend to be smeared into oblivion 
before they can be preserved as distinguishable sedimentary structures. It follows that “a 
[straightforward] application of the actualistic study of cheniers is not appropriate” for 
the purpose of interpreting the sedimentary record. Still, the actualistic study of cheniers 
can be useful indirectly “because it can aid geologists in identifying those transgressive 
ravinements [low-relief surfaces formed by the landward migration of a shoreface] that 
were generated from the reworking of cheniers.” It turns out, for explicable taphonomic 
reasons, that the shells composing a chenier are typically derived from a single 
opportunistic species. “Thus, unless cheniers of different ages are thoroughly mixed 
during a transgression, the chenier-derived ravinements should retain the close-to-
monospecific composition [of the original chenier].” So even though cheniers are not an 
important feature of the sedimentary record, the actualistic study of cheniers can help 
geologists identify the type and origin of particular ravinements—a key collateral benefit. 
The second response to the worry that actualistic studies may not be applicable to 
the sedimentary record is to chronicle changes in taphonomic conditions over time, and to 
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evaluate their effects on the quality of the fossil record (Allison and Bottjer 2011).22 This 
promises to illuminate how far actualistic studies can be extended into the past; namely, 
just as far as the relevant taphonomic conditions can be shown to have obtained. For 
example, most existing Paleozoic and Mesozoic sediments (that is, sediments that formed 
between 541 and 65 million years ago) are lithified: they have been condensed and 
transformed into solid rock. Sediments that formed more recently, however, are 
increasingly unlithified; and unlithified sediments tend to preserve more biological 
diversity than lithified sediments. This means that live-dead studies in which the death 
assemblage is derived from unlithified sediments may paint a too-rosy picture of the 
fidelity of the fossil record, precisely because lithification itself tends to destroy 
biological information. In order for these studies to tell us about the record of diversity in 
deep time, they need to be corrected to account for this bias (see Bokulich 2018 for a 
general treatment of this strategy). And so it is with other taphonomic biases; hence the 
extent to which we trust actualistic studies to guide our interpretations of the fossil record 
hinges on our confidence that we have identified all the relevant biases and made the 
appropriate corrections. 
Again, there should be no mystery as to why this question about 
uniformitarianism is contested. How useful one takes actualistic (uniformitarian) studies 
of the fossil record to be will depend, at least, on one’s view of the collateral benefits of 
actualistic observations and on one’s confidence in our ability to identify and correct for 
the biases in large datasets. Since neither the collateral benefits of actualistic studies nor 
 
22 These large-scale trends in taphonomic conditions are known as “megabiases” (Allison 
and Bottjer 2011). 
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the ability of paleontologists to identify and correct for the relevant biases is obvious, 
there is much room here for disagreement. 
 
5. Whither Uniformitarianism? 
We have now reviewed four substantive questions raised by the application of 
“uniformitarianism” to different kinds of investigative goals (corresponding to different 
forms of understanding). Each question we found to be contested among practicing 
geoscientists; hence, it is little mystery that uniformitarianism continues to occupy an 
ambiguous place in geological discourse. The problem with “uniformitarianism” is not 
just its “kaleidoscopic usage in the literature” and whatever conceptual confusions this 
engenders (Romano 2015, 65). Rather, it is its entanglement with a number of substantive 
questions that remain unresolved—questions that concern standards and values as much 
as matters of fact. How useful are uniformitarian studies of the geological record really, 
given that the full scope of their application cannot be precisely delimited? And how hard 
should we push for a uniformitarian explanation before we explore non-uniformitarian 
alternatives? Questions like these do not have straightforward answers, and it is therefore 
unsurprising that they elicit different responses from different scientists. It is to be 
expected, then, that uniformitarianism will continue to excite geological passions for the 
foreseeable future. 
I imagine that this conclusion will strike certain readers as unsatisfying. Sure, 
scientists might disagree about the all-sufficiency of uniformitarian models or the 
usefulness of actualistic studies of fossilization, but isn’t the point of a philosophical 
intervention to see past these local dust-ups to the heart of the matter? In short, shouldn’t 
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a philosophical study of uniformitarianism tell us whether the present really is the key to 
the past? I don’t think so. Sometimes the role of philosophy is to add nuance to 
discussions of a contested subject, and the debate over “uniformitarianism” is a debate 
that badly wants for nuance. As I have argued in this chapter, the question of the 
adequacy and applicability of uniformitarianism is a complex one, since the term 
“uniformitarian[ism]” attaches to different kinds of things: reasoning strategies (and 
associated models), explanations, assumptions about earth system dynamics, and studies. 
To probe the concept of “uniformitarianism,” then, is to probe the value of these diverse 
things in equally diverse investigative contexts. It might be the case that uniformitarian 
models can be applied to every environment in the sedimentary record, and also that 
uniformitarian explanations have definite limits, or that actualistic studies of the fossil 
record can be used to illuminate only certain stretches of geological time. If this is true, 
then uniformitarianism stands both acquitted and condemned: vital to geological 
methodology and yet limited in deep and meaningful ways. 
All this suggests that there is no simple answer to the question, “Is the present the 
key to the past?” On the one hand (to recall a worry from Section 4), there seem to be 
situations in which the key to the past is found within the historical record itself. So, for 
example, maybe the key to understanding late Permian reef complexes lies within the 
Precambrian, prior to the rise of animal-dominated ecosystems. Only in the Precambrian 
were the shallow oceans sufficiently devoid of animals to “model” the conditions found 
after the end-Permian mass extinction, the greatest biological calamity of the past half-
billion years. Maybe it is even the case that, in the absence of the Precambrian 
sedimentary record, the stromatolitic interpretation of late Permian reefs would have been 
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permanently foreclosed (although this strikes me as unlikely). Still, having said all this, it 
is not the case that the key to the Precambrian world was discovered in rocks of 
Precambrian age. Rather, it was discovered in the present: in studies of the stromatolites 
of Shark Bay, which clinched the case for the biological origin of stromatolites (Knoll 
2003). This suggests that the present really does supply a key to the late Permian—or at 
least a key to that compartment of the past that contains a key to the late Permian. Similar 
cases are most likely similarly convoluted, excepting those cases in which no keys exist 
for the relevant door. (Might the Ediacara biota be trapped behind such a door?) 
Thus my title: “The Present is the Key to the Past, Except When it Isn’t (And 
When Then it Kind of Is).” This wouldn't look great on a bumper sticker, and I don’t 
expect to see it in a geology textbook any time soon. But probably it is the best we can 
do, at least for the time being. To say anything stronger is to trade rigor for specious 
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1.  Introduction 
In 1995, Stephen Jay Gould issued the last of what his colleagues jokingly 
described as his “state of paleontology” addresses. The occasion was the twentieth 
anniversary of the founding of Paleobiology, the journal that had served as the focus and 
principal mouthpiece of the “Paleobiological Revolution” (Sepkoski 2012).2 Gould’s title 
 
1 This chapter includes an Appendix, which provides a glossary of important stratigraphic 
terminology. It begins on page 256. 
2 The Paleobiological Revolution was a campaign to upgrade the disciplinary standing of 
paleontology, and saw the emergence of paleobiology as a distinct area of study 
“centered around the quantitative analysis and interpretation of the history of life” 
(Sepkoski 2013, 402). It is usually dated from about 1970 to 1985, and associated with 
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was “A Task for Paleobiology at the Threshold of Majority [legal adulthood].” It was 
designed to contrast with his earlier article, “The Promise of Paleobiology as a 
Nomothetic, Evolutionary Discipline,” written to commemorate Paleobiology’s first five 
volumes (Gould 1980). In this earlier “address,” Gould exhorted his colleagues to slip the 
yoke of stratigraphic geology—a yoke that saw fossils relegated to “an empirical tool” 
for “stratigraphic ordering and environmental reconstruction” (Gould 1980, 98). In 
addition, he urged them to abandon their “passive” stance before evolutionary theory and 
to assume the role of active and creative contributors. Gould himself had modeled this 
role when, in 1972, he debuted the theory of punctuated equilibria with co-author Niles 
Eldredge (Eldredge and Gould 1972). Yet in 1980, contributions like this remained 
scarce, and Gould looked forward to a time when paleobiology could boast a large brood 
of theoretical insights, testifying to its unique role as the “guardian of the record for vast 
times and effects.” 
 Fast forward to 1995, and the “promise of paleobiology” had largely been 
fulfilled. In thrall to no one, the new discipline had emerged as a valued (if frequently 
controversial) contributor to evolutionary theory (Ruse and Sepkoski 2009; Sepkoski 
2012). And the journal Paleobiology, little more than a fledgling in 1980, had become an 
institution. In Gould’s estimate: “Paleobiology has won attention and respect because it 
has been the active centerpiece for a scientific movement that will largely define 
paleontology in our time” (Gould 1995, 3). What remained was for paleobiologists to 
complete their Revolution by solidifying their status as valued, and indeed invaluable, 
 
names like Gould, David Raup, J. John (“Jack”) Sepkoski and Thomas Schopf (see 
Sepkoski and Ruse 2009; Sepkoski 2012). 
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contributors to evolutionary theory. This involved two tasks. First, paleobiologists were 
to characterize large-scale patterns in the history of life; then, they were to explain these 
patterns using a body of home-spun evolutionary theory. Gould was careful to note that 
theory alone “does not define the task of paleobiology,” since “narrative patterns of life’s 
long-term history are as important as theories invoked to explain them” (Gould 1995, 7). 
Still, “the twin themes of macroevolutionary theory and [large-scale] pattern work 
together to define the task of paleobiology for the evolutionary sciences” (12, emphasis 
added). And since the evolutionary sciences are paleobiology’s rightful home, these 
themes come close to exhausting the task of paleobiology as a whole. 
Like many of the things Gould wrote, this article was not a little self-serving. Few 
would have failed to notice that his “task for paleobiology” awarded a central place to 
just those theoretical activities in which Gould was already engaged (Dresow 2019). 
Moreover, his “task” was singularly, and characteristically, focused on evolution 
(Bambach 2008). “[The] development of macroevolutionary theory and its application to 
understanding the pattern of life’s history. That is our task,” Gould declared (Gould 1995, 
3). The vision is striking, if only because the scope and diversity of paleobiological 
research had exploded since the early days of Paleobiology. During that time, 
paleobiologists had studied everything from the chemical composition of fossils to 
microbial controls on geochemical cycling in the Neoproterozoic. So broad was its remit 
that, by 2000, Douglas Erwin and Scott Wing could write that “[the] diversity of 
paleobiological research seems almost to defy unification” (Erwin and Wing 2000, ii). 
A particularly promising strand of research involved the application of new 
models of sedimentary basin filling to the problem of understanding the stratigraphic 
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distribution of fossils. In fact, the very issue of Paleobiology that contained Gould’s 
“Task” also contained a paper by Steven Holland that brought this approach into the 
domain of numerical modeling, with celebrated results (Holland 1995a). Armed with 
these models, paleobiologists turned increasingly to questions that “require the collection 
of fossils in a field context and directly incorporate field data into their solutions” (Droser 
1995, 507). These questions were biological in nature, and concerned things like the 
relative timing of physical and biological events, and the interpretation of biological 
patterns documented at the scale of outcrops to sedimentary basins (Patzkowsky and 
Holland 2012). Yet they differed from the questions that were focal during the 
Paleobiological Revolution by concerning regional, as opposed to global, patterns, and by 
focusing as much on ecological as on evolutionary considerations. What’s more, they 
incorporated a basically novel approach to stratigraphic complexity; one grounded in the 
deployment of high-resolution frameworks for analyzing the incompleteness of the fossil 
record, and for parsing controls on the distribution and abundance of fossil taxa. But 
more on this in a moment. 
Gould’s cramped view of paleobiology has tended to be reflected in recent 
historical scholarship on the field. The reason is that this literature has focused almost 
entirely on the Paleobiological Revolution, and in particular, on the period from about 
1970 to 1985.3 Apropos of this focus, two themes have come to play coordinating roles in 
the historiography of paleobiology. The first is that paleobiology is a biological (read: 
evolutionary) science, which is tasked above all with contributing to evolutionary theory 
 
3 As I observed in Chapter 1, a similar restriction of focus has shaped philosophical 
reflections on paleontology (usually understood narrowly to mean paleobiology). 
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(Bambach 2009; Grantham 2009; Ruse 2009; Valentine 2009; Baron 2011; Turner 2011; 
Sepkoski 2009, 2012, 2019). So Derek Turner writes that the Paleobiological Revolution 
was undergirded by a belief that “Paleontology has more to contribute to [evolutionary] 
biology than to geology” (Turner 2011, 7). He continues: 
 
The study of fossils has long played an important role in geology, in part because 
understanding fossils is helpful for identifying and dating types of rocks. [Yet the] 
1970s revolutionaries sought to move their field closer and closer to biology, and one 
way in which they tried to do that was to show that they had something to say about 
evolutionary theory…Some started using the term “paleobiology” to describe their 
work. This was a way of signaling that the game had changed; paleontologists were 
now contributing to evolutionary theory. (Turner 2011, 7, emphases added) 
 
David Sepkoski has a similar take:         
 
The dilemma faced by paleontologists in establishing paleontology as a legitimate 
evolutionary discipline...involved both asserting the theoretical value of the fossil 
record and repositioning paleontology within the larger matrix of evolutionary 
biology...The new model paleontologist was trained in biology as well as geology, 
was adept at quantitative analysis, was prepared to employ general theoretical models 
to explain how evolution worked, and might be more comfortable seated at a 
computer than at a fossil preparation table. (Sepkoski 2012, 2–3, emphases added) 
 
To establish paleontology as an evolutionary discipline, paleontologists needed to 
reposition their field within the matrix of evolutionary biology and, ultimately, 
demonstrate that paleontology has distinctive contributions to make to evolutionary 
theory. Not for nothing did Sepkoski subtitle his 2012 monograph on the Paleobiological 
Revolution, The Growth of Paleobiology as an Evolutionary Discipline. 
The second theme is related to Sepkoski’s observation that the new paleontologist 
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is wont to prefer the computer bench to the preparation table (and, we might add, the 
museum stacks to the outcrop). It is that paleobiology is a science centered on the 
analysis of large amounts of data—it is not an activity concerned with the classification 
and interpretation of particular specimens. As Sepkoski (2013) observes, data-centric 
practices have a long pedigree in paleontology. From its first stirrings as a discipline, 
paleontologists have employed technologies for managing and analyzing copious data, 
from lavishly illustrated atlases to tabular compilations of the fossil record supplemented 
with interpretive diagrams (Rudwick 1972; Sepkoski 2013, 2017; Tamborini 2019). Yet 
something important changed during the 1970s and 1980s. With the advent of digital 
computers and computerized data, “large-scale quantitative analyses of patterns in the 
history of life” become the stock-in-trade of the new evolutionary paleobiologists 
(Sepkoski 2012, 2). The history of data practices in paleontology, it follows, involves 
significant ruptures imposed upon no less significant continuities. 
Because the historiography of paleobiology has centered on two themes—
paleobiology as an evolutionary and data-centric science, respectively—inquiry has 
focused on two topics: (1) the drama of paleontology’s relationship with evolutionary 
theory and (2) the history of practices used to characterize large-scale patterns in life’s 
history. Yet this leaves sizable gaps in our understanding, most notably concerning 
paleobiology’s status as a geoscience. It was no aim of the 1970s revolutionaries to 
uproot paleobiology entirely from the geosciences, after all. Even Gould, the most 
biologically-oriented of the Young Turk paleobiologists, affirmed “the absolute necessity 
of comprehensive geological training for success in paleontology”—and in a paper 
touting paleobiology as an evolutionary discipline, no less (Gould 1980, 98). “[With] all 
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biology and no geology, paleontology is empty; but with geology alone it is blind,” 
Gould claimed. It is “blind” without biology because paleontology’s most important 
questions come from evolutionary theory (or so Gould tended to suppose). Yet it is 
“empty” without geology because in its working methods and visual language, there is 
much in paleontology-cum-paleobiology that is distinctively geological. 
 
This chapter begins to fill the gap in our understanding of paleobiology as a 
geoscience. It does this by tracing the emergence of a new approach to stratigraphic 
complexity: first in geology, and then, following its creative appropriation, in 
paleobiology. The approach is associated with a set of models that together 
revolutionized stratigraphic geology during the 1970s and 1980s. These included the 
celebrated sequence stratigraphic models of Peter Vail and others, which show how the 
processes of sedimentary accumulation impart a complex structure to the stratigraphic 
record. Transposed into paleobiology, they gave researchers a powerful way of studying 
the incompleteness of the fossil record, and of removing biases imposed by the structure 
of the rock record itself. In addition, they helped to reconfigure the cultural landscape of 
paleobiology, giving a new impetus to fieldwork and eroding the barrier that Gould and 
others had erected between the “old” and the “new” paleontology. In the words of Mary 
Droser, a field-based paleobiologist writing in 1995: 
 
Paleobiology is broadening as it matures and finding answers in the field sciences. 
With this, the lines that separate divisions of paleontology become even more vague. 
Those who consider themselves paleobiologists or [field-based] paleontologists may 




The remainder of this chapter is organized in six sections. In Section 2, I survey 
the strained relationship between paleontology and stratigraphy in the lead-up to the 
Paleobiological Revolution. This section also reviews the strategies that paleobiologists 
developed to cope with the incompleteness of the fossil record, and explains why these 
failed to provide much guidance for the interpretation of biological patterns at local and 
regional scales. Section 3 provides a whirlwind tour of some important ideas and 
developments in twentieth century stratigraphy. These form a springboard to Sections 4 
and 5, which explore the development of event and sequence stratigraphy, respectively. 
In Section 6, I consider how these developments were appropriated by paleobiologists, 
focusing on the influential simulation models of the “stratigraphic paleobiologist” Steven 
Holland (1995a, 1995b). Then, in Section 7, I consider how the advent of stratigraphic 
paleobiology shaped the development of the field, not least by shortening the cultural 
distance that had opened up between the old (field-based or stratigraphic) paleontology 
and the new paleobiology. I close, in Section 8, with a brief reflection on how 
stratigraphic paleobiology has begun to change the conversation surrounding 
incompleteness and bias in the fossil record.4 
 
4 A note for philosophical readers. This chapter is a historical study, and as such it does 
not engage philosophical themes directly. Still, the chapter points towards several issues 
of philosophical interest. The first concerns ideas about the rock record. To date, 
philosophers of science have been remarkably uninterested in the rock record as such, 
saying little more than that it is stratified (i.e., layered). But the rock record is not just 
stratified; it is also intricately structured, and this structure both complicates and 
facilitates attempts to reconstruct geohistory (at least once the structure has been 
adequately understood). Recently, Alisa Bokulich has examined how paleobiologists use 
models to “correct” data in large datasets (Bokulich 2018). We need parallel 
investigations of how paleobiologists and other geoscientists use models (like those 
discussed in this chapter) to guide the interpretation of field data and to inform sampling 
strategies. This is a distinct form of practice from that discussed in Bokulich (2018), in 
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2.  The Paleobiological Revolution and Beyond 
The Paleobiological Revolution was premised, in no small part, on a desire to 
liberate paleontology from the clutches of stratigraphic geology (Baron 2011; Sepkoski 
2012). This was necessary, it was argued, in order that paleontologists might cultivate a 
genuinely biological attitude towards their subject matter: the fossilized remains of past 
organisms. Fossils have a variety of uses in geohistorical research, not the least of which 
is as tools for subdividing the rock column and correlating distantly separated 
stratigraphic sections. Yet nothing in these practices requires the investigator to regard 
fossils as the remains of once-living organisms as opposed to neutral markers of 
stratigraphic position. As such, stratigraphic paleontology, which provided the main 
employment for invertebrate paleontologists during the first half of the 20th century, 
failed to develop a pronounced biological orientation.5 Its questions remained geological 
 
part because it targets a different scale of investigation, and in part because it has 
different aims. 
 A second theme concerns notions of incompleteness and bias. As I note in this 
chapter, the idea that the fossil record is incomplete and biased has a long pedigree in 
paleontology. It is also a prominent feature of philosophical analyses of the historical 
sciences, which have tended to highlight evidential degradation as a major challenge 
facing historical scientists (see Chapter 1, in particular, fn. 8). But stratigraphic 
paleobiology puts pressure on this simplistic characterization. Sure, the fossil record is 
“incomplete” and “biased” (e.g., skewed towards hard parts), but no less important, it is 
structured—and this structure can be investigated to inform data collection and to aid in 
model specification. What this means is that philosophers should not assume that 
incompleteness (driven by evidential degradation) is an appropriate characterization of 
paleontologists’ epistemic situation. In addition, they should take a second look at 
whether there is anything unusual about the “incompleteness” and “bias” of the fossil 
record when compared to other scientific datasets. 
5 This was the case in the Anglophone world, at any rate. In the German-speaking world, 
the relationship between stratigraphy and paleontology seems to have been less strained 
(Tamborini, personal communication). It is possible that this owed to the influence of 
figures like Heinrich Bronn (1800–1862) and Karl Alfred von Zittel (1802–1871), whose 
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and utilitarian, and its practitioners remained narrow taxonomic specialists as opposed to 
question-driven biological researchers. J. Brookes Knight, an invertebrate paleontologist, 
put the point tartly in his 1947 presidential address to the Paleontological Society: 
  
[What] we today call a paleontologist, particularly that jellylike variety without a 
backbone, incapable of standing erect on his own two feet, the invertebrate 
paleontologist, is not a paleontologist at all. He is a geologist, a stratigraphical or 
“soft-rock” geologist. He has considerable familiarity with invertebrate fossils, to be 
sure, but he is a geologist nevertheless. (Knight 1947, 284) 
  
The problem had not abated by 1968, when Martin Rudwick (then working as a 
paleontologist) complained that paleontology had been “stunted throughout its existence 
by its subservience to the needs of stratigraphy”: 
  
This [subservience] has hindered the mainstream of paleontological work from 
developing any genuinely biological attitude. The situation has certainly improved 
within the last decade, but even today what is so often missing is any imaginative 
awareness of fossils as the remains of organisms that were once alive. (Rudwick 
1968, 35) 
  
Even in 1980, the situation was dire enough to cause Gould to write the following: 
  
Invertebrate paleontology has cast its institutional allegiance with geology—more by 
historical accident than by current logic. When it operates as a geological discipline, 
paleontology has tended to be an empirical tool for stratigraphic ordering and 
environmental reconstruction. As a service industry [of academic and economic 
geology], its practitioners have been schooled as minutely detailed, but restricted 
experts in the niceties of taxonomy for particular groups in particular times. (Gould 
1980, 98) 
 
“data-driven” approaches fostered a biological integration of paleontological and 
stratigraphic data (see Sepkoski 2017; Tamborini 2017; Sepkoski and Tamborini 2018). 
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All this points to a consensus among would-be paleobiologists: (1) that the science of 
paleontology had been unjustly subordinated to the project of stratigraphy; (2) that 
progress in paleontology required the cultivation of a genuinely biological attitude; and 
(3) that because the subordination of paleontology to stratigraphy prevented the 
cultivation of such an attitude, the future of paleontology hinged on its liberation from 
stratigraphic geology, as well as the reassertion of its status as an autonomous biological 
science. 
But how was all this to be achieved? Gould, at least, had a plan. If paleontology 
was to slip its fetters and step forth as an autonomous biological discipline, it needed to 
cultivate a new attitude toward its data, on the one hand, and evolutionary theory, on the 
other (Gould and Eldredge 1977; Gould 1980). This involved breaking a loop of 
reinforcement that saw paleontology relegated to the status of a mere satellite of 
evolutionary theory—a source of data about life’s empirical pattern, but not a contributor 
of new ideas. For Gould, it all began with the fossil record. Since the middle of the 19th 
century, it had been a commonplace that the rock record (including the record of 
emplaced fossils) is woefully incomplete. Charles Darwin referred to it as “a history of 
the world imperfectly kept,” and proceeded to deny that we have any right “to expect to 
find in our geological formations, an infinite number of those fine transitional forms, 
which on my theory assuredly have connected all the past and present species” (Darwin 
1859, 310, 301). Later paleontologists mostly agreed with his assessment (Eldredge and 
Gould 1972; Sepkoski 2012). It is not the case that here and there in the pile of 
formations, a page has been torn from the record of earth’s history. To the contrary, the 
record is missing most of its pages, and of those that remain, the majority are “torn” or 
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“blotted,” or else covered in confused writing like a palimpsest. It was this dim view of 
the fossil record that Gould and others sought to reform “through a deliberate 
manipulation of Darwin’s book metaphor” (Sepkoski 2012, 3). If the fossil record was 
“an imperfect text,” the strategy of paleobiologists would be to “reread” that text in a way 
that enabled them to frame valid generalizations about large-scale patterns and processes 
in the history of life. 
Sepkoski (2012) identifies three strategies that paleobiologists developed to cope 
with the incompleteness of the fossil record. The first he calls “literal rereading,” and 
consists in a disposition to read certain aspects of the fossil record, at least, at face value. 
So Eldredge and Gould claim that “[m]any breaks in the fossil record are real; they 
express the way in which evolution occurs, not the fragments of an imperfect record” 
(Eldredge and Gould 1972, 96, emphasis added). The second strategy is its polar 
opposite. Inspired by the success of abstract modeling practices in ecology, “idealized 
rereading” was designed to circumvent the messiness of the fossil record by simulating 
the history of life in silico. In these simulations, “the physical particulars of the fossil 
record [are] all but ignored, and the history of life...is modeled as a series of 
homogeneous data points...using very simple parameters” (Sepkoski 2012, 3–4). The 
results of these simulations could then be compared to the fossil record to make certain 
inferences about the history of life. Finally, there is the approach that Sepkoski calls 
“generalized rereading,” which involves the assembly of data in large electronic 
databases for the purpose of framing “statistical generalizations...about patterns in life’s 
history” (Sepkoski 2012, 4). Crucially, this approach is “marked by meticulous collection 
of data on a monumental scale and by an interplay between mathematical modeling and 
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rigorous, insightful data analysis” (Foote 1999, 326). It is not just an attempt to smooth 
out a patchy fossil record with copious data (see also Bokulich 2018). 
As Sepkoski observes, generalized rereading emerged in the 1970s and 
“ultimately became the dominant methodology in analytical paleobiology during the 
1980s” (Sepkoski 2012, 4). Yet generalized rereading was most easily applied to 
problems at the largest spatial and temporal scales (e.g., global studies of marine diversity 
through time). For studies of individual basins, not to mention bed-by-bed studies of 
morphology or taxonomic change, other strategies were more suitable, like literal 
rereading.6 But literal rereading had well-known limitations, as even Gould was fast to 
admit (Gould 1969). Compounding the problem, growing knowledge of the processes 
that structure the rock record suggested that the pattern of fossil occurrences is strongly 
shaped by the structure of the rock record itself (e.g., Kidwell 1991; MacLeod 1991; 
Brett 1995). Some strategy was therefore needed for taming these biases—for extracting 
biological signals from the scrambling and distorting effects of stratigraphic overprint. 
This researchers would eventually find in sequence stratigraphy, but only after a new 
generation of paleobiologists had traversed the cultural gap that had opened between 
paleobiology and its erstwhile oppressor. 
The next three sections explore the roots of this new approach to stratigraphic 
complexity by examining those developments in stratigraphy that made possible a fruitful 
reconciliation with paleobiology after the Paleobiological Revolution. In Section 3, I 
 
6 Idealized rereading was not an option, since it is not an approach to “reading” the 
paleontological record at all, but rather an alternative to reading it. 
 178 
 
explore the background to the revolutionary developments in stratigraphy during the 
1970s and 1980s. Then, in Sections 4 and 5, I unpack the content of these developments. 
 
3.  Stratigraphy Before 1970: From the Layer Cake to the Crazy-Quilt 
Stratigraphy is the study of layered rocks, and layered rocks are the archives of 
geohistory: “the sum of a thousand narratives in stone-stacked order” (Fortey 1997, 8). A 
major goal of geology is to piece together these narratives from scattered evidence, and to 
fit them into appropriate spatial and temporal frameworks (the tasks of reconstruction and 
correlation, respectively). Stratigraphy is central to both these tasks, and for this reason 
has been called “the heart of geology” (Weller 1947, 570), “the basic activity of geology” 
(Greene 2009, 171) and “the key to understand[ing] the Earth, its...structure and past life” 
(Doyle and Bennett 1998, 1). Indeed, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the 
main activity of geologists “has been to name and measure every stratum of every 
sequence on earth, to detail its component minerals, and to reconstruct the story of its 
formation, its existence, and in many cases its deformation and destruction” (Greene 
2009, 171). This activity is basically stratigraphic. Elaborate reconstructions of 
geohistory are built upon the frameworks supplied by stratigraphic research; so in this 
sense it is no exaggeration to say that “stratigraphy…underpins the whole basis of Earth 
history” (Benton and Harper 2009, 25). 
Central to stratigraphy throughout its long history has been paleontology, since 
fossils provide the best means of correlating rocks over hundreds, or even thousands, of 
kilometers. Enthusiasm for this practice blossomed during the early decades of the 
nineteenth century due to the recognition that many systems established on the basis of 
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fossil evidence could also be recognized abroad, even on different continents (see, e.g., 
Rudwick 1985; Rupke 1998). Guided by fossils, geologists were able to see past “the 
bewildering variety of local formations and the confusing effects of local tectonic 
disturbances,” to articulate a consistent outline of geohistory for the largest divisions of 
geological time (Rudwick 1972, 199). Indeed, with the refinement of stratigraphic 
methods during the middle of the century, hopes were high that the rock record might be 
decomposed into a predictable succession of “zones” with global, or near-global, 
applicability.7 The rock record might then be pictured as a layer cake, with each layer 
representing a unique interval of time as well as a group of strata corresponding to that 
interval (Brett and Baird 1997). 
Although many nineteenth century geologists held views that later generations 
would malign as “layer cake stratigraphy,” all were aware that the stratigraphic record is 
complex, and that this complexity has an important spatial dimension. In the present day, 
environmental conditions are highly variable from place to place. Even at a single place, 
a range of environments are liable to be found in close proximity, each with its own 
complement of biological inhabitants. Conditions in the past were probably similar, at 
least in the sense that many environments are likely to have existed side by side, forming 
a mosaic of environmental conditions. It is to be expected, then, that this mosaic will be 
reflected in the rocks as a mosaic of lithological and paleontological characteristics. As 
the British geologist Henry De la Beche wrote in 1839, it is most unlikely “that detrital 
 
7 The term “zone” was used in a number of ways in the nineteenth century (Hancock 
1977). Most influentially, it referred to a stratigraphic interval characterized by a 
particular fossil assemblage, although zones were typically named for a single fossil 
taxon. (See the Appendix to Chapter 5, pp. 256–259, for a complete glossary.) 
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matter has been strewed in exactly the same manner, enveloping exactly the same organic 
remains, over all parts of the world, where deposits were taking place at the same time” 
(39). His point was directed against those who assumed a contrary picture in their 
practice: in particular, those who assumed that the rock record could be analyzed as a 
stack of mostly homogeneous strata, each with a distinctive set of fossils that fixed the 
location of that stratum uniquely in the pile. 
The term “facies” was introduced in 1838, and signaled an increased recognition 
that the characteristics of a rock unit can vary considerably from place to place (Teichert 
1958; Hancock 1977).8 Yet the notion that the rock record resembles a layer cake—one 
with dappled layers, perhaps, but a layer cake nonetheless—persisted into the twentieth 
century (Brown 2013). Especially in North America, stratigraphers continued to describe 
strata as laterally continuous sheets of mostly homogeneous rock, with the presumption 
that these corresponded to unique intervals of time (Brett et al. 2007). These 
stratigraphers were aware that rock type often shifts as you trace a formation laterally (the 
phenomenon of lateral facies change). Moreover, they did not believe that all rock units 
of consistent lithology were necessarily “isochronous,” or equivalent in age over their 
entire extent. Still, stratigraphers during this period remained largely absorbed in the 
tasks of naming and mapping broad packages of strata over extensive geographical areas 
(Miall 2010). And for these tasks, layer cake views served passably well. Sure, the 
stratigraphic record may not form a perfect layer cake, but it approximates one well 
enough that geologists can get on with the work of delimiting major packages of strata, 
 
8 “Facies” is a Latin word meaning “face” or “external appearance.” In geological usage, 
it means a sedimentary deposit characterized by a set of features that permit its 
environment of origin to be inferred (e.g., coastal plain, reef front, deep water). 
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and correlating them between localities using various kinds of evidence. All that is 
required is that laterally continuous strata units exhibit some degree of isochrony: in other 
words, that units traceable across country not differ markedly in age from place to place. 
(Rock units that differ in age from place to place are known as “diachronous.”) 
The story of stratigraphy in the middle of the twentieth century is a story of the 
erosion of confidence in lateral continuity. Indeed, by the 1960s, the influential 
stratigrapher Alan B. Shaw could speak with authority of “the universality of 
diachronism”—that is, of the notion that all sedimentary rocks deposited in 
stratigraphically important environments are diachronous (Shaw 1964, x). According to 
this view, similar-looking and ostensibly continuous strata should not be regarded as 
roughly equivalent in age. Instead, they should be regarded as merely analogous facies, 
and therefore as probably diachronous. (As Carlton Brett summarizes this view, “if a rock 
unit looks the same in two different places it must be of different ages” (2000, 496).) 
Likewise, faunal occurrences should be interpreted as diachronous unless members of the 
fauna belonged to widespread and short-lived taxa, termed “index fossils” for their 
usefulness in telling time. By the 1960s, the majority of stratigraphic complexity was 
analyzed in facies terms, and little attention was given to the project of tracing laterally 
continuous strata over extensive geographical areas (Brett et al. 2007; Miall 2015). As a 
consequence, paleontological methods were largely expelled from the mainstream of 
stratigraphic research, although they continued to find employment in the rapidly 
expanding field of energy exploration (see Newell 1962). 
The 1960s are sometimes described as a “revolution” in lithostratigraphy. Out was 
the practice of tracing broadly continuous strata over large areas, mostly on the strength 
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of fossil evidence. Out too was the practice of representing these strata as “uniform 
blankets bounded by sharp vertical lines [on] the correlation table”—echoes of the old 
layer cake view (Miall 2000, 4). In their place were substituted facies analysis and 
diagrams showing “crazy-quilt” patchworks of lithostratigraphic blobs (see Figure 11).9 
Developments in stratigraphic nomenclature consolidated this trend, calling for a 
separation of units based on rocks (the subject matter of lithostratigraphy), fossils 
(biostratigraphy) and time (chronostratigraphy). By all accounts, the nomenclatural 
innovations were successful, and “put an end to the days when a single term might 
represent a rock unit, a time unit, or some hopelessly confused combination [of the two]” 
(Holland 1999, 409). Still, a growing emphasis on “pure lithostratigraphy” added 
tremendously to the complexity of the geological literature. In addition, it “sidetracked 
the field from the central [issue] of reconstructing Earth’s history,” because it 
discouraged inquiry into the complex interrelationships of rocks, fossils and time 
(Holland 1999, 409). Or, to hear Carlton Brett tell it, “[in] their adherence to a 
stratigraphic code stating that rock units must be kept strictly separate from time units, 
lithostratigraphers almost lost the most critical of all notions: the perspective of the 
temporal scope of rock layers” (Brett 2000, 496).10  
 
9 Facies analysis aims to “identify different environments in ancient rocks, and also to 
understand the range of processes that can operate within these environments” (Walker 
1984, 5).  
10 The perception that traditional stratigraphy had grown moribund in the 1960s and 
1970s was a widespread one. Bhattacharya and Abreu (2016), for example, describe the 
early 1970s as the “end of stratigraphy,” since at the time undergraduate education in 
geology “focused almost exclusively on process sedimentology, facies analysis, and 
petrographic description, [as opposed to] stratigraphy [per se]” (7). Comments like this 
illustrate how far the revolution in lithostratigraphy carried the field away from its 





Figure 11  A diagram of the Cincinnatian strata of Indiana, Ohio and Kentucky, showing 
lateral relationships between “lithostratigraphic blobs” (named facies units). (From 
Cuffey 1998) 
 
The eclipse of time in stratigraphy was a temporary one, and in the next two 
sections, I will review several ways that mainstream stratigraphers regained their interest 
in the temporal scope of rock layers. Before coming to this, however, it is worth pausing 
on the question of why the alienation of litho- and biostratigraphy resulted in a curiously 
 184 
 
ahistorical stratigraphy. For all of the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century, 
biostratigraphy provided the primary means of determining the temporal relationships of 
rock bodies (a task that would come to be known as “chronostratigraphy”). Although 
radioisotopic methods were known from the early twentieth century, most rocks cannot 
be dated using isotopes, and other methods (like magnetostratigraphy calibrated to an 
absolute time scale) lacked the resolving power of biostratigraphy. When 
lithostratigraphy was “revolutionized” in the 1960s, then, biostratigraphy and 
chronostratigraphy were effectively the same project (Shaw 1963).11 It follows that when 
lithostratigraphy expelled paleontological methods, the mainstream of stratigraphic 
research lost its best means of establishing time scales for the smaller divisions of 
geological time. It is this alienation that is in focus for complaints that stratigraphy got 
“sidetracked” in the 1960s and 1970s, and that it “lost the most critical of all notions: the 
perspective of the temporal scope of rock layers.” 
 There is an irony in all this: that while invertebrate paleontologists were 
bemoaning their subordination to stratigraphic geology, paleontological methods were in 
the process of being expelled from the mainstream of stratigraphic research (Newell 
1962). Still, it would not be long before geologists were reminded of the temporal scope 
of rock layers, as well as Darwin’s great bugbear: the imperfection of the rock record. 
And perhaps unsurprisingly, it would be a paleontologist who would do the reminding. 
 
 
11 This is not to say that biostratigraphic (rock) units were ever chronostratigraphic (time) 
units—although in practice they were frequently treated as such (Hedberg 1965). It is just 




4.  More Gap Than Record 
 “There is something damn funny about the stratigraphical record.” So wrote the 
paleoecologist Derek Ager in a volume whose slim dimensions belie its enormous 
importance in the history of stratigraphy (Ager 1973, 1).12 The volume is a self-
proclaimed “ideas book,” which, given the reputation of most stratigraphers as narrow-
minded empiricists, might have been expected to produce a small impact on the field 
(Ager 1993a, ix). Yet as the stratigrapher Andrew Miall recalls, “the issue of time in 
stratigraphy did not begin to have a major influence on the science until Ager’s work in 
the 1970s” (Miall 2015, 285). In this section, I introduce a few of the key ideas from 
Ager’s The Nature of the Stratigraphical Record before turning to the most influential 
development in late twentieth century stratigraphy—the articulation of a new model of 
large-scale stratigraphic architecture based on seismic records of continental marine 
deposits. 
What did Ager find so curious about the “stratigraphical record”? For one thing, 
“[the] record is spasmodic and ridiculously incomplete, with particular strata and fossils 
extremely widespread, but separated by vastly longer gaps than anything that is 
preserved” (Ager 1993a, 112). For another, individual strata and fossils are almost 
certainly diachronous (Ager agreed with Shaw that most sedimentary strata and fossils 
spread diachronously, with the possible exception of deep-sea oozes). Because the record 
is “ridiculously incomplete,” however, these strata and fossils are “to all intents and 
geological purposes synchronous”—it is not the case that diachronism destroys the value 
 
12 The book was The Nature of the Stratigraphic Record, and it went through three 
editions in Ager’s lifetime (1973, 1981, 1993a). 
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of fossils and sedimentary facies as markers of equivalent time. The death of lateral 
continuity, then, had been somewhat exaggerated. As unlikely as it must have seemed in 
1973, the stratigraphic layer cake had some life in it still. 
Ager himself disowns the layer cake analogy, but his picture of the rock column 
permits the recovery of a certain layer cake pattern. In Ager’s view, one of the chief 
results of “Recent sedimentary studies has been the demonstration of lateral rather than 
vertical sedimentation” (87). “Modern deposits are not, it seems, laid down layer upon 
layer over a wide area,” as old-fashioned layer cake stratigraphers liked to imply. Rather, 
“[they] start from a particular point and then build out sideways as in the traditional 
picture of a delta.”13 To illustrate his point, Ager offers the analogy of “carpets being 
brought periodically into a shop for display and rolled out one by one on a pile” (112). 
The end product of this stacking would resemble a layer cake with clearly distinct layers; 
still, “the process of formation and the record it preserves [would be] different [from the 
naive layer cake view].” For one thing, “we know that the time-gaps between successive 
layers might have been very considerable”—an issue for any layer cake picture tied to the 
outdated model of continuous sedimentation (112–113). In addition, “[we] know that 
when a new layer arrived, it was not deposited simultaneously all over the preceding 
layer” (113). Ager’s criticisms, then, are not directed at the layer cake pattern, but rather 
at the view that sedimentation resembles “gentle rain from heaven”—a view that he 
curiously associates with the notion of a facies mosaic (since God’s rain falls on the just 
and the unjust, the muddy lagoon and the barrier reef). 
 
13 The formation of a delta involves the deposition of sloping layers of sediment atop 
already-existing layers. It is an example of what geologists call “progradation”: in other 
words, the building of a shore- or coastline into the sea. 
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Ager’s most important contribution, however, was not his idea that sedimentation 
consists in lateral spreading instead of vertical stacking.14 Instead, it was his claim that 
significant portions of the geological record were deposited in a very short time by 
“catastrophic events” like hurricanes and underwater avalanches (termed “turbidity 
currents”). These events are instantaneous in geological terms, and may cover areas of 
hundreds or even thousands of square kilometers. As a consequence, they can be used as 
time-lines to correlate distant stratigraphic sections, even if most of the rocks comprising 
those sections were deposited diachronously. Writes Ager: 
 
We have managed to confuse ourselves for years with the jargon of lithostratigraphy, 
biostratigraphy, chronostratigraphy and the rest. In fact, it can be argued that basically 
there are only two concepts—rocks and time—with the rest just an obfuscation of 
nomenclature. Nevertheless, it is useful to distinguish between our various means of 
correlation and I make no apology for suggesting another term, just to draw attention 
to its usefulness as a method. This is what may be called “event stratigraphy” in 
which we correlate not the rocks themselves, on their intrinsic petrological characters, 
nor the fossils, but [discrete geological and biological] events. (Ager 1993a, 98–99) 
 
The term “event stratigraphy” has since passed into general usage; likewise the practice 
of constructing high-resolution time scales on the basis of “geologically instantaneous” 
events (Aigner 1985; Kauffman 1988; Einsele et al. 1991). According to Patzkowsky and 
Holland (2012), it is one of two approaches that lay at the heart of stratigraphic 
paleobiology, since it permits the high-resolution correlation of individual beds and sets 
of beds—a prerequisite for resolving the dynamics of rapid paleobiological events within 
 




single sedimentary environments (Holland 1999, 2000). (The other approach is sequence 
stratigraphy, the subject of Section 5.) 
There is a flip side to the view that most sedimentation is episodic, and that large 
portions of the geological record accumulate in virtually instantaneous events. This is the 
notion that the record is ridiculously incomplete—“more gap than record,” as Ager puts 
it—even in putatively complete sections. Ager observes that the traditional way of 
representing the stratigraphic column is as a stack of rocks (or in a correlation chart, a 
series of stacks) interrupted, if at all, by minor gaps (see Figure 12). Yet Ager proposes 
that a “far more accurate picture” is that of “[a] long gap with only very occasional 
sedimentation” (Ager 1993a, 52–53).  
 
Perhaps the best way to convey this [picture] is to remember a child’s definition of a 
net as a lot of holes tied together with string. The stratigraphical record is a lot of gaps 
tied together with sediment. It is as though one has a newspaper delivered only for the 
football results on Sunday and assumes that nothing at all happened on the other days. 
(Ager 1993a, 53). 
 
As Ager notes in a later book, each bedding plane is effectively an unconformity—a 
surface corresponding to a period of non-deposition and perhaps erosion (Ager 1993b). 
And the number of bedding planes in a given stratigraphic succession is enormous. The 
upshot is that “gaps probably cover most of earth history, not the dirt that happened to 
accumulate in the moments in between.” Or as Ager writes in the oft-quoted conclusion 
to The Nature of the Stratigraphical Record: “the history of any one part of the earth, like 
the life of a soldier, consists of long periods of boredom and short periods of terror” 






Figure 12  A comparison of a conventional representation of a stratigraphic section (left) 
with “what is probably the true picture” (right). Notice that in the “probably...true 
picture,” strata are represented at an angle, in accordance with Ager’s view that 
sedimentary accumulation consists in lateral spreading as opposed to “gentle rain from 
heaven.” (From Ager 1993a) 
 
Ager’s work had an immediate impact on stratigraphic thought. Apart from 
stimulating interest in “catastrophic” events, perhaps the most important thing it did was 
reopen the question of the temporal scope of rock layers, and increasingly, of surfaces 
corresponding to gaps in the record. Time is continuous, but sedimentation—and 
therefore the stratigraphic record of time—is not. Yet to understand the distribution of 
gap-lengths and the meaning of surfaces corresponding to periods of non-deposition or 
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erosion, geologists required tools for interpreting the stratigraphic record in terms of 
controls on sedimentary accumulation over a range of spatial and temporal scales. These 
were mostly unavailable when the first edition of The Nature of the Stratigraphic Record 
appeared in 1973. They were soon to become available, however, with the advent of a 
new approach to stratigraphy for larger scales of time. This approach, which studies the 
architecture of stratigraphic sequences over a range of spatial and temporal scales, is 
termed “sequence stratigraphy.” Although little heralded outside the earth sciences, it is 
hard to overstate its importance for the study of sedimentary rocks. To a greater extent 
than even the “revolution” in lithostratigraphy, sequence stratigraphy was a game-
changer. 
 
5.  Sequence Stratigraphy 
The basic ideas behind sequence stratigraphy began to coalesce in the 1940s, but 
it was not until the 1980s that they precipitated what has been called a revolution in 
stratigraphy (Sloss 1988).15 The chief architect of this revolution was Peter Vail, a 
stratigrapher working for the Exxon oil company’s Upstream Research Group (of which 
more in a moment). However, it was Vail’s doctoral advisor, Laurence Sloss, who got the 
ball rolling with his study of the enormous packages of strata comprising the cratonic 
region of North America.16 Sloss was an outlier among American stratigraphers in the 
 
15 This is different from the revolution in lithostratigraphy, which took place during the 
1960s. Geologists, you will have noticed, are fond of the term “revolution.” 
16 A craton is a large and ancient block of the earth’s crust that comprises the nucleus of a 
continent. A cratonic region is the region overlying a craton and containing piles of 
younger rocks. What Sloss and colleagues showed was that the cratonic region of North 
America could be subdivided into four “unconformity-bounded successions”—thick 
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middle of the twentieth century. While many of his colleagues were engaged in the 
mapping and analysis of small-scale stratigraphic units (as described in Section 3), Sloss 
was interested in “an entirely different scale of research, encompassing whole basins [and 
indeed multiple basins at once]” (Miall 2015, 288). Sloss was also unusual for his interest 
in external controls on sedimentary processes—things like tectonism and sea-level 
change—as opposed to processes internal to sedimentary systems. He speculated in 1949 
that the North American craton contained four major “unconformity-bounded 
successions,” and that these were controlled by tectonic movements: large-scale 
movements of the earth’s crust (Sloss et al. 1949). When the crust went down, shallow 
seas invaded the continental interior and sediment was deposited; when it went up, the 
seas retreated, exposing the previously deposited rocks to erosion. Later Sloss 
demonstrated an association between these same “sequences” (the number had since 
grown to six) and major rises and falls in sea-level, suggesting that global sea-level exerts 
a control on sediment accumulation in sedimentary basins. It was observations like this, 
more than anything else, that set the agenda for future studies of depositional sequences, 
including Vail’s work at the Exxon oil company. 
 
 
packages of strata inferred to have been deposited during the same interval of time. This 
number was later increased to six in a paper that many regard as the earliest example of 





Figure 13  The six North American sequences of Sloss (1963). Each sequence is a 
package of strata that may be hundreds of meters thick in some places, and that represents 
tens to hundreds of millions years of geological time. Moreover, each sequence is 
bounded by a major regional unconformity (or non-depositional surface) without specific 
time significance. 
 
Vail began his career at Exxon interested in correlating Sloss-type sequences 
between basins using evidence from boreholes (Vail 1992). Yet when high-quality 
seismic reflection data became available during the 1960s (largely in virtue of advances 
in computer processing), he decided to switch tracks. Oil companies had begun using 
seismology to map underground stratigraphic relationships during the 1920s, hopeful of 
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locating oil and gas reserves without costly drilling. But the practice was notoriously 
unreliable, and remained so even as increasingly high-resolution reflection profiles 
became available. In Portuguese Guinea, for example, Vail was tasked with examining a 
series of three wells, the first of which had been drilled into “a major Cretaceous 
reservoir of sand, overlying an unconformity with Paleozoic rocks below” (Vail 1992, 
86). The top of the sand layer corresponded to a reflection surface (a line on a seismic 
profile), and since it was assumed that seismic reflections were generated at facies 
boundaries, it was expected that a second well would encounter sand at about the about 
same level (i.e., at the depth corresponding to the same reflection surface). Yet when the 
second well was drilled it encountered sand two reflection layers lower than the first well. 
A third well encountered sand at even greater depth. This seemed to indicate that 
whatever was generating the reflection surface in this case, it was not a change in rock 
type associated with a facies boundary. 
The breakthrough came when Vail recruited a paleontologist, Lou Stover, to date 
the sand and reflection layers using biostratigraphy. This revealed that the reflection 
surfaces—but not the sand layers—were equivalent in age. Vail’s earlier work had 
demonstrated that physical surfaces in rocks “cross the facies of time-transgressive rock 
units, suggesting that seismic reflections do not follow [lithofacies boundaries]…but 
instead [follow] the detailed bedding patterns or the real physical surfaces in the rocks” 
(Vail 1992, 87). Stover’s dates served to confirm this. The surfaces on reflection profiles 
correspond to isochronous physical surfaces as opposed to diachronous facies boundaries: 
they were time lines etched in stone. Far from “a low-resolution tool for mapping major 
rock units,” reflection seismology was in fact “a high-resolution tool for determining 
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chronostratigraphy [the relative ages of rocks].” For someone interested in stratigraphic 
correlation, a more welcome result could hardly have been imagined. 
 The discovery that seismic records can be used to reconstruct the temporal 
development of sedimentary basins was a revelation. Using Exxon’s wealth of 
proprietary data, Vail’s team set to work “[developing] the methodology to make regional 
chronostratigraphic correlations and to put stratigraphy into a geologic time framework 
for mapping and the understanding of paleogeography” (Vail 1992, 87). The seminal 
publication appeared in 1977, and is commonly cited as AAPG Memoir 26 (although its 
full name is Seismic Stratigraphy—Its Application to Hydrocarbon Exploration). In it, 
Vail and colleagues demonstrate that the stratigraphic record of continental shelves 
consists in a series of stratal packages partially bounded by unconformities, which the 
authors call “depositional sequences.” Because unconformities and their correlative 
conformities appear as lines on seismic profiles, it follows that seismology can be used to 
recognize depositional sequences throughout a sedimentary basin, making them a highly 
useful way of dividing up the stratigraphic succession. In addition, because the 
boundaries of sequences are presumed to have time significance, sequence stratigraphy 
gives researchers “a powerful methodology for the analysis of time and rock relationships 
in sedimentary strata,” blurring the line between chrono- and lithostratigraphy and 
reopening important questions about what controls the distribution of gaps and 
sedimentary environments in the rock record (Maliva 2016, 32).17 
 
17 This is no place to review the complex history of sequence stratigraphy since the 
1970s. Suffice it to say that the original model of Vail and others was repeatedly 
amended as higher-resolution seismic data became available, and as the importance of 
factors beyond eustatic sea-level change became more widely appreciated (Miall and 
Miall 2001; Embry et al. 2007). Deductive models also played an important role, for 
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 Sequence stratigraphy is notorious for its difficult terminology and steep learning 
curve. Still, the basics of the approach can be summarized simply enough. In Andrew 
Miall’s succinct formulation, it is “essentially [the] study of repetitive cycles of 
[sediment] accumulation followed by [gaps], at various time scales” (Miall 2015, 295). 
No less important, it is a framework for interpreting the stratigraphic record in terms of a 
small number of basic parameters, including rates of eustatic sea-level change, tectonic 
subsidence and sediment supply.18 Importantly, these parameters are related, with rates of 
tectonic subsidence and eustatic sea-level rise controlling the space available for 
sedimentation, or “accommodation [space].”19 Changes in accommodation, in turn, 
control the accumulation of sediment over periods of tens of thousands to millions of 
years. (On shorter time scales, sediment accumulation is dominated by the depositional 
events that Ager described as “catastrophic.”) 
Changes in accommodation also influence the distribution of gaps in the 
stratigraphic record. When the rate of sediment supply exceeds the rate of increase in 
 
example, in clarifying the internal anatomy of sequences and the meaning of key surfaces 
(Jervey 1988; see also Posamentier and Vail 1988; Van Wagoner et al. 1988). A 
particularly important development was the ability to apply sequence stratigraphy directly 
to outcrops and well-logs, in the absence of seismic reflection data (Van Wagoner et al. 
1990). All this was crucial in fashioning sequence stratigraphy into a tool for interpreting 
the depositional origin of rock bodies, and for predicting the heterogeneity, extent and 
character of constituent facies. 
18 The term “eustasy,” or eustatic sea-level change, refers to changes in global sea-level 
as distinct from more local variations (Dott 1992). 
19 More precisely, “accommodation [space]” is defined as the vertical envelope between 
the sea surface and the basement of rocks beneath the sedimentary pile, which is 
available for potential sedimentation (Jervey 1988). Changes in accommodation reflect 
the sum of changes in eustatic sea-level and tectonism, with rising seas and tectonic 




accommodation, sediment accumulates, forming packages of sediments termed 
“parasequences.”20 Parasequences are successions of relatively conformable strata 
bounded at their tops by “flooding surfaces” associated with abrupt deepening events 
(often, periods of nondeposition). They are produced by oscillations in the balance 
between sediment supply and accommodation space; but these oscillations are 
superimposed on longer-term changes in eustatic sea-level that build the major features of 
depositional sequences (Figure 13). The most important of these features are “systems 
tracts,” which commonly consist of parasequences bounded by characteristic surfaces of 
various types. The names of the systems tracts are not important yet; but what is 
important is that they succeed one another in regular order, and that the ensemble of 
systems tracts is bounded at its top by an erosional surface called the “sequence 
boundary.” This is the surface that separates one depositional sequence from another. It 
forms when sea-level falls, promoting the erosion of sedimentary deposits. Typically, 
sequence boundaries represent significant unconformities, which record long periods of 
time in which no sediment accumulates. But they are not the only chronostratigraphically 
significant surfaces within a sequence, and other surfaces, like the “maximum flooding 
surface,” are also associated with periods of highly reduced deposition.21 
 
 
20 A typical parasequence is between one and ten meters thick, and represents tens to 
hundreds of thousands of years of elapsed time. By contrast, depositional sequences are 
considerably thicker (comprising multiple stacked parasequences), and typically 
represent millions of years of elapsed time. 
21 To say that a surface is “chronostratigraphically significant” is to say that all the rocks 
overlying it are always younger than all the rocks underlying it. Because of this, 





Figure 14  The anatomy of a depositional sequence. Here (a) shows a series of 
parasequences: packages of sediment exhibiting a gradual upward change in facies, 
bounded by flooding surfaces (dark lines). By contrast, (b) pictures the anatomy of the 
depositional sequence as a whole, comprising stacks of parasequences organized into 
discrete “systems tracts.” (From Mitchum and Van Wagoner 1991) 
 
 
In addition to conferring an understanding of the nature and distribution of gaps in 
the record, sequence models are also informative about facies relationships. Consider 
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parasequences—common building blocks of depositional sequences. As noted, each 
parasequence records a cycle of decreasing and then increasing accommodation rate for a 
particular sediment supply. Because sediments entering the sea accumulate first in 
nearshore environments before building outward, parasequences record the seaward 
movement of a shoreline. This means that, if we examine a parasequence in cross-section, 
the facies within this succession will represent progressively shallower environments as 
we move from the bottom of the succession to the top (until we reach the flooding 
surface, at which point a deep-water facies will be juxtaposed with a shallow-water one). 
Likewise, if we examine whole sets of parasequences stacked one upon the other, it will 
be possible to discern trends in their constituent facies and three-dimensional 
arrangement, which tell of long-term trends in the physical environment (Van Wagoner et 
al. 1990).22 Sequence stratigraphy, then, permits a theoretical understanding of facies 
relationships within sedimentary successions, since sequences record a hierarchical set of 
paleoenvironmental variations in their anatomical structures. This in turn brings order to 
the apparently crazy-quilt pattern of sedimentary environments for a range of marine and 
terrestrial systems.23 
 
22 Trends in global sea-level are especially salient, and are recorded by different stacking 
patterns in parasequence sets. These patterns in turn allow stratigraphers to make 
inferences about long term rates of sedimentation and accommodation in a basin. 
23 At least one influential stratigrapher has even claimed that sequence stratigraphy 
rehabilitates a version of the layer cake metaphor, although this is controversial (Brett 
2000; Brett et al. 2007). In sequence stratigraphy, the stratigraphic record is divisible into 
packages of strata bounded by unconformities and their correlative conformities. These 
packages are tapering wedges that shade off in every direction—so far, nothing 
resembling a layer cake. However, they also contain stratigraphically significant surfaces, 
which cut across local facies like “frosting layers” through a well-marbled cake (Brett 
2000). Many beds representing catastrophic events also cut across local facies, and for 
this reason can be used to subdivide the rock record into approximately time-parallel 
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These innovations had far-ranging effects on geological practice. Perhaps the 
most important was to transform the oil and gas industry, enabling geologists to predict 
stratigraphic relationships in areas that had yet to be explored by costly drilling (Maliva 
2016). But the approach had some positive consequences as well, including that it: (1) 
“[raised] questions about eustasy and tectonics that had largely been forgotten in the 
desire...to explain everything as just so much facies shifting”; (2) “[recognized] genetic 
units...that have meaning in the interpretation of earth’s history”; (3) “[emphasized] the 
incompleteness of the record and [opened] up the study of surfaces, those recorders of 
times of nondeposition and erosion that represent most of earth history”; and (4) “[raised] 
questions about sediment accumulation over much larger timescales than sedimentology 
has traditionally dealt with and about secular trends in the nature of sediment 
accumulation” (Holland 1999, 412). All these were relevant to paleobiological research, 
as Steven Holland was eager to point out. And fittingly, it was Holland, as much as 
anyone else, who leveraged the distinctive features of the new stratigraphy for 
 
units. A kind of chronostratigraphic “layer cake” can thus be recognized, composed not 
of tabular layers (as in the old layer cake picture), but rather of tapering wedges 
penetrated by isochronous “frosting layers” that provide “high-resolution markers with 
which to subdivide the stratigraphic record into approximately time-parallel units” (Brett 
2000, 497). 
 It should be noted that many stratigraphers believe this stretches the layer cake 
metaphor beyond all recognition and usefulness. In the words of Steven Holland, “[the 
layer cake metaphor] runs completely counter to how sequence stratigraphers envision 
the rock record. To make the metaphor square with the rock record as we now know it, 
the cake has to be modified so that it looks nothing like any cake you've ever been 
served…[The] basic point…[is] that there are some lithologically based horizons that 
have chronostratigraphic usefulness…[but to describe this in term of cake layers] is a 
distraction, and a misleading one in terms of how the rock record is put together” 
(Holland, personal communication). 
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paleobiological ends, most notably in a pioneering model of stratigraphic architecture and 
fossil preservation (Holland 1995a). 
 
6.  The Stratigraphic Distribution of Fossils 
As I observed in Section 2, paleontologists have long been exercised by worries 
about their data. In the wake of the Paleobiological Revolution, this led to efforts to 
construct increasingly comprehensive databases, which could, “in idealized form, claim 
to represent the complete fossil record” (Sepkoski 2017, 402). It is hard to overstate the 
importance of these databases for the history of the field; research on large datasets has 
illuminated topics ranging from patterns of diversification and extinction (Raup and 
Sepkoski 1982; Sepkoski 1984; Benton 1985), to changes in biomass and guild 
occupation (Bambach 1993), to onshore–offshore patterns of clade origination (Jablonski 
et al. 1983; Jablonski and Bottjer 1991). However, for studies at the scale of outcrops to 
depositional basins, global taxonomic databases are of more limited utility. Here what is 
needed are better tools for analyzing the stratigraphic distribution of fossils, and for 
dissecting the incompleteness of the fossil record into component biases (e.g., facies 
control, condensation and missing time). 
It is the great virtue of sequence stratigraphy that it provides these tools for many 
stratigraphically important settings. Yet this was not immediately apparent, and in the 
years following the publication of AAPG Memoir 26 (1977), the approach made only 
limited inroads into paleontology. Sequence analysis was first applied to the study of sea-
level changes, where information from fossils was used to recognize and interpret 
sequence patterns and sedimentation dynamics (Hallam 1992; Brett 1998). Later it played 
 201 
 
a role in building integrated models of depositional environments and paleoecology, like 
Susan Kidwell’s influential models of shell accumulation (Kidwell 1986, 1991). Carlton 
Brett and colleagues applied sequence stratigraphy to the Devonian rocks of New York 
beginning in the 1980s, enabling them to study temporal variation in fossil communities 
(Brett et al. 1990; Brett 1992).24 Prior to the mid-1990s, however, explicitly 
paleobiological applications of sequence stratigraphy remained a relative rarity. 
This began to change during the second half of the 1990s, for reasons having to 
do with the internal development of the field. Around this time, self-identified 
paleobiologists were increasingly turning from the museum stacks to the outcrop⁠—to 
studies that required the collection of fossils in well-resolved temporal and environmental 
frameworks. From these projects, “a new category of research questions” began to 
emerge “between the ‘traditional’ research avenues of paleobiology and field-based 
paleontology.” According to Mary Droser, these questions “are the domain of ‘field [or 
stratigraphic] paleobiology’,” and include: 
 
“Does this turnover correspond with a significant relative sea-level change?,” Can we 
refine the timing of this radiation?,” “Do these clades actually radiate in concert?,” 
“Was this extinction gradual or sudden?,” “How significant is environment in 
morphological variability?,” “Does a basinal pattern reflect taphonomic biases?,” 
“Can taphonomic biases be corrected for?,” [and] “Can we test patterns of radiations 
through examination of proxies?” (Droser 1995, 507–508) 
 
Droser is careful to note that these new questions are not the province of any particular 
 
24 These studies resulted in the characterization of “coordinated stasis,” a phenomenon in 
which “groups of coexisting species lineages display concurrent stability over extended 
intervals of geologic time separated by episodes of relatively abrupt change” (Brett et al. 
1996, 1; see also Brett 2012). 
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methodological approach; yet she also observes that “the integration of stratigraphy with 
paleobiology is one of the major breakthroughs in the analysis of the fossil record and is 
an important approach in field paleobiological studies” (Droser 1995, 508). In particular, 
the integration of sequence and event stratigraphy with paleobiology can be expected to 
yield important insights into the history of life and its interaction with factors like sea-
level change, as several earlier authors had suggested (e.g., Kauffman and Sageman 
1992; Gómez and Fernández-López 1993; see also Brett 1998). 
 But this is not all. In addition to providing high-resolution frameworks for 
interpreting events in the fossil record, sequence stratigraphy promised to illuminate 
biases in the record as well. These biases had come under increased scrutiny since the 
1970s, as research into fossil preservation had expanded, first in Germany, and then in 
the United States (Behrensmeyer and Kidwell 1985). Known as “taphonomy,” the 
science of fossil preservation held great interest for paleobiology, since many of the 
biases that affect the fossil record are the result of the selective preservation of organic 
remains, or else of processes that influence the fate of biological materials after burial. 
However, not all biases that affect the fossil record are the result of selective preservation 
or postmortem tinkering. Others are the result of “the selective archiving of the 
sedimentary deposits that entomb those remains,” and these are the province of 
stratigraphic geology (Kidwell and Holland 2002, 562, emphasis added). In particular, 
they are the province of sequence stratigraphy, since they concern the distribution of 
sedimentary environments in the rock record, and the processes that structure the 
available record in space and time. 
 It is this second kind of bias that supplies the focus of Steven Holland’s study, 
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which appeared in the journal Paleobiology in 1995. Bearing the unassuming title, “The 
Stratigraphic Distribution of Fossils,” the study was a first-of-its-kind attempt to apply 
computer simulation to the problem of what controls the distribution of fossils in 
sedimentary basins.25 The problem is of wide relevance, since many paleontological 
practices involve the documentation and interpretation of fossil occurrences in outcrops 
and sedimentary basins. Still, Holland’s aims in this article are straightforwardly paleo-
biological, as his opening remarks make plain: 
 
Sequence stratigraphy has revolutionized stratigraphic analysis in much the same way 
that facies models did decades ago. Many paleobiological and biostratigraphic models 
require or use stratigraphic testing; these models include biozonation studies, mass 
extinction studies, and confidence limits on ranges. Many other paleobiological 
concepts are based, at least in part, on the distribution of fossils in the stratigraphic 
record; such concepts include punctuated equilibrium. Therefore, any fundamental 
change in stratigraphic thought should require a similar reexamination of 
paleontological thought. (Holland 1995a, 92) 
 
In pursuing this reexamination, Holland identifies three factors as both significant in their 
effects on fossil distribution and amenable to quantitative modeling. These are: (1) the 
rarity of fossils (or the chances that a fossil taxon will be collected in a bed where it is 
expected to occur); (2) facies control (or the probability of collection for a taxon as a 
function of an environmental variable, like water depth); and (3) sequence architecture 
(which controls facies change and sedimentation rate over space and time). Altogether, 
they provide an integrative picture of the controls on fossil occurrence—a picture that 
 
25 Holland produced two modeling studies in 1995: the first (Holland 1995b) appeared in 
an edited collection, and contained the first three of the four models presented in Holland 
(1995a). Holland (1995a) is the first publication to contain Holland’s complete sequence 
model (the fourth model). 
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both generates predictions about what will be observed in outcrop and suggests strategies 
for field studies of paleobiological events. 
Holland presents his model in four “steps,” beginning with a model of “the perfect 
stratigraphic record” and then layering in additional factors to increase its realism. In the 
first step, Holland assumes that any taxon living in a sedimentary basin at a time will be 
preserved in a bed deposited at that time. So, because the “probability of collection” is 
here 100%, the stratigraphic distribution of fossils will perfectly mirror the true durations 
of fossil taxa. Step two complicates the situation by simulating probabilities of collection 
of 50%, resulting in a record strewn with gaps, and 10%, resulting in a record that is 
“more gap than record,” to recall Ager’s memorable phrase. However, because the model 
lacks any representation of ecology, the preserved fossils are scattered randomly 
throughout the range of a taxon. It is this simplification that the third model seeks to 
remove. 
 Holland’s third model begins with the observation that “[m]any, if not most, taxa 
are most abundant at some particular level of an environmental variable” (Holland 1995a, 
94). So in marine environments, most taxa show a peak abundance at a particular point 
along a depth gradient, with population numbers shading off as you move away from this 
optimal water depth (Ziegler 1965; Ziegler et al. 1967; Bretzsky 1969; Cisne and Rabe 
1978).26 Since fossil abundance is related to the probability of collection at a bed 
(McKinney 1968), it is possible to model the probability of collection for nearshore 
marine taxa as a function of water depth. And this is exactly what Holland’s third model 
 
26 This is not because water depth governs the distribution of organisms directly, but 
rather because it is correlated with many variables that do directly govern their 
distributions (including temperature, substrate consistency and salinity). 
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does, by specifying preferred depths, depth tolerances and peak abundances for simulated 
taxa.27 Together, these variables comprise the form of facies control for the model, where 
“facies control” refers to the influence of an environmental variable—in this case, water 
depth—on the distribution of fossil taxa. 
 Facies control is one of the complicating factors added to model three. In 
addition, the model includes a representation of water depth change for the simulated 
section (generating facies change). This is modeled as a series of two shallowing upward 
cycles bounded by abrupt deepening events, matching the pattern of two stacked 
parasequences. With these two factors in the mix, the model generates a number of 
distinctive results. In particular, “[the] combination of [water depth change] and facies 
control produces a characteristic fossil distribution consisting of a few sporadic 
occurrences low in the parasequence, followed by a zone in which the fossil achieves a 
peak abundance, followed by a return to sporadic occurrences” (Holland 1995a, 96). That 
is, simulated taxa display a “scarce-common-scarce” pattern of occurrence within a 
parasequence (Holland 1995b), and a clustered and nonrandom distribution over the 
entire section. Parasequence boundaries (corresponding to flooding surfaces) truncate this 
pattern when a taxon’s preferred environment lies close to the parasequence boundary. 
Importantly, this effect is produced solely by facies change—no depositional gap is 
required to truncate the ranges of facies controlled taxa. The message for paleobiologists 
is accordingly a cautionary one: “The abrupt disappearance of a taxon is likely to 
represent a true extinction where it occurs in the middle of a parasequence, but probably 
 
27 Preferred depth is the optimal water depth for a taxon. Depth tolerance is the sensitivity 
of a taxon to water depth, measured as the standard deviation of the abundance/depth 
distribution. And peak abundance is the abundance of a taxon at its preferred water depth. 
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represents [mere] facies control when it occurs at a parasequence boundary” (Holland 
1995a, 96). 
 To interpret ecological and evolutionary processes in sedimentary basins, 
however, one must understand the effects of stratigraphic architecture on fossil 
occurrences. For this, a complete sequence model is required—one that enables the 
incompleteness of the fossil record to be dissected into component effects. This is what 
Holland’s fourth model attempts to provide. The model has two main components. The 
first is a model of ecology, in which 1,000 taxa are assigned facies characteristics from 
uniform probability distributions. At each time step in the simulation (corresponding to 
50,000 years of elapsed time), a taxon has a fixed probability of going extinct. If a taxon 
goes extinct, a new taxon is created for the next time step with randomly generated facies 
characteristics; so total diversity does not vary over the length of the simulation. This 
means that observed patterns are unlikely to be the result of a surplus of originations 
relative to extinctions for a time interval (or vice versa). Most likely, they will owe to the 
filtering effects of the stratigraphic record. 
 The second component of the model is a representation of environmental change 
and sedimentation. These features are simulated using existing models of sedimentary 
basin filling, in which accommodation space is generated through a combination of 
tectonic subsidence and eustatic sea-level change, and sediment is deposited within this 
space according to a diffusion function. Holland’s model simulates two complete 
depositional sequences, each composed of three systems tracts: the “lowstand systems 
tract” (LST), “transgressive systems tract” (TST) and “highstand systems tract” (HST). 
The TST consists of two parasequences; the HST, of six. (No sediment is deposited in the 
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LST.) As in the third model, parasequences are modeled as shallowing upward cycles of 
deposition bounded at their tops by abrupt deepening events recorded by flooding 
surfaces. 
 The process of sedimentary basin filling proceeds as follows. At the base of each 
sequence is a surface known as the “sequence boundary,” which forms when relative sea-
level is falling. During this interval, no new sedimentation takes place, so the sequence 
boundary corresponds to a gap in the rock record. When relative sea-level begins to rise, 
deposition is renewed and parasequences stack seaward in a net shallowing pattern. 
These parasequences form the “lowstand systems tract” (LST), so named because it sits 
at a topographically lower position than the rest of the sequence. As relative sea-level rise 
accelerates (such that the rate of sea-level rise exceeds the rate of sedimentation), the 
pattern of stacking is reversed and parasequences exhibit a net deepening trend: the 
transgressive systems tract (TST). Separating the LST and the TST is a flooding surface 
called the “transgressive surface.” This marks the point at which seaward stacking is 
replaced by landward stacking, and is often associated with reduced sedimentation (a 
phenomenon known as “[stratigraphic] condensation”). Other flooding surfaces within 
the TST may also exhibit considerable condensation. Finally, as the rate of sea-level rise 
begins to slow, parasequences again start to build seaward, exhibiting a net shallowing 
trend. At this juncture too there is a flooding surface—the “maximum flooding 
surface”—which records the greatest water depth in the sequence and is often highly 
condensed. The parasequences deposited atop the maximum flooding surface comprise 
the “highstand systems tract” (HST). These are bounded at their top by the sequence 
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boundary, which, to reiterate, forms when relative sea-level is falling.28 
 Holland’s fourth model simulates two depositional sequences, each with a 
duration of 3.5 million years. It has three steps. First, a sedimentary basin is generated 
using a basin simulation. Then, a suite of species is produced, each characterized by a set 
of randomly generated facies characteristics. Finally, occurrences of each taxon are 
simulated within the sedimentary basin. For each horizon across the basin, the age and 
water depth of the horizon are used in conjunction with the environmental parameters to 
determine the probability of collection for a species (see Patzkowsky and Holland 2012). 
This probability is then compared with a random number generator to test for the 
occurrence of a species at a horizon, and a list of occurrences is compiled. From this a 
record of first and last appearances can be generated, and the number of first and last 
appearances per section plotted for each section in the depositional sequences. 
 The results of the simulation are striking. To begin, it is immediately apparent that 
first and last occurrences (FADs and LADs, respectively) are concentrated at particular 
stratigraphic positions, not randomly distributed as they would be if the fossil record were 
uncontrolled by sequence stratigraphic architecture.29 FAD spikes are particularly well 
developed at the four TST flooding surfaces, for example, including the two transgressive 
surfaces (which are highly condensed). These spikes are dominated by shallow-water and 
environmentally-tolerant taxa that originated during the lowstand (when no sediment was 
 
28 This was how the HST was defined in 1995, at any rate. Today, it is customary to 
recognize a fourth systems tract, the “falling-stage systems tract” (FSST), which 
separates the HST from the sequence boundary (making the top of the HST a basal 
surface of forced regression, at least in those places where the FSST is present). 




deposited), or else by deep-water and environmentally-picky taxa that originated during 
the LST or the shallow-water portion of the previous HST (when preservation of deep 
water facies was not occurring). Importantly, the spikes are not the result of any 
biological response to sea-level change, since this is not possible within the model. 
Rather, they are produced by changing conditions of preservation, and are therefore 




Figure 15  Results of Holland’s complete sequence model, showing numbers of first and 
last occurrences for single stratigraphic sections throughout two depositional sequences. 
Notice the major spikes in first occurrences just above the sequence boundary and all 
TST flooding surfaces, and the major spikes in last occurrences just below the sequence 




In a similar vein, LADs are concentrated immediately beneath the sequence 
boundary and above the flooding surfaces of the TST. The peaks at the sequence 
boundary represent the last occurrence of species that went extinct during the hiatus 
represented by the boundary, or else during the subsequent lowstand when no sediment 
was being deposited. The peaks at the flooding surfaces, by contrast, represent the last 
occurrence of shallow-water species that became extinct after the deepening events 
recorded by the flooding surface. It is notable that no spikes in either FAD or LAD are 
located within the HST, probably because no major floodings take place during the 
highstand, when sea-levels are falling. 
In the remainder of his article, Holland shows that the simulation of certain 
taphonomic and ecological gradients modulates but does not change the stratigraphic 
position of these peaks.30 This indicates that sequence architecture can predict where the 
fossil record of sedimentary basins is likely to be particularly misleading—a prerequisite 
for designing better sampling and analytical strategies. As noted, sequence boundaries are 
particular hotspots, with clusters of LADs expected beneath the boundary and clusters of 
FADs expected above it. This is an example of an unconformity effect, since the major 
factor generating the bias is unrecorded time. Similarly, LADs will cluster beneath 
transgressive flooding surfaces and FADs above them: a symptom of facies control, since 
it arises from the limited facies tolerance of taxa or the limited availability of facies in an 
outcrop. It should be noted that clusters of first and last appearances do not necessarily 
reflect the shaping of the fossil record by the rock record. Some of the most interesting 
 
30 These include gradients in preservation potential (associated with water depth), 




events in life’s history involve spikes in rates of origination or extinction; one need only 
think of the mass extinctions that commanded so much paleobiological interest during the 
1980s and 1990s (Sepkoski 2021). Still, to recognize biologically meaningful spikes, 
knowledge of sequence stratigraphic architecture is useful, and in many cases, necessary 
(Patzkowsky and Holland 2012). Here is the ultimate utility of Holland’s model: that it 
“reveal[s] not only ways in which the fossil record may be controlled by processes of 
sediment deposition, but also clues to recognizing those effects and strategies for 
overcoming them” (Patzkowsky and Holland 2012, 111).31 
 In this way, sequence stratigraphy helps to unlock the potential of the fossil 
record, and to extract biological signals from a fossil record shaped as much by 
stratigraphic processes as by biological history. In addition, it provides an approach to 
stratigraphic complexity that avoids Darwinian pessimism about the quality of the record, 
on the one hand, and the “dangerous seduction” of more literal approaches, on the other 
 
31 Holland has continued to refine his model since 1995, frequently in collaboration with 
Mark Patzkowsky (Holland and Patzkowsky 1999, 2002, 2015; Holland 2020). 
Particularly important was a 2002 article, in which a more detailed model of 
sedimentation permitted the simulation of “range offset” (the difference in age between a 
taxon’s first/last occurrence in a local section and its first/last occurrence in the basin as a 
whole). Simulations showed that range offset was much greater than has often been 
expected—on the order of one million years for marine invertebrate species. Given that 
the average estimated duration of marine invertebrate species is just four million years, 
this suggests that many species “are never sampled in any local stratigraphic record 
because their duration is so short that their preferred environment never occurs locally 
during their existence” (Patzkowsky and Holland 2012, 99). This in turn indicates that the 
temporal resolution of the marine fossil record may often be on the order of one million 
years—a level of resolution routinely exceeded by geochronologists. The upshot is that 
“the absolute age of a [rock] horizon may be known to a higher degree of precision than 
the timing of an extinction of a fossil found in that horizon” (Patzkowsky and Holland 
2015, 100). Failing to take this into account can lead to major errors in the interpretation 
of extinction patterns (see Section 7).  
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(Holland 2000, 148). Unlike “generalized rereading,” this approach is capable of 
supporting inquiry at the scale of outcrops to sedimentary basins—scales in which field 
context plays a key role in the interpretation of fossil patterns.32 And because the effects 
of stratigraphic processes are “widespread and nearly inescapable for shallow marine and 
terrestrial settings,” the consideration of field context is not a mere luxury for studies at 
these scales (Patzkowsky and Holland 2012, 108). Instead, it is a vital part of the 
expansion of paleobiological inquiry, and of attempts to bridge the scales of “traditional” 
paleobiological and field-based paleontological inquiry. This expansion, and the cultural 
reconfigurations it engendered, is the subject of the final section. 
 
7.  Paleobiology, Prestige and “the Field” 
 From its consolidation in the Paleobiological Revolution, the science of 
paleobiology has had an ambiguous relationship with “the field.” All paleontology is 
ultimately based on fieldwork, yet this does not mean that every paleontologist—or even 
every group of paleontologists—must labor to produce new fossil collections. Indeed, a 
major accomplishment of the Paleobiological Revolution was to show how much damage 
a paleontologist could do with just a computer and a library card. Half-jokingly, it was 
said of Jack Sepkoski that his field site was the library; but this was no censure spoken 
under the breath of dusty fieldworkers. On the contrary, it was an honest description of a 
mode of practice that revolutionized paleontology, and that came to be associated with 
 
32 “Field context” refers to the contextual features of geological data, and may include 
“three-dimensional position, vertical and lateral stratigraphic relations, the nature of 
bedding and bed contacts, the nature of surrounding lithofacies, observable sedimentary 
structures, fossil content, ichnofacies, and so on, at [various] scales” (Miall 2015, 273). 
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paleobiology in particular (Sepkoski 1993). All this suggests that to understand the 
evolution of paleobiology, including its expansion after the Paleobiological Revolution 
(ca. 1985–), some reflection on its relationship to “the field” is required. 
In Landscapes and Labscapes (2002), Robert Kohler explores the border between 
“the lab” and “the field”: a lively and contested space structured by an overarching 
normative regime. Within this regime, labs are special places precisely because they are 
place-less; they are generic places, whose seeming universality provides “[a] symbolic 
guarantee that the science done there is everyone’s, not just someone’s in particular” 
(Kohler 2002, 7). “The field” inverts this logic. Natural spaces are irredeemably 
particular and variable—that is what makes them interesting objects of study, in addition 
to sites of knowledge-production. Yet this creates a problem for field scientists, who must 
contend with the notion that their knowledge is less than fully scientific. Comparisons of 
field scientists with stamp collectors underscore the greater value that attaches to the 
universal over the particular. In this culture, any system that escapes the undertow of 
particularity is likely to be highly valued; laboratory science is just the most obvious 
example. But laboratories are not the only place-less places in modern science, and in 
recent decades, another (non-)place has become equally important. This is the inside of a 
digital computer, which promises not a “view from nowhere,” but rather a “view from 
everywhere,” capable of synthesizing local observations into a consistent and fully 
synoptic data picture. 
 Kohler’s framework provides a useful way of analyzing the history of 
paleobiology, including its initial constriction and later expansion. Recall that during the 
Paleobiological Revolution, a small group of paleontologists sought to “[reinvent] their 
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discipline by creating a new identity for themselves” (Sepkoski 2012, 3). The identity 
was that of a modern evolutionary scientist; but no less important, it was that of a non-
field geologist. Since its origin as a disciplinary specialty, invertebrate paleontology “had 
been an almost exclusively field-oriented science,” with biostratigraphy and 
paleoenvironmental analysis as major activities (Sepkoski 2012, 389). As Peter Ward 
recalls of the time before the Paleobiological Revolution: “More often than not, a hopeful 
new paleontologist, arriving in some professor’s office, would be sent away with some 
assigned geological quadrangle to map, or some quarry to excavate in the hopes of 
finding one more new species, or [orders to refine] some stratal sequence of time” (Ward 
1994, 114). This was honest work, and led to a large number of invertebrate 
paleontologists becoming employed by the petroleum industry. Yet as Gould grumbled in 
1980, these “non-biological approaches have not infused our profession with the 
excitement of ideas” (Gould 1980, 98). They also did few favors for paleontology’s 
reputation, which by the eve of the Paleobiological Revolution was in a sorry state.33 In 
short, paleontology in the 1960s was in dire need of an overhaul, and the young Turks of 
the Paleobiological Revolution knew how to overhaul it: by shedding their associations 
with field geology, and using the power of digital computers to range god-like over the 
entire history of life. 
 This “view from everywhere” played the same epistemic role that the fiction of 
placelessness plays in the lab sciences. Whereas the field is a place of untrammeled 
particularity, large electronic databases abstract from this particularity to render the fossil 
 
33 Witness the gibe in a 1969 issue of Nature that “Scientists in general might be excused 
for thinking that…most paleontologists have staked out a square mile for their life’s 
work” (Anonymous 1969, 903). 
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record in a completely general way. Earlier non-electronic databases, like those compiled 
by Jack Sepkoski, abstracted even more, partially as a result of the massive “data 
friction” involved in compiling synoptic datasets by hand.34 For example, Sepkoski's 
compendia tabulated only the first and last occurrences of taxa, with no data on 
geographical range, taxonomic richness, taphonomy, abundance or paleoecology. The 
result was a powerful but limited resource, capable of generating synoptic pictures of 
diversity through time, but incapable of answering questions that involve these 
unrecorded particularities (Marshall et al. 2018). (More recent databases record a much 
richer set of metadata, although missing metadata, especially for older collections, 
remains a serious issue.) 
It is against this backdrop that the novelty of “stratigraphic paleobiology” is best 
understood. Stratigraphic paleobiology did not just represent the extension of 
paleobiology’s model-driven approach to problems at the scale of outcrops to 
sedimentary basins. In addition, it represented an openness to inputs from stratigraphic 
geology that cut against the grain of the Paleobiological Revolution—or at least its 
rhetorical program. One dimension of this openness was conceptual, and involved the 
uptake of ideas about processes that structure the stratigraphic record in time and space. 
But no less important was a practical dimension, which involved a willingness on the part 
of paleobiologists to undertake painstaking stratigraphic work to better characterize the 
field context of fossil collections. Steven Holland, for example, did not just build the first 
integrated model of sequence stratigraphy and paleoecology (an expression of the first 
 
34 “Data friction” refers to “the costs in time, energy and attention” required to “collect, 
check, store, move, receive and access data” (Edwards 2010, 84). It is particularly great 
when data must be transferred from one medium to another. 
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dimension of openness). He also established the standard subdivision of Middle and 
Upper Ordovician strata into depositional sequences for the eastern United States. For 
this work, he was awarded the James Lee Wilson Award from the Society for 
Sedimentary Geology (SEPM)—a dubious honor for a paleobiologist, one might think, 
but only on the misleading assumption that one must be either a stratigrapher or a 
paleobiologist. 
 This twofold openness is stratigraphic paleobiology’s unique contribution to the 
expansion of the discipline. More specifically, its contribution consists in a synergy 
between the two dimensions of openness, in which ideas from stratigraphy inform 
modeling work that in turn informs strategies of data collection and analysis (Holland 
2000). On the data collection side, sequence analysis facilitates the collection of data in a 
time-environment framework, which allows fossils to be placed in context, “both for their 
habit and their sequence stratigraphic position” (Patzkowsky and Holland 2012, 108).35 
This allows researchers to assess the degree to which a continuous fossil record can be 
obtained for a particular environment, since empty cells in a time-environment matrix 
correspond to missing information (either because samples have not been obtained or 
because the relevant environments have not been preserved). In addition, time-
environment sampling informs the interpretation of fossil occurrences, since missing 
information may scramble or distort the pattern preserved in outcrop. Regarded literally, 
a pattern may seem to indicate that a taxon disappeared abruptly at a particular juncture 
 
35 In time-environment sampling, temporal bins are provided by sequence stratigraphic 
analysis, and environmental bins are provided by field analysis of sedimentary facies. 
One benefit of this method is that it avoids the potentially circular method of using fossils 




in a depositional sequence. Yet if that taxon has a strong facies preference, and if the 
relevant facies is not preserved in the beds surrounding that juncture, the pattern may be 
deceptive. In particular, if the juncture is a sequence boundary or flooding surface, 
models like Holland’s caution against a literal interpretation of the data. Here field 
context earns its keep. By characterizing the field context of fossil collections, 
paleobiologists gain important insights into the resolution of their data, as well as 
valuable checks on literal readings of the fossil record. 
 Mass extinctions provide a useful example. Beginning in the 1980s, the study of 
mass extinction rose to occupy a central place in the disciplinary agenda of 
paleobiologists (Sepkoski 2021). Particularly important was determining whether an 
extinction had been gradual or rapid, since rates of extinction hold a key to determining 
causation for these episodes. Then as now, rates of extinction were evaluated by 
scrutinizing the timing of last occurrences in the stratigraphic record. Clustered LADs at 
particular stratigraphic positions were indicative of catastrophic mass extinction; smeared 
out extinctions, by contrast, were indicative of something more gradual. Of course, there 
were complications. Relatively early in the vogue for mass extinction, it was realized that 
even catastrophic mass extinctions will appear gradual when probabilities of collection 
are sufficiently low (Signor and Lipps 1982). This was important, since it had long been 
assumed that major extinctions were protracted affairs, spanning perhaps ten million 
years or more. However, if even rapid mass extinctions may appear gradual because of 
stratigraphic factors, then many extinctions may be veritably catastrophic despite leaving 
ambiguous signatures in the fossil record.    
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 Recent decades have seen increasing support for models of catastrophic mass 
extinction. To take one example, the end-Permian mass extinction was once thought to 
have taken place over a period of perhaps ten million years, as the scattered contingents 
slowly congealed into the supercontinent of Pangea (Erwin 1994; Ward 2004). Yet recent 
estimates place the duration of the extinction at less than 100,000 years, and perhaps 
considerably less (Burgess et al. 2014). This is a remarkable change, aided by the 
recognition of widespread “Signor-Lipps effects.” However, if recent simulations of the 
stratigraphic expression of mass extinctions are correct, this interpretation may need to be 
revised. The reason is that the stratigraphic pattern of last occurrences for the end-
Permian “is considerably complicated by sequence stratigraphic architecture” (Holland 
and Patzkowsky 2015, 915). In the three geographical regions were Permo-Triassic (P–
Tr) boundary sections are well developed, the main cluster of LADs is associated with at 
least one major flooding surfaces. In addition, all major P–Tr sections contain either 
subaerial unconformities beneath the main cluster of LADs or highly condensed strata in 
the earliest Triassic. All of these features are capable of concentrating last occurrences 
independent of biological processes; hence “[it] is likely that the appearance of the end-
Permian extinction is considerably altered by stratigraphical architecture, with the 
extinction taking place over a substantially longer period…than generally thought.” 
Similar considerations apply to many other marine extinctions in the fossil record, with 
the notable exception of the K–Pg extinction (which also eliminated non-avian 
dinosaurs). This suggests, at least, that the stratigraphic expression of mass extinctions is 
more complicated than it is widely held to be, and that more attention must be paid to 
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stratigraphic architecture to resolve the tempo and biological nature of major extinction 
events. 
 In a certain sense, this is nothing new. Paleontologists have long been engaged in 
characterizing the spatial and temporal distributions of fossils, in many cases for 
biological purposes (Sepkoski 2012, 2021; Kelley et al. 2015; Tamborini 2017; Sepkoski 
and Tamborini 2019). Further, in some areas of paleontology (like paleoecology), close 
attention to field context and sampling strategies have traditionally been regarded as 
necessary features of responsible practice (Ager 1963; Raup and Stanley 1971). 
Stratigraphic paleobiology is a latecomer in this respect, and amounts to something less 
than a full-blown (second) paleobiological revolution. Still, as Droser observed in 1995, 
“[the] wedding of [new] stratigraphic approaches with all fields within paleontology has 
made a significant impact on how we view the fossil and stratigraphic record. Essentially, 
we now have a stratigraphy within which we can frame life’s history, ranging from the 
scale of global correlation to the outcrop. We no longer view events that occur on a 
specific time scale in the fossil record without first asking what the relationship is to sea-
level changes” (508). In addition, paleobiologists now increasingly evaluate patterns of 
fossil occurrence in light of stratigraphic processes like sediment accumulation. These are 
significant advances, which only came about because a group of paleobiologists was 
willing to traverse the cultural gap that had opened between paleobiology and 
stratigraphy during the Paleobiological Revolution. In so doing, they helped to 
reconfigure the cultural landscape of paleobiology, giving a new impetus to fieldwork 
and dissolving, at least in part, the barrier that Gould and others had raised between the 
“old” (field) and the “new” (evolutionary) paleontology. 
 220 
 
8.  Conclusion 
 Pessimism about the quality of the fossil record runs deep in paleontology. As 
Darwin was keen to emphasize, the fossil record is incomplete—“ridiculously” so, to crib 
a phrase from Derek Ager. This was welcome news, since it provided an apology for the 
failure of contemporary naturalists to uncover those transitional forms that must have 
existed in multitudes were his theory of gradual divergence correct (Sepkoski 2012). 
Later paleontologists mostly followed Darwin in regarding the record as deficient: as a 
book whose pages are “badly torn and blotted” (Cushman 1938, 356), or else as a 
document of which only“[o]ccasional lines from disconnected paragraphs in obscurantist 
chapters…can be read” (Pretorius 1973, quoted in Schumm 1991, 5). The view was not 
without merit; yet by the twentieth century, the incompleteness of the fossil record had 
become, in the words of Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould, “a catechism that brooks 
no analysis” (Eldredge and Gould 1972, 90). Moreover, it was a catechism whose 
repetition had injurious effects. No data set is complete—we speak of the human genome, 
but how many people living today have had their complete genomes sequenced? The 
answer is only a small number, and this level of incompleteness is typical of scientific 
datasets. Why then do paleontologists persist in self-flagellation over the incompleteness 
of the fossil record? 
 We saw in Section 2 that the leaders of the Paleobiological Revolutions had 
several responses to this state of affairs. One was to treat the fossil record as a reliable 
source of information about at least certain evolutionary patterns (Sepkoski’s “literal 
rereading”). So, for example, Gould wrote of the fossil record that it “is a faithful 
rendering of what [modern speciation] theory predicts, not a pitiful vestige of a once-
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bountiful tale” (Gould 1980, 184). Others utilized large datasets to avoid some of the 
problems of local stratigraphic records, in particular, their incompleteness (“generalized 
rereading”). However, neither of these approaches proved to be a panacea. The former 
simply asserted that the fossil record can be relied upon, with little by way of 
stratigraphic principles to back this up; whereas the latter worked by abstracting away 
from field context to frame statistical generalizations, thus limiting its applicability. This 
paper has traced the emergence of a different approach to the fossil record, which works 
by analyzing the structure of the record and using this knowledge to inform sampling and 
interpretive strategies. A key benefit of this approach is its ability to dissect 
incompleteness and diagnose bias in the service of more reliable interpretations of the 
fossil record, including major biological events like mass extinctions (Holland and 
Patzkowsky 1999, 2012). 
 However, the approach has an ancillary benefit as well, and this is to call into 
question the entire discourse surrounding “incompleteness” and “bias” in paleontology. 
According to stratigraphic paleobiology, there are two sets of processes that serve as 
equal partners in the construction of the fossil record. On the one hand are biological 
processes including speciation, extinction, migration and community assembly. On the 
other are stratigraphic processes like sedimentation, erosion and condensation. The task 
of stratigraphic paleontology is to analyze how these sets of processes interact to produce 
the fossil record; it is not to understand how a “once-bountiful tale” is reduced to “a 
pitiful vestige” through stratigraphic filtering. The structure of the fossil record can then 
be regarded as a guide to sampling and analysis, not as the professional bugbear that it 
has too-long been (Holland 2017). 
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 It is too early to know whether talk of the structure of the fossil record will 
replace talk of incompleteness and bias. However, if it does, it will be for reasons that the 
leaders of the Paleobiological Revolution would have appreciated. As Holland (2017) 
observes, “When we…write yet another paper about bias in the fossil record, that is what 
our colleagues hear. When they hear this repeatedly, they conclude that the fossil record 
is not worth bothering with” (1316). Gould had much the same worry. In his “Task for 
Paleobiology,” he chastises his colleagues for their “brutal pessimism” about the fossil 
record, not least because it implies a subordinate role for paleontology among the 
evolutionary sciences (Gould 1995, 1). Yet Gould had few arguments for why the fossil 
record could be trusted, beyond the suggestion that patterns in the fossil record seem to 
match certain expectations from evolutionary theory. Sequence stratigraphy places 
paleobiologists in a stronger position: by disclosing how the fossil record is physically 
assembled, it enables them to see the fossil record for what it is. And what it is is an 
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Appendix to Chapter 5: 
 









Accommodation (or “accommodation space”):  The vertical envelope between the sea 
surface and the basement of rocks beneath the sedimentary pile. Represents the space 
available for sedimentary accumulation. 
Bedding plane:  A surface that separates one layer of stratified rock from the preceding 
one. 
Biostratigraphy:  The branch of stratigraphy concerned with fossils and their use in 
dating and correlating strata. 
Chronostratigraphy:  The branch of stratigraphy concerned with the time-relations of 
strata, in particular, their relative time relations. (The branch of geology concerned with 
the absolute ages of strata and their contents is termed  “geochronology.”) 
Chronostratigraphically significant surface: A surface at which all overlying rocks are 
younger than all underlying rocks. If a surface is chronostratigraphically significant, it 
can be used as a temporal marker in local correlation. 
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Correlation:  The activity of establishing a correspondence between strata, usually on the 
basis of their age (“temporal correlation”). 
Craton:  A large and ancient block of the earth’s crust that comprises the nucleus of a 
continent. 
Depositional basin: A region of the earth’s surface where long-term subsidence creates 
accommodation space for the accumulation of sediments. 
Depositional sequence:  A relatively conformable (i.e., containing no major 
unconformities), genetically-related package of strata bounded by unconformities and 
their correlative conformities. 
Diachronism:  The phenomenon in which a sedimentary deposit or other geological unit 
varies in age with the place it was deposited. 
Eustasy (or “eustatic sea-level change”):  Global sea-level, which changes in response to 
the amount of water in the oceans and the volume of ocean basins. 
Event stratigraphy:  The stratigraphic study of short-lived events (on the scale of seconds 
to thousands of years). 
Facies:  A sedimentary deposit with a distinct set of physical, chemical and biological 
features, which permit its environment of origin to be inferred. From the Latin faciēs 
meaning “face” or “external appearance.” 
Facies analysis:  The activity that aims to identify aims to different environments in 
ancient rocks, and also to understand the range of processes that can operate within these 
environments. 
First appearance datum (FAD):  The first appearance of a fossil taxon at a location. 
Flooding surface:  A surface separating younger from older strata, across which there is 
evidence for an abrupt increase in water depth. 
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Highstand systems tract (HST):  The third systems tract in a depositional sequence, 
characterized by “aggradational” (neither landward nor seaward) to seaward stacking 
patterns, and overlain by the sequence boundary.1 
Last appearance datum (LAD):  The last appearance of a fossil taxon at a location. 
Lithostratigraphy:  The branch of stratigraphy concerned with the lithological (i.e., 
physical, as opposed to biological) features of strata. 
Lowstand systems tract (LST):  The first and lowest systems tract in a depositional 
sequence, characterized by seaward to aggradational (neither seaward nor landward) 
stacking, and overlain by the TST. 
Maximum flooding surface:  A flooding surface separating the underlying TST from the 
overlying HST. This surface represents the great water depth in a sequence and marks the 
turnaround from landward to seaward stacking. 
Outcrop:  A visible exposure of rock at the surface of the earth. 
Parasequence:  A relatively conformable (i.e., containing no major unconformities), 
genetically-related succession of strata bounded by flooding surfaces and their correlative 
surfaces. Internally, parasequences commonly display shallowing upward successions of 
facies (meaning that within a parasequence, shallow water facies lay atop deeper water 
facies). They are a major building block of depositional sequences. 
Reflection seismology:  A type of geophysical imaging technique used to image the 
subsurface part of the earth and to understand its geological features. 
Sedimentary basin (see “Depositional basin”) 
Sedimentology:  The study of sedimentary rocks and the processes by which they are 
formed. 
 
1 This is an out-of-date definition of the HST, although for historical reasons it is the one 
employed in Chapter 5. In current practice, the HST is overlain by a fourth systems tract 




Seismology (see “Reflection seismology”) 
Sequence (see “Depositional sequence”) 
Sequence boundary:  A surface that forms in response to relative falls in sea-level, and 
which often corresponds to a subaerial (i.e., formed in open air) unconformity. 
Sequence stratigraphy:  “The study of repetitive cycles of [sediment] accumulation 
followed by [gaps], at various time scales” (Miall 2015, 295), or “The study of 
genetically related facies within a framework of chronostratigraphically related surfaces” 
(Patzkowsky and Holland 2012, 220). 
Stratigraphic paleobiology:  “[The] intersection of sequence and event stratigraphy with 
paleobiology” (Patzkowsky and Holland 2012, 3). 
Stratum:  A rock layer or series of rock layers. 
Systems tract:  A set of contemporaneous depositional systems (packages of strata), 
defined by their positions within depositional sequences and by the stacking pattern of 
their constituent parasequences. 
Unconformity:  A surface of contact between two layers of unconformable (i.e., non-
continuous) strata. Represents missing time in a stratigraphic succession, that is, a gap. 
Tectonism:  The deformation of the outer layer of the planet, which raises and lowers the 
earth’s crust (corresponding to the phenomena of “uplift” and “subsidence”). 
Transgressive surface:  A marine flooding surface separating the underlying LST from 
the overlying TST. Marks the point in a depositional sequence when seaward stacking is 
replaced by landward stacking. 
Transgressive systems tract (TST):  The second systems tract in a depositional sequence, 
characterized by the landward stacking of parasequences and overlain by the HST. 
Zone:  A stratigraphic interval characterized by the occurrence of a particular fossil 
assemblage, and usually named for a single, characteristic fossil taxon. 
